11th Circuit discusses THUG MANSION

Per Judge Carnes:

This appeal stems from a violent drug conspiracy in South Florida that involved a number of criminals, most of whom have aliases or nicknames. The four whose joint trial led to this appeal were Daniel “D.V.” Varela, Liana “The Negra” Lopez, Ricardo “Rick” Sanchez, and Daniel “Homer” Troya. Showing a keen appreciation for their own character, they referred to the townhouse where they lived as the “Thug Mansion.” During their crime wave two of the self-styled thugs, Troya and Sanchez, carjacked a fellow drug dealer and shot him to death. What would have been unfortunate became triply tragic when they also gunned down the drug dealer’s wife and their two children, ages three and four. Troya and Sanchez left all four bodies on the side of the road.

The ensuing police investigation led to the Thug Mansion, which was located in a gated residential community. Officers executed a search warrant there and found evidence of the murder and the on-going drug conspiracy. An indictment and two superseding indictments followed, and then a trial at which the four defendants were convicted on all counts. Lopez and Varela, who brought this appeal, raise several issues, the primary one being that they should not have been jointly tried with Troya and Sanchez, who committed the murders. (Sanchez and Troya were convicted of those murders and sentenced to death, and they have filed appeals that are proceeding separately from this one.)

Who wants to guess how this one came out?

Here's Tupac discussing "Thugz Mansion" (NSFW):

Which one doesn't belong?

The Federalist Society is having a panel looking back at the last ten years after September 11, 2001. On the panel: Wilfredo Ferrer, Jeff Sloman, Alex Acosta, Marcos Jimenez, Guy Lewis and Michael Caruso.

Back to work

Thanks to Rick for his excellent blogging, as usual.

A few items to start the week:

1. Enjoy the last week before school starts on the 22nd. Then back to parking-lot traffic. Ugh. (btw, shouldn't school start after Labor Day?)

2. In case you didn't see it, the Eleventh Circuit held 2-1 that President Obama's healthcare legislation was unconstitutional. Judges Dubina and Hull wrote a "joint opinion" and Judge Marcus dissented. Let's see what the Supremes do.

3. Florida state judges are saying (via Miami Herald) that they aren't bound by a federal judge's decision that the Florida drug statute is unconstitutional. I'm hearing that the same thing is occurring with Judge Martinez's order on the Florida death penalty -- state judges are saying that they aren't bound by the decision. But aren't they under the Supremacy Clause? Isn't this what federal habaes is all about? If state judges can just respond -- well, that's nice, but we'll decide what our state law says -- then why have habeas at all?

Summer speaking

Lots of Supreme Court Justices speaking this summer in really nice places. The latest are Justices Roberts and Kagan.

Justice Roberts has a rule about not speaking while on vacation, but he broke it and spoke in Maine:

"When judges or justices speak in court, there's a good chance we will disappoint half of the people who appear before us. When we speak in public, we have a good chance of disappointing everyone," Roberts said. "Despite that clear and present danger, I was happy to accept your kind invitation to visit this afternoon."

***

Roberts said that while he appreciates the efficiency of the information age, he worries that modern methods of legal research could make it easier to confuse the collection of information with the acquisition of knowledge.

"I hope that the generations that follow will get a chance to experience learning in the enriching environment of a real library and not just a virtual one – a library where you feel connected to knowledge in a very tangible way and also connected to those working alongside you in a similar pursuit for knowledge," he said, "even if they're representing an adversary or even if they're working for a judge who will decide your case."


And Justice Kagan spoke in Aspen:

“I think this comes as a surprise to many people when I talk about my experiences on the court, and to me as well,” Kagan said during a conversation in the Greenwald Pavilion at the Aspen Institute. “You know you read the court's decisions, and often there's some pretty sharp give-and-take: people accusing other justices on the other side [of the issue] of a wide variety of terrible conduct.”

“The truth is, it is an incredibly collegial and warm institution, with good friendships throughout the court and across whatever people think of as ideological divides, and that was the nicest feature of joining the court, was feeling that,” she said. “And how well and respectfully the members of the institution operate together.”

BREAKING -- Kathy Williams confirmed! Yes!

Wow, lots of great news today in the District. First, as discussed below, Judge Adalberto Jordan was nominated to fill Judge Susan Black's seat on the 11th Circuit. So we're losing one great judge, but we gain another -- the Senate just unanimously confirmed Kathy Williams to sit on the Southern District of Florida (Judge Hurley's seat).

I'm so happy for Kathy. It took wayyy too long, but that's a story that's been written about quite a bit and today is not the day to rehash it. Today is the the day to celebrate for Kathy. And yes, I'm biased -- I used to work for her at the Federal Public Defender's office, where she is known and respected around the country as running the model FPD office.

She's going to be a fantastic judge -- smart, hardworking, and compassionate. What else do you want from a federal judge?

The picture is Kathy from her confirmation hearings.

Congrats to Judge Adalberto Jordan!

President Obama nominated him today to sit on the 11th Circuit. He will be terrific on the court of appeals but will be sorely missed on the district court where he was known for his smarts, his patience, for treating everyone with respect and for calling 'em right down the middle.

Here's the press release from the White House:
President Obama Nominates Judge Adalberto José Jordán to the United States Court of Appeals

WASHINGTON, DC – Today, President Obama nominated Judge Adalberto José Jordán to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

“Judge Adalberto José Jordán will bring an unwavering commitment to fairness and judicial integrity to the federal bench,” President Obama said. “His impressive legal career is a testament to the kind of thoughtful and diligent judge he will be on the Eleventh Circuit. I am honored to nominate him today.”

Judge Adalberto José Jordán: Nominee for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Judge Adalberto José Jordán has served as a District Judge on the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami since 1999. He also teaches as an adjunct professor of law at University of Miami School of Law, where he has taught since 1990, and Florida International University College of Law, where he has taught since 2007. Judge Jordán was born in Havana, Cuba, and immigrated to the United States with his parents at the age of six. He received his B.A. magna cum laude from the University of Miami in 1984, and his J.D. summa cum laude from University of Miami School of Law in 1987. After graduating from law school, he served as a law clerk to the Honorable Thomas A. Clark of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit from 1987 to 1988, and the following year he served as a law clerk to the Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor of the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1989, Judge Jordán joined the Miami law firm of Steel Hector & Davis LLP (now Squire Sanders & Dempsey) as a litigation associate, eventually specializing in appellate practice and becoming a partner in 1994. Later that year, he joined the United States Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of Florida, serving as an Assistant United States Attorney in the appellate division and handling criminal and civil appeals on behalf of the government. Judge Jordán became appellate division chief in the office in 1998, and also served as special counsel to the United States Attorney for legal policy. Since being appointed to the District Court bench in 1999, Judge Jordán has presided over nearly 200 trials on a wide range of civil and criminal matters. In addition, he has frequently sat by designation on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

August in Miami

It's boiling outside and there's a hurricane that may slide by us this weekend, but at least there's no traffic.

Now that the debt deal is about done, the Senate has the rest of the week before the August recess to get Kathy Williams and Bob Scola confirmed. Let's see what happens.

Big reversal in the Second Circuit yesterday in US v. Ferguson. The AP summarizes the case this way:

Former executives of American International Group Inc. and General Re Corp. who were convicted in a $500 million fraud case deserve a new trial, because the judge at their 2008 trial wrongly admitted stock-price data into evidence and gave improper jury instructions, a federal appeals court ruled Monday.

The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals threw out the fraud convictions for the five officials and sent the case back to U.S. District Court in Hartford.

Prosecutors had accused the executives of participating in a scheme in which New York-based AIG secretly paid Stamford-based Gen Re to take out reinsurance policies with AIG in 2000 and 2001 to boost AIG's falling stock price. Reinsurance policies are backups purchased by insurance companies to completely or partly insure risk they have assumed for their customers.

Ronald E. Ferguson, Elizabeth A. Monrad, Robert D. Graham and Christopher P. Garand, all former executive officers of Gen Re, and Christian M. Milton, AIG's vice president of reinsurance, were sentenced to prison in 2009 for their involvement in the scheme, which authorities estimate cost AIG shareholders more than $500 million.

Testimony from two cooperating witnesses associated with Gen Re helped convict the five executives of conspiracy, mail fraud, securities fraud and false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission. They received sentences ranging from one to four years in jail, but remain free on bail pending the outcome of the appeal.

***

[Chief Judge Jacobs] said the verdicts had to be vacated because of how U.S. District Judge Christopher Droney handled stock-price evidence and because Droney gave jury instruction that influenced the verdict.

The lower court was inconsistent in its rulings on displaying stock-price charts, Jacobs said. One chart showing the full decline in stock price was excluded as overly prejudicial, but it was "functionally identical" to another chart shown during prosecutors' opening statement, he said.

"The court's solution, to allow only isolated ranges of stock-price data, did not mitigate the prejudice," Jacobs wrote. "Instead of a downward line, there were three dropping sets of dots; it is inevitable that jurors would connect them."

In instructing the jury, the trial judge erred by offering an ambiguous standard of conviction that allowed the jury to convict without determining what caused the fraud, Jacobs wrote.

Oh, and Rumpole is finally back from his vacation.

Justice Ginsburg is funny!

Here's a recent speech she gave to the Otsego County Bar Association, which I found to be a great read (One example: “I am now delighted to report that not once this term has an advocate called me Justice Sotomayor or Justice Kagan, and the same holds true for my junior colleagues.")

JoshBlackman.com summarized some of the questions Justice Ginsburg reviewed from this Term (Ginsburg: “From the foregoing samples, you may better understand why the court does not plan to permit televising oral arguments any time soon.”):

• “What [did] James Madison th[ink] about video games?” --Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.

• “What do you think about Satan?” -- Justice Antonin Scalia in Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano.

• “Does al-Qaida know all this stuff?” --Justice Antonin Scalia in NASA v. Nelson. (after a lawyer for the employees said they worked in a “campus atmosphere” and they posed little or no security risk).

• “Where is the 9,000-foot cow?” --Justice Stephen G. Breyer in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, involving Breyer’s hypothetical involving a Swiss law only allowing the purchase of milk from cattle grazing in pastures higher than 9,000 feet.

Bob Barr and I agree!

Here's an op-ed he just wrote on the over-criminalization problem in America. From the piece:

[F]ailure to address the overcriminalization of America is turning us into a society in which the average citizen is at the mercy of the federal government for fear of running afoul of some criminal law or regulation on any given day, despite having no intention whatsover of doing so.

The explosive growth in the number of federal crimes in recent decades has been nothing short of phenomenal. Three crimes — three — were considered of sufficient importance and of a unique federal nature, to be included specifically in the Constitution. Those three uniquely federal crimes are treason, piracy and counterfeiting. Over the decades, of course, other crimes were added, usually pegged to the infamous “commerce clause.” By 1980, the federal criminal code had mushroomed to about 3,000 separate criminal offenses. What has happened since 1980, however, has been nothing short of phenomenal — the list of federal criminal offenses has exploded to nearly 4,500 offenses; as noted most recently by Gary Fields and John Emshwiller in the Wall Street Journal. This figure does not even include the many more thousands of federal regulations that can be enforced by the government as criminal offenses.

***

The list of such unfair and outrageous instances of abusive federal prosecutions is depressingly long; with many the result of the explosive growth of “environmental crimes” since the birth of the EPA four decades ago. Yet Congress after Congress continues to add crime after crime to the burgeoning federal criminal code, based often on pressure from interest groups and federal agencies themselves.

Finalists for U.S. Marshal

They are: James S. Higgins, Eben Morales and Amos Rojas Jr..

Many of you will remember Jaime Higgins, who is an ATF agent, currently on assignment in Vancouver, Canada. His wife is Celeste Higgins, a former AFPD in Miami.

Florida drug laws ruled unconstitutional

Today Judge Mary Scriven from the Middle District granted a writ of habeas corpus and declared Florida’s drug law unconstitutional. The case is Shelton v. Dept. of Corrections. NACDL filed this amicus brief . Here's the intro to the order:

On May 13, 2002, the Florida Legislature enacted changes to Florida’s Drug Abuse Prevention and Control law, FLA. STAT. § 893.13, as amended by FLA. STAT. § 893.101. By this enactment, Florida became the only state in the nation expressly to eliminate mens rea as an element of a drug offense. This case, challenging the constitutionality of that law, was filed following Plaintiff’s conviction for delivery of cocaine without the jury being required to consider his intent in any respect and the subsequent imposition of an eighteen year sentence following his conviction. Upon consideration of all relevant filings, case law, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s request for habeas relief (Dkt. 1), and finds that FLA. STAT. § 893.13 is unconstitutional on its face.

Full disclosure: I was one of the co-signors of the amicus brief for NACDL, authored by Todd Foster.

BREAKING -- JNC sends 4 names to Senators

Your next federal judge will be one of these four people:

Jerald Bagley
John O'Sullivan
Robin Rosenbaum
John Thornton

Two State Circuit judges and two Federal Magistrates. I'm picturing a cage match -- Bagley and Thornton vs. O'Sullivan and Rosenbaum. Who wins that one?

Update-- happy to report that Judge Moreno's letters were cited yesterday in the Senate. Hopefully they will have some impact. Here's the link: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-07-25/pdf/CREC-2011-07-25-pt1-PgS4860.pdf#page=1

HT: SFL

"Characterizing a government as a pimp is far from advocating violence."

That was Irfan Khan's lawyer Sowmya Bharathi, challenging the strength of the evidence against her client who is accused of helping to finance part of the Pakistani Taliban terror group. Love the quote! Plus it gave me some inspiration for the morning:



More on the case from Curt Anderson's article:

The son of a Muslim cleric in South Florida was a key part of his father's alleged finance network for the Pakistani Taliban terror group and shared the older man's support for violent attacks, an FBI agent testified Tuesday.
Agent Michael Ferlazzo said at a bail hearing that 37-year-old Irfan Khan appears to advocate violence repeatedly on some of the more than 1,000 phone calls the FBI recorded between him and his father, brother and other alleged conspirators.

On one call, Ferlazzo said, Irfan Khan referred to Pakistan's government as “big pimps.”

“They're talking about violent opposition to the government,” Ferlazzo said. On another call, the agent said, Irfan Khan seemed pleased that people feared the Pakistani Taliban “because of how lethal they had become.”
***
But Irfan Khan's attorney, Sowmaya Bharathi, said most of his comments could be chalked up to passionate political talk about Pakistan's government and its troubles, not evidence of support for terrorism.

“There is absolutely nothing wrong with people exchanging information about horrible events in a part of the world they have a connection to,” Bharathi said. “Characterizing a government as a pimp is far from advocating violence.”

She said nearly two dozen people, including members of Irfan Khan's cricket team, were willing to put up cash and property to secure his release on bail. She noted that he has a wife and two young children in Florida and would be able to get a job driving a taxi if released.

“He is going to stay here and fight the charges,” Bharathi said.
Jordan has not said when he will rule on bail for Izhar Khan, who is imam at a mosque in suburban Margate. Hafiz Khan is imam at Miami's oldest mosque.

Chief Judge starts letter writing campaign for Kathy Williams and Bob Scola

Congrats to Bob Scola, who received a unanimous voice vote today getting out of the judiciary committee.

Now, Chief Judge Moreno has written letters to Senator Mitch McConnell and Senator Harry Reid urging confirmation by the full Senate of Kathy Williams and Bob Scola before the August recess. The intro from the letters:

As Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, I urge you to expedite the Senate's confirmation of Kathleen Williams and Robert Scola to the positions of district judges in our district. I understand that the Judiciary Committee has sent both nominations by unanimous voice vote and is awaiting a vote by the full Senate. Ms. Williams, our district's Federal Public Defender, has been awaiting confirmation for the longest period of any present nominee to the district court in the entire country. State Judge Robert Scola's nomination is of a more recent vintage but the litigants are eagerly awaiting his confirmation.

The judgeship Ms. Williams has been nominated to fill has been vacant for two years! At the present time, our district has three vacancies. Unfilled positions in our Court present an undue hardship on the citizens residing in the Southern District of Florida, particularly those with cases pending in the affected division of the Court. Our district is huge and heavily populated. It includes the most populous counties in Florida, Miami-Dade, Broward (where Fort Lauderdale is located) and Palm Beach Counties. The district also includes Monroe, St. Lucie, Highlands, Okeechobee, Martin, and Indian River Counties.

Now it's our turn. Please follow Judge Moreno's lead and send letters now to get Williams and Scola confirmed.

Why is Lanny A. Breuer attacking the defense bar?

Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division spoke at the National District Attorneys Association Summer Conference in Sun Valley, Idaho today and said the following:

Before I conclude my remarks this morning, and I hope there will be plenty of time left for questions, I want to discuss one other issue with you, on which we are all focused: our ethical obligations as prosecutors.

As I and others have detailed elsewhere, the Justice Department has taken a series of far-reaching steps in the past two years to ensure that all federal prosecutors consistently meet their disclosure obligations. These measures – such as providing guidance to federal prosecutors on gathering and reviewing discoverable information and making timely disclosure to defendants, or instituting a requirement that all federal prosecutors take annual discovery training – are important steps forward. And I think it’s fair to say that, as a Department, we are in a better place today than we were two-and-a-half years ago. And I suspect that is true for many DA’s offices across the country as well.

Certain defense lawyers nevertheless continue to want to try and turn honest mistakes into instances of misconduct. This kind of gamesmanship is unfortunate. The steps we have taken go further than what the Supreme Court requires. And they go well beyond what any prior Administration has done. That’s a fact. Do we need to remain vigilant? Absolutely. At the same time, together, we cannot – and I know we will not – shy away from taking hard cases, or otherwise shrink from our obligation to investigate and prosecute criminal activity without fear or favor, because of the possibility that an opportunistic defense lawyer will try and make hay out of an honest mistake.

As prosecutors, we occupy a unique role in the criminal justice system. Our job is not just to win cases, but also to do justice in every case. I think prosecutors are more aware of their ethical obligations today than they may ever have been – and, as far as I’m concerned, that’s a good thing.

How strange, no?

Was this a message to the judge in the Roger Clemens case that he should find that the prosecutors simply made an honest mistake? If you were Roger Clemens, wouldn't you want your lawyer to pursue the issue and fight for no retrial? To bar a retrial, part of what the defense must show is that the behavior of the prosecutors was intentional. Clemens' lawyer would be committing malpractice not to argue that it was intentional after the prosecutors disregarded the judge's order by playing the tape and then leaving the image on the screen during the sidebar. Don't prosecutors argue that defendants have acted in bad faith all of time based on far less circumstantial evidence?

In any event, I challenge Mr. Breuer to a debate on the subject of prosecutorial and defense ethics. Just for starters, I would ask Mr. Breuer why DOJ is opposing a change to Rule 16 (as suggested by the ABA and on July 7, by NACDL) requiring what their guidelines merely suggest.

I have written an op-ed on this subject, as have others.

I do like the part where he says prosecutors must seek justice, not a win. Here's part of what I wrote about that (back in May) in connection with the government's discovery obligations:

The AG reminded prosecutors that they were tasked with doing justice, not winning. Ethical standards established by most state bar rules also require disclosure, even if the evidence is not “material.”

All of this sounded very promising, but actions speak louder than words.

Prosecutors continue to keep their files closed, telling lawyers and judges that they need not disclose basic items such as interview reports of witnesses, even when those witnesses lie under oath, because their boss’s guidelines and state ethical rules are not the law and therefore are not binding on them.

Because of these recurring problems, on April 22, 2011, in Miami, the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section passed a resolution “urging” a change in the federal rules to require prosecutors to timely disclose all favorable information to the defense.

Only the Department of Justice member of the section voted against the resolution, arguing that individual prosecutors could be trusted without such a rule. Many judges, including Paul Friedman in Washington, D.C., have explained why the “trust us” argument is flawed: “Most prosecutors are neither neutral (nor should they be) nor prescient, and any such judgment necessarily is speculative on … many matters that simply are unknown and unknowable before trial begins.”

Based on these guidelines and cases, a simple — and what should have been uncontroversial — change was suggested to the federal criminal rules: prosecutors would be required to turn over all favorable information to the defense, not just “material” evidence.

Despite the ABA’s resolution, the Department of Justice just convinced the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee (the group that recommends changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) to vote down (on a 6-5 vote) this proposed rule change.

Perhaps the Department of Justice would like to amend the plaque found in federal courtrooms that reads: “We who labor here seek the truth” with the addition, “only if we think it is material.”

This just makes my blood boil

I guess it shouldn't anymore because I really believe that Brady/Giglio violations happen in just about every trial where there isn't open-file discovery. The latest is a pretty shocking violation in the Casey Anthony case, which (I believe) would have resulted in a new trial had she been convicted. From the NY Times:

Assertions by the prosecution that Casey Anthony conducted extensive computer searches on the word “chloroform” were based on inaccurate data, a software designer who testified at the trial said Monday.

The designer, John Bradley, said Ms. Anthony had visited what the prosecution said was a crucial Web site only once, not 84 times, as prosecutors had asserted. He came to that conclusion after redesigning his software, and immediately alerted prosecutors and the police about the mistake, he said.

The finding of 84 visits was used repeatedly during the trial to suggest that Ms. Anthony had planned to murder her 2-year-old daughter, Caylee, who was found dead in 2008. Ms. Anthony, who could have faced the death penalty, was acquitted of the killing on July 5.

According to Mr. Bradley, chief software developer of CacheBack, used by the police to verify the computer searches, the term “chloroform” was searched once through Google. The Google search then led to a Web site, sci-spot.com, that was visited only once, Mr. Bradley added. The Web site offered information on the use of chloroform in the 1800s.

***

“I gave the police everything they needed to present a new report,” Mr. Bradley said. “I did the work myself and copied out the entire database in a spreadsheet to make sure there was no issue of accessibility to the data.”

Mr. Bradley, chief executive of Siquest, a Canadian company, said he even volunteered to fly to Orlando at his own expense to show them the findings.

Cheney Mason, one of Ms. Anthony’s defense lawyers, said it was “outrageous” that prosecutors withheld critical information on the “chloroform” searches.

“The prosecution is absolutely obligated to bring forth to the court any and all evidence that could be exculpatory,” Mr. Mason said. “If in fact this is true, and the prosecution concealed this new information, it is more than shame on them. It is outrageous.”

“This was a major part of their case,” Mr. Mason added.

In big trial after big trial there continues to be Brady violations. Imagine what happens on a daily basis in state and federal court where there isn't a great deal of scrutiny over what prosecutors do. There really needs to be open-file discovery and more needs to be done when prosecutors do not comply with their constitutional obligations.

Federal Judge interviews in one week

Below is the schedule for next Monday. Any volunteers for a guest blogger to cover the interviews?

Jerald Bagley, 9am
William Thomas, 9:30
Beatrice Butchko, 10
Peter Lopez, 10:30
Robert Levenson, 11
Barry Seltzer, 11:30
John Thornton, Jr. 1pm
Caroline Heck Miller, 1:30
Robin Rosenbaum, 2
Marina Garcia Wood, 2:30
John J. O’Sullivan 3pm

Too many lawyers, not enough judges

The NY Times has the story about the lawyers. The intro:

The basic rules of a market economy — even golden oldies, like a link between supply and demand — just don’t apply.

Legal diplomas have such allure that law schools have been able to jack up tuition four times faster than the soaring cost of college. And many law schools have added students to their incoming classes — a step that, for them, means almost pure profits — even during the worst recession in the legal profession’s history.

It is one of the academy’s open secrets: law schools toss off so much cash they are sometimes required to hand over as much as 30 percent of their revenue to universities, to subsidize less profitable fields.

In short, law schools have the power to raise prices and expand in ways that would make any company drool. And when a business has that power, it is apparently difficult to resist.

And BLT has the story about Obama's judicial appointment team. What's wrong with the administration on this?

The article is part of a 42-page package on “Obama’s Judiciary at Midterm,” by political scientists Sheldon Goldman of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Elliot Slotnick of Ohio State University and Sara Schiavoni of John Carroll University. (Click here for the Web site of Judicature, which is subscription-only and published by the American Judicature Society.)

The political scientists write that the White House shut out them, too, as they tried to put together the package. Their work is the latest in a long-running series.

“Tellingly, no one from the White House Counsel’s Office was able or willing to meet with us — the first time in our over 30 years of conducting our research on judicial selection that we have not had cooperation from that office,” the researchers write.

They add: “While the perspective from the White House Counsel’s Office would have been welcome, we believe that our other sources have enabled us to provide an accurate portrait of the successes and failures of the president’s judicial selection team. Other sources included interest group participants from groups along the ideological continuum.”

But too many lawyers and lack of federal judges seems like the same ol' stories again and again, no?

To me, the more interesting story is the Clemens trial and what's going to happen now that there was a mistrial. Here's Maureen Dowd's piece from the weekend:

But the trial had barely begun when those lawyers made what Tom Boswell, the Washington Post sports sage, called “the most shocking, inexplicable error in modern baseball history.” An error, Boswell said, that would cause the sports world and the legal community to “oscillate between pity and ridicule, incredulity and laughter, for years.”

With a high, close pitch at the government team, the judge declared a mistrial. “I think that a first-year law student would know you can’t bolster the credibility of one witness with clearly inadmissible evidence,” he said angrily.

Before the testimony started, Walton had said that an affidavit from Laura Pettitte was inadmissible. She had stated that her husband, Andy, who was Clemens’s teammate, told her that his pal had confided that he used human growth hormone. It was hearsay.

But on day two, the prosecutors played some video of the Capitol Hill hearing in which a congressman talked to Clemens about how compelling Laura Pettitte’s affidavit was. They even left her testimony on the monitors in the jury box while they gathered at the judge’s bench. It was such a chuckleheaded move that no one was sure whether the prosecutors had forgotten the judge’s ruling or were trying to sneak the testimony through a back door. Either way, it was another great day for defense lawyers and their clients who have already been convicted in the public eye.

“Government counsel doesn’t do just what government counsel can get away with doing,” the judge said sternly. “I’m very troubled by this. A lot of government money has been used to reach this point.” He added, “I don’t see how I can unring the bell.”

Should we be going bench more often?

The stats certainly say yes -- there are more federal bench acquittals than jury acquittals on a percentage basis. But the conventional wisdom is to go jury...

In any event, yesterday, Judge Moore said not guilty as the finder of fact in a visa fraud case. AFPDs Vanessa Chen and Helaine Batoff decided to go bench before Judge Moore and after he denied the Rule 29, he said that as the finder of fact he found the defendant not guilty.

“Government counsel doesn’t do just what government counsel can get away with doing …I’m very troubled by this."

Ouch. That was Judge Reggie Walton declaring a mistrial in the Roger Clemens case:

Judge Reggie B. Walton declared a mistrial in the Roger Clemens perjury trial today.

"He's entitled to a fair trial," said Walton. "He now cannot get it."

Lead defense attorney Rusty Hardin had asked for a mistrial because the prosecution revealed a statement to the jury that violated a pre-trial order. The prosecution also violated pre-trial orders when Assistant U.S. attorney Steven Durham talked about the Yankees' drug use during his opening statement.

Walton scheduled a Sept. 2 hearing to determine whether to hold a new trial for the former baseball star who pitched for four teams, including the Red Sox, during his 24-year career. Walton told jurors he was sorry to have wasted their time and spent so much taxpayer money, only to call off the case.

"There are rules that we play by and those rules are designed to make sure both sides receive a fair trial," Walton told the jury, saying such ground rules are critically important when a person's liberty is at stake.

He said that because prosecutors broke his rules, "the ability with Mr. Clemens with this jury to get a fair trial with this jury would be very difficult if not impossible."

In angry comments directed toward the prosecution, Walton said, “Government counsel doesn’t do just what government counsel can get away with doing …I’m very troubled by this. A lot of government money has been used to reach this point. The government should have been more cautious. I don’t see how I can un-ring the bell.”

By that, Walton meant that he could not figure out how the jury’s exposure to statements by Laura Pettitte, wife of former Yankees pitcher Andy Pettitte, can be erased from their memory so it does not later influence decision-making. Laura Pettitte is someone designed to bolster the credibility of her husband, a former teammate of Clemens who was expected to be a key witness in the trial. Under dispute in the case is whether Clemens mentioned using human growth hormone to Andy Pettitte.

Blog makes news

Pretty cool -- Alyson Palmer of the Daily Report in Georgia wrote a nice story about the Rojas opinion disappearing and reappearing on the 11th Circuit website and our coverage of it:


The case of the missing opinion has been solved.
Court watchers had been scratching their heads after a June 24 sentencing opinion by a panel of the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals vanished from the court's website. Lawyers interested in reading the decision had to go to other sources, such as the Federal Public Defender's Office in Miami or a Miami lawyer's blog.
On Wednesday, more than one week after the Miami blogger noted on June 28 the opinion's disappearance, the decision reappeared on the court's site with the original June 24 date. A few hours later, a revised opinion was issued, mandating the same pro-defendant result and bearing the explanation that the panel had modified the opinion to reflect recent case law developments in other circuits.
According to Clerk of Court John Ley, the original opinion was withdrawn at the request of the judge who wrote it. (The unanimous three-judge panel was composed of Judges Charles R. Wilson and Beverly B. Martin and Senior Judge R. Lanier Anderson, but the opinion was unsigned.) "It happens every now and then," said Ley, "but then they reissued it once they reviewed their citations."
***
Within days of the opinion's issuance, however, it disappeared from the court's website. Noting the federal public defender's office was fielding requests for copies of the opinion, a University of Miami law professor, Ricardo J. Bascuas, posted the ruling on the blog of Miami attorney David O. Markus.
Lawyers at the federal public defender office that's handling the matter couldn't be reached to discuss what they were thinking when their case appeared in limbo, and federal prosecutors in Miami declined to comment. But others were talking.
"When a decision like that just disappears and there's no explanation and no reason given, it just makes the court look weird—I don't know the right word for it," Bascuas said in an interview Wednesday shortly before the opinion resurfaced on the court's site.
An anonymous comment on Markus' blog mused that perhaps the court was concerned that the upcoming vote by the federal sentencing commission on whether to make changes to the crack sentencing guidelines retroactive, scheduled for June 30, could moot the case. But the commission's decision to extend its guidelines changes even to those who were sentenced years ago didn't, and couldn't, change the mandatory minimums at issue in Rojas' case; the guideline changes would help the many inmates whose crimes involved drug quantities that placed their sentences beyond (often far beyond) the statutory minimums.

"If American goes to World War III, I'll be in the front line. This is a great country."

That was Navy officer Elisha Leo Dawkins today after accepting pretrial diversion before Judge Altonaga. Gotta love that quote. Can't imagine a jury would convict a guy like that, but it's almost impossible to turn down diversion. From the Miami Herald:

In a surprise, his court-appointed lawyer Clark Mervis notified Judge Cecilia Altonaga that they had accepted the offer late Monday. Details were still secret Tuesday but his attorney said it did not address the issue of Dawkins’ citizenship. Separately, the U.S. immigration agency has agreed not to detain him on a 1992 removal order.

Experts have said such pre-trial probation packages typically involve rehabilitation, pledges to stay out of trouble and to undertake community service.

Altonaga agreed to abort the trial and send him to the program, provided Dawkins pay $1,600 in jury fees -- $40 to each citizen in a pool of 40 jury candidates assembled Tuesday morning, plus parking and transportation fees.

The debt became part of his probationary agreement.

In court, prosecutor Michael O’Leary said the sailor had a change of heart after hearing the case laid out in trial preparation on Monday. Federal prosecutors had made the offer, said O’Leary, because “his military service did mitigate” any alleged crime.

Outside court, Dawkins declined on the lawyer’s advice to explain if he still believed he was a U.S. citizen.

He declared that “the next project here” is sorting out “that situation” -- but said his experience persuaded him of the need to pass The Dream Act. It lets the children of foreigners who serve in the U.S. military attain American citizenship.

The case of the man who says he grew up believing he was American, that’s why he enlisted, energized pockets of Miami and the military.

Are criminal trials about seeking the truth?

Rumpole discusses the motion that was filed in state court asking that the sign saying "We who labor here seek only the truth." (Herald article here).

Of course, that's not what criminal trials are about at all (the only question is whether the prosecutor proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt), and perhaps that is why the public is so upset about the Anthony verdict. Alan Dershowitz explains it the best in this op-ed:

A criminal trial is never about seeking justice for the victim. If it were, there could be only one verdict: guilty. That's because only one person is on trial in a criminal case, and if that one person is acquitted, then by definition there can be no justice for the victim in that trial.

A criminal trial is neither a whodunit nor a multiple choice test. It is not even a criminal investigation to determine who among various possible suspects might be responsible for a terrible tragedy. In a murder trial, the state, with all of its power, accuses an individual of being the perpetrator of a dastardly act against a victim. The state must prove that accusation by admissible evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.

Even if it is "likely" or "probable" that a defendant committed the murder, he must be acquitted, because neither likely nor probable satisfies the daunting standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, a legally proper result—acquittal in such a case—may not be the same as a morally just result. In such a case, justice has not been done to the victim, but the law has prevailed.

For thousands of years, Western society has insisted that it is better for 10 guilty defendants to go free than for one innocent defendant to be wrongly convicted. ...
***
That is why a criminal trial is not a search for truth. Scientists search for truth. Philosophers search for morality. A criminal trial searches for only one result: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

A civil trial, on the other hand, seeks justice for the victim. In such a case, the victim sues the alleged perpetrator and need only prove liability by a preponderance of the evidence. In other words, if it is more likely than not that a defendant was the killer, he is found liable, though he cannot be found guilty on that lesser standard.

That is why it was perfectly rational, though difficult for many to understand, for a civil jury to have found O.J. Simpson liable to his alleged victim, after a criminal jury had found him not guilty of his murder. It is certainly possible that if the estate of Caylee Anthony were to sue Casey Anthony civilly, a Florida jury might find liability.

Casey Anthony was not found innocent of her daughter's murder, as many commentators seem to believe. She was found "not guilty." And therein lies much of the misunderstanding about the Anthony verdict.

Jack Thompson takes on Cheney Mason

For this picture:

While we are on Mr. Mason, here's his closing from the Casey Anthony case. I note his reference to our own Milton Hirsch at the 53 second mark.

Pacenti exposes Zloch story

Well, I was hoping that this story wouldn't leak until after Kathy was confirmed, which is expected any day now.

For the life of me, I don't see how Kathy's use of a lawyer in her office could upset anyone:

When [attorney] Menendez's first year was up, all Williams had was an opening for a research and writing attorney, but she still needed lawyers in the courtroom, according to a May 12, 2010, letter of explanation to Moreno in response to Zloch's criticism. She has explained herself to Moreno, the 11th Circuit committee and the Judiciary Committee.

Moreno wrote the Judiciary Committee, saying he had been advised Zloch "has forwarded to the Senate Judiciary Committee various documents that he perceives reflect poorly" upon the nominee.

"It is not the role of a judge to opine whether a nominee should be confirmed," Moreno wrote Feb. 15. "However, since Judge Zloch's memorandum to me has been forwarded to your committee, I must respond to your inquiries."

The issue of Menendez's assignment snowballed in a six-week period last year.

Moreno said the use of a research and writing attorney in court presented no ethical problem to any other judge in the Southern District of Florida when the issue was presented at a district judicial conference May 13, 2010. Zloch was absent.

Williams obtained permission from Moreno to allow Menendez to make court appearances and sign pleadings.

Williams said she also went to U.S. District Judges James Cohn and William Dimitrouleas, two of the four district judges serving in Fort Lauderdale. Neither had a problem with Menendez's assignments, she said in the letter to Moreno.

"At this time we do not have the positions available to make him a permanent assistant public defender," she wrote Moreno in July 29, 2009, memo. "I will directly supervise him and assure that his representations are limited."

No one complained -- not the defendant who was represented by the lawyer, not the district judges (other than Zloch), not the 11th Circuit. No one.

Judge Moreno has been a mensch throughout this thing in his support of Kathy:

Moreno wrote the Judiciary Committee in Williams' defense and dismissed Zloch's concern.

"Ms. Williams is an extraordinary administrator, an ethical lawyer and a fine human being," Moreno wrote the Judiciary Committee. "I hope that your committee will likewise dispose of this 'non-issue' quickly as my court presently has three vacancies and Ms. Williams has been nominated to fill one that has been vacant for two years."

Sources say Williams is collateral damage in a long-running feud between Zloch, former chief judge, and his successor, Moreno.

Zloch has refused to attend judicial meetings since Moreno became chief judge, according to one of the letters. He also wrote an unsolicited memo in 2009 urging Moreno to step down to allow U.S. District Judge Donald Graham to become the first black chief judge in the district's history.

The Judiciary Committee had to investigate because Zloch complained, but they have rejected his claim as well. So now it's up to the full Senate. Here's hoping that Kathy gets confirmed quickly and this issue remains dead. In any event, I will let you all comment and give your thoughts about this.

Rojas is back on the 11th Circuit homepage

Very strange. Prior coverage here. And here's the opinion, which still has the June 24 date. Below is a screen shot of the 11th Circuit home page:

UPDATE: The 11th actually issued a revised opinion today with this language starting it off (the link in the initial post above and on the 11th home page is to the old June opinion):

We sua sponte modify our previous opinion in this appeal to reflect recent developments in the law of the First and Seventh Circuits. See United States v.
Fisher, 635 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Douglas, No. 10-2341,
2011 WL 2120163 (1st Cir. May 31, 2011).

The issue in this appeal is whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), applies to defendants who committed crack cocaine offenses before August 3, 2010, the date of its enactment, but who are sentenced thereafter. We conclude that it does.

Jury sends note to be read after verdict

No, not in that case...

... but in federal court before Judge William Dimitrouleas after an acquittal in which Bill Matthewman argued that the feds policy of not recording a defendant's alleged confession must be rejected. Below is the note.


VALDEZ.jury Note

Monday baby!

A couple quick items to start off your week:

1. Cameras in the federal courtroooms in the SDFLA! But only in civil cases for now. We are part of a pilot program for 14 districts. From the press release:

Electronic media coverage of criminal proceedings in federal courts has been expressly prohibited under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 since the criminal rules were adopted in 1946, and by the Judicial Conference since 1972. In 1996 the Conference rescinded its camera coverage prohibition for courts of appeals, and allowed each appellate court discretion to permit broadcasting of oral arguments. To date, two courts of appeals—the Second and the Ninth—allow such coverage.

Districts volunteering for the pilot must follow guidelines (pdf) adopted by CACM. The pilot is limited to civil proceedings in which the parties have consented to recording.

No proceedings may be recorded without the approval of the presiding judge, and parties must consent to the recording of each proceeding in a case. The recordings will be made publicly available on www.uscourts.gov and on local participating court websites at the court's discretion.

The pilot recordings will not be simulcast, but will be made available as soon as possible. The presiding judge can choose to stop a recording if it is necessary, for example, to protect the rights of the parties and witnesses, preserve the dignity of the court, or choose not to post the video for public view. Coverage of the prospective jury during voir dire is prohibited, as is coverage of jurors or alternate jurors.

Electronic media coverage of criminal proceedings in federal courts has been expressly prohibited under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 since the criminal rules were adopted in 1946, and by the Judicial Conference since 1972. In 1996 the Conference rescinded its camera coverage prohibition for courts of appeals, and allowed each appellate court discretion to permit broadcasting of oral arguments. To date, two courts of appeals—the Second and the Ninth—allow such coverage. In the early 1990s the Judicial Conference conducted a pilot program permitting electronic media coverage of civil proceeding in six district courts and two courts of appeals.

As I have previously argued on this blog, I see no good reason why cameras shouldn't be allowed in federal court. The public should see what goes on in our courthouses...

2. The NY Times reviews the Supreme Court Term that just concluded. Justice Kennedy was in the majority more than any other Justice, 94% of the time, followed by the Chief Justice, 91%. Ginsburg brought up the rear.

3. Curt Anderson covers the interesting lawsuit between NASA and former astronaut Edgar Mitchell:

NASA is suing former astronaut Edgar Mitchell to get back a camera that went to the moon on the Apollo 14 mission — a historic device Mitchell apparently tried to sell recently at an auction.

The lawsuit filed in federal court contends that the 16mm Data Acquisition Camera is NASA's property and there are no records showing it was transferred to Mitchell. NASA calls Mitchell, one of only 12 humans to walk the lunar surface, "a former NASA employee who is exercising improper dominion and control" over the camera.

"The United States has made numerous requests to defendant and defendant's counsel for return of the NASA camera to no avail," Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Macchiaroli wrote in the lawsuit filed Thursday.

"All equipment and property used during NASA operations remains the property of NASA unless explicitly released or transferred to another party," Macchiaroli added.

Mitchell, 80, has a home in the Lake Worth, just south of West Palm Beach, but a phone listing for him was disconnected. His attorney did not immediately respond to a phone message and email. A message was also left with the Institute of Noetic Sciences, which Mitchell founded in 1972 as an organization dedicated to exploring mysteries of the human mind and universe.

NASA contends in the lawsuit that it learned in March that the British auction house Bonhams was planning a "Space History Sale" that included an item labeled "movie camera from the lunar surface." Bonhams also provided a more detailed technical description and four photos of the camera.

The item, according to the auction house description, "came directly from the collection of Apollo 14 Lunar Module Pilot Edgar Mitchell." The camera was one of two that went to the moon's surface on the mission, during which Mitchell and Alan Shepard spent about nine hours collecting 95 pounds of lunar samples.

Happy Birthday to the blog!

The Southern District of Florida Blog was launched July 4th weekend 2005 with this post. Six years later, this is the 1,863 post. The blog is averaging over 500 visitors a day.

I just wanted to thank all of you (defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges, civil lawyers, and others) for stopping by and reading, and for emailing me tips. The blog wouldn't work without you.

This is the most fun district in the country -- we have the best cases, the most trials, and the most interesting stories.

Have a great 4th of July weekend.

Thanks,

--David Oscar Markus

Judge Cooke finds 300+ year mandatory sentence for juvenile unconstitutional

Here's the money passage:

Here, Mathurin faces a mandatory minimum 307-year sentence. Because Congress has abolished the federal parole system, this sentence gives Mathurin no possibility of release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. A significant portion of this sentence is comprised of mandatory 25-year consecutive sentences required under § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides:

[N]o term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.

Under Graham, this provision of § 924(c)(1)(D) is unconstitutional as applied to Mathurin, a juvenile offender convicted of non-homicide offenses. To apply the statute in accordance with the Eighth Amendment, severance of the constitutionally offensive portion of § 924(c)(1)(D) is necessary.

Judge Cooke ends up finding the rest of the statute can be saved and sentences James Mathurin to 40 years in prison, meaning he will get out in his 50s, instead of spending the rest of his life in jail. Here's the entire order.

Cooke Finds Sentence Unconstitutional

Vanishing precedent

Rojas isn’t gone only from the Eleventh Circuit’s website. It’s gone from Westlaw and apparently everywhere else as well. The Federal Public Defender has been fielding requests for copies of the mysteriously vanished decision. Here it is:
Rojas

“I’m almost speechless. It’s a kinder, gentler day over there. It happens so infrequently.”

That was Judge Altonaga at a hearing on a passport fraud violation for a Navy petty officer after the government offered pretrial diversion. Both the NY Times and the Miami Herald has been covering the case. From the Herald:

While common in state court, pretrial diversions are so rare in the South Florida federal system that Altonaga said it left her “speechless,” and appeared to reflect “a kinder gentler” prosecutorial office.

They happen so infrequently, she added, that it was unclear whether the clerk’s office in the downtown Miami courthouse knew how to process one.

The idea is to give someone facing charges an opportunity to avoid prosecution through a program designed by the U.S. Probation Services, such as doing community service or perhaps taking a civics class.

Without speaking to the specifics of the Dawkins case, Todd W. Mestepey deputy chief of special prosecutions at the Miami U.S. Attorney’s Office, explained it this way Tuesday:

“Participants who successfully complete the program will not be charged or, if charged, will have the charges against them dismissed. Unsuccessful participants are returned for prosecution.”

***

Mestepey said the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney’s office consult through their chain of command on a “pretrial diversion” package.

“Politics do not play a role in the decision,” he added.

In court, the case prosecutor, Olivia S. Choe, also raised with the judge the issue of what she called “pretrial publicity” in the case. The New York Times, Miami Herald, CNN and Wired magazine had all put a spotlight on the case of the combat vet turned captive, with the Associated Press distributing a version of The Herald’s article.

The judge seemed unconcerned. “I read one,” she replied, without specifying.

I bet it wasn't Wired...

Tuesday News and Notes

1. Mark Cuban files a pretty funny pleading with a picture from the championship.

2. The State AG's office has asked Judge Martinez to reconsider his ruling finding the Florida death penalty unconstitutional.

3. Strangely, the U.S. v. Rojas case (finding the Fair Sentencing Act applied to all defendants sentenced after August 2010) has disappeared from the 11th Circuit website.

"Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat."

Says Justice Scalia in today's 7-2 opinion in California v. Entertainment Merchants Association, striking down a California law that restricted the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.

I wonder if Justice Scalia actually played Mortal Kombat before writing that in footnote 4. At least he ruled for the First Amendment and struck down the statute. More fun from his opinion:

California’s argument would fare better if there were alongstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none. Certainly the books we give children to read—orread to them when they are younger—contain no shortageof gore. Grimm’s Fairy Tales, for example, are grim indeed. As her just deserts for trying to poison Snow White, the wicked queen is made to dance in red hot slippers “till she fell dead on the floor, a sad example of envy and jealousy.” The Complete Brothers Grimm Fairy Tales 198 (2006 ed.). Cinderella’s evil stepsisters have their eyes pecked out by doves. Id., at 95. And Hansel and Gretel (children!) kill their captor by baking her in an oven. Id., at 54.
High-school reading lists are full of similar fare. Homer’s Odysseus blinds Polyphemus the Cyclops bygrinding out his eye with a heated stake. The Odyssey ofHomer, Book IX, p. 125 (S. Butcher & A. Lang transls.1909) (“Even so did we seize the fiery-pointed brand and whirled it round in his eye, and the blood flowed about the heated bar. And the breath of the flame singed his eyelids and brows all about, as the ball of the eye burnt away, and the roots thereof crackled in the flame”). In the Inferno, Dante and Virgil watch corrupt politicians struggle to stay submerged beneath a lake of boiling pitch, lest they beskewered by devils above the surface. Canto XXI, pp.187–189 (A. Mandelbaum transl. Bantam Classic ed.1982). And Golding’s Lord of the Flies recounts how a schoolboy called Piggy is savagely murdered by other children while marooned on an island. W. Golding, Lord of the Flies 208–209 (1997 ed.).FOOTNOTE 4

FOOTNOTE 4: JUSTICE ALITO accuses us of pronouncing that playing violent video games “is not different in ‘kind’ ” from reading violent literature. Post, at 2. Well of course it is different in kind, but not in a way that causesthe provision and viewing of violent video games, unlike the provision and reading of books, not to be expressive activity and hence not toenjoy First Amendment protection. Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat.But these cultural and intellectual differences are not constitutional ones. Crudely violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The Divine Comedy,and restrictions upon them must survive strict scrutiny—a question to which we devote our attention in Part III, infra. Even if we can see in them “nothing of any possible value to society . . . , they are as muchentitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.” Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948).

Big defense wins in the 11th Circuit

Friday afternoon was a rare time in the 11th Circuit -- two published opinions in favor of criminal defendants.

First up is a win by rising star AFPD Sowmya Bharathi in U.S. v. Rojas, No. 10-14662 (11th Cir. June 24, 2011):

The issue in this appeal is whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), applies to defendants who committed crack cocaine offenses before August 3, 2010, the date of its enactment, but who are sentenced thereafter. We conclude that it does.
***
We conclude that the FSA applies to defendants like Vera Rojas who had
not yet been sentenced by the date of the FSA’s enactment. The interest in
honoring clear Congressional intent, as well as principles of fairness, uniformity,
and administrability, necessitate our conclusion. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand to the district court for re-sentencing.

Next up is a win by Richard Klugh in U.S. v. Ladson, No. 10-10151 (11th Cir. June 24, 2011):

Ladson argues that the Government did not file and serve an information
containing notice of an enhanced sentence in accordance with § 851(a)(1). We agree
that he was not served before trial with a copy of the information in accordance with
§ 851(a)(1), and thus the district court lacked authority to impose an enhanced
sentence on Counts I and II under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), (C), and 846.
We therefore vacate Ladson’s mandatory term of life imprisonment on Count I and
ten-year sentence on Count II, and remand with instructions to resentence Ladson on
Counts I and II without the § 851 sentence enhancement under the second
information. We affirm the judgment of conviction on Counts I, II, and IV.

Most quotable AND best dressed

"Their lawsuit is like Castro trying to seize Miami homes from families who fled from Cuba. Their lawsuit, if they win it, will create a precedent that Castro and Chavez can come in and sue every political refugee in Miami and seize their houses." That's Mike Tein on the cover of today's DBR. Plus I love the suit, but could never pull it off.

In other news, the Supreme Court really means what it says in the Confrontation Clause cases. From the WaPo:

The constitutional guarantee that a defendant be able to confront his accusers means prosecutors must produce even the technicians involved in the specific laboratory tests used in his trial, the Supreme Court ruled Thursday.

In a case involving a drunken driver from New Mexico, a majority of the court reinforced its recent decisions that fortified the right of defendants to cross-examine witnesses, established in the Sixth Amendment.

The rulings have scrambled the court’s usual ideological pairings, with Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg the most vigorous defenders of defendants’ rights in such circumstances.

Ginsburg wrote Thursday’s opinion, which said defendant Donald Bullcoming should have had the opportunity to cross-examine the lab analyst who provided the main evidence in his trial: a lab report showing his high blood-alcohol level. New Mexico prosecutors instead had called another analyst who had no role in performing the specific test.

“The Sixth Amendment does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because a court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination,” Ginsburg said.

Scalia and Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan agreed with the decision, but only Scalia joined Ginsburg’s opinion in full.

Florida death sentence overturned as unconstitutional

Judge José Martinez granted a writ of habeas corpus today on the ground that Florida’s death penalty process did not afford due process because a judge, not a jury, decided that Paul H. Evans must die. Rather, a jury had recommended that Evans die by a vote of 9 to 3 without specifying what aggravating factor or factors led to that conclusion. There was no indication that a majority of jurors agreed on the factors that convinced them to recommend the execution.

The Florida Supreme Court had affirmed Evans’ death sentence. Key to its decision was that court’s finding that Evans’ sentence became final in February 2002—before the U.S. Supreme Court decided the seminal capital case Ring v. Arizona. Judge Martinez disagreed:

This is incorrect. Mr. Evans’ death sentence became final (for retroactivity purposes) in October of 2002, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Evans v. Florida, 537 U.S. 951 (2002). Ring was decided in June of 2002 which makes it applicable to Mr. Evans’s petitions ... .

Applying Ring, Judge Martinez held that the Florida scheme fell short of due process:

There are no specific findings of fact made by the jury. Indeed, the reviewing courts never know what aggravating or mitigating factors the jury found. It is conceivable that some of the jurors did not find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, or that each juror found a different aggravating circumstance, or perhaps all jurors found the existence of an aggravating circumstance but some thought that the mitigating circumstances outweighed them. ... After the jury's recommendation, there is a separate sentencing hearing conducted before the judge only. ... The defendant has no way of knowing whether or not the jury found the same aggravating factors as the judge. Indeed, the judge, unaware of the aggravating factor or factors found by the jury, may find an aggravating circumstance that was not found by the jury while failing to find the aggravating circumstance that was found by the jury. ... This cannot be reconciled with Ring.

The case is Evans v. McNeil, 08-14402-CIV-JEM. The petitioner was represented by Capital Collateral Regional Counsel.

So you wanna be a federal judge?

Below are the 12 applicants for Judge Gold's seat:

Jerald Bagley
Beatrice Butchko
Marina Garcia Wood
Brian Gilchrist
Robert Levenson
Peter Lopez
Caroline Heck Miller
John J. O'Sullivan
Robin Rosenbaum
Barry Seltzer
William Thomas
John Thornton, Jr.

UPDATE -- I fixed the initial post in which I initially listed the applicants for Marshal. Here they are:

Gwendolyn Boyd
Darin Cooper
James Higgins
Eben Morales
Hector Pesquera
Amos Rojas, Jr.
Michael Roy
David Say, Jr.
G. Wayne Tilman
John F. Timoney
Chadwick E. Wagner

Back to work...

I see that the good professor did a good job last week at the conn.

Some good news to report -- Judge Bob Scola will have his hearing this Wednesday, June 22, 2011 at the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 226, at 2:30 p.m. This is good news and it's good to see that his nomination is moving relatively quickly.

Looks like I have some light reading to do now that I'm back -- Judge Carnes issues two lengthy and significant opinions last week -- United States v. Hill and Johnson v. Dept of Corrections(163 pages and 69 pages). Hill is a mortgage fraud case with lots of twists and turns. Here's a quick summary from Business Week:

But the three-judge panel soundly rejected his arguments in a scathing 163-page opinion that traced the plot from its inception to its downfall. The decision painstakingly recounted and then dismissed almost every objection filed by Hill and the others during the 31-day trial, which involved more than 100 witnesses and thousands of pages of documents.

"Without Hill there would have been no conspiracy, no massive amount of mortgage fraud resulting from it, and no ruined lives in the wake of it," read the opinion. "He bore the greatest responsibility for the massive crime and deserved the longest sentence."

Interestingly, Carnes ruled for a state death row habeas petitioner in Johnson based on ineffective assistance of counsel back from 1980. From the intro:

Earlier this year the Supreme Court reminded lower federal courts that when the state courts have denied an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits, the standard a petitioner must meet to obtain federal habeas relief was intended to be, and is, a difficult one. Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). The standard is not whether an error was committed, but whether the state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law that has been clearly established by decisions of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As the Supreme Court explained, error alone is not enough, because “[f]or purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 785 (quotation marks omitted). And “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id., 131 S.Ct. at 786.

When faced with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits by the state courts, a federal habeas court “must determine what arguments or theories supported or, [if none were stated], could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id., 131 S.Ct. at 786. So long as fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the state court’s denial of the claim was inconsistent with an earlier Supreme Court decision, federal habeas relief must be denied. Id., 131 S.Ct. at 786. Stated the other way, only if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents” may relief be granted. Id., 131 S.Ct. at 786.

Even without the deference due under § 2254, the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), standard for judging the performance of counsel “is a most deferential one.” Harrington, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 788. When combined with the extra layer of deference that § 2254 provides, the result is double deference and the question becomes whether “there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id., 131 S.Ct. at 788. Double deference is doubly difficult for a petitioner to overcome, and it will be a rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding. This is one of those rare cases.

Set a course for the Eleventh Circuit!

Judge Seitz entered a $16.7 million judgment predicated on fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation for Carnival Cruise Lines, represented by Greenberg Traurig and Fowler Rodriguez, against Rolls-Royce PLC. The suit is over a new high-tech steering and propulsion system appurtenant to the Queen Mary II. The jury had also awarded $8 million for breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike performance, but Judge Seitz granted the motion by Rolls-Royce, represented by Black Srebnick et al., for judgment on that claim. The jury rejected Carnival’s claims for breach of both ordinary and specific warranties and for unfair trade practices.

Newspaper articles almost never give either the complete story or a case number, but I found it after abusing D.O.M.’s PACER account just a little bit. The verdict form is 10 pages long and reads a lot like an IRS 1040. As far as I can tell from that document and Judge Seitz’s order, the jury thought Rolls-Royce materially lied about the new technology. I know, I know. How is that not barred by the economic loss rule? According to the order, “Rolls-Royce ignores the fact that the parties did not actually have a contract.” Rather, Carnival bought the ship from a shipbuilder who bought the system from Rolls-Royce. I may be entirely out-of-date on this since it’s been a very long time since I did this kind of thing, but I think there’s a good argument that the economic loss rule applies regardless of whether a contract action lies against any particular defendant. That will be the Eleventh’s problem, I guess. Issues like this almost make me miss commercial litigation. Reviewing the 424-entries-long docket doesn’t.

Quit shooting your mouth off

Judge Marcia Cooke drew the lawsuit sponsored by the Brady Center challenging a Florida law that purports to circumscribe physicians’ conversations about guns. The law is part of a national push by the NRA for such laws in a bunch of states. We are, of course, the first to have one. Even West Virginia voted against it. (They’re trying again.) From the complaint, filed by D.C.’s Ropes & Gray and Miami’s Astigarraga Davis with the Brady Center:

Specifically, the Physician Gag Law expressly restricts health care practitioners, in certain vaguely-defined circumstances, from asking patients questions related to gun safety or recording information from those conversations in patients’ medical records, on penalty of harsh disciplinary sanctions, including fines and permanent revocation of their licenses to practice medicine.

Dr. Michael Hirsh, head surgeon at UMass Memorial Children’s Medical Center, sponsored a resolution by the Massachusetts Medical Society opposing such legislation up there. He seems to think “Florida” is short for floridly insane:

On the Florida law, he said, “I just don’t want to see this wave of stupidity come anywhere where sane people might understand this is going to affect kids.”

Welcome back. Your dreams were your ticket out.

A pot smuggler who skipped the country in 1979 got five years. This is big news today, I guess because 31 years is a long time to be gone, only to find yourself back in front of Judge King. New courtroom, though. New building, too. Named for him, you know.

Episode Two, sponsored by Black’s Law

Roy Black has published a genuinely stirring account of the leader and inspiration that was and is Judge Phillip Hubbart. The essay is poignant and thought-provoking, aspiring to mirror the dedication to excellence personified by its subject. Highly recommended reading, in short.

As a public service, I will encapsulate a significantly more prolix work evincing perhaps not the same commitment to quality as Mr. Black’s. Let’s look just at the majority’s opening line in the en banc Gilbert decision:

Ezell Gilbert, a federal prisoner, wants to have an error of law in the calculation of his sentence corrected based upon a Supreme Court decision interpreting the sentencing guidelines, even though that decision was issued eleven years after he was sentenced.

Truly pregnant: There was an error. At sentencing. No one doubts that. Hell, the Supreme Court said so. But this guy, this “federal prisoner”, wants to have it fixed now.He wants us to correct a sentence eleven years later. Well, where’s it going to stop? How many more of he are there?

All that follows is structured in the predictable way: “He” is a hapless, unrepetent, common criminal. The opinion preempts sympathy by pointing out that, even if he has a point, his sentence might well be the same—then graciously allows that it might be less. Ultimately, it erects “finality of judgment” as the bulwark shielding civilized and free society from such incorrigibles, even taking liberties with Justice Powell, having already violated Justice Holmes.

The short answer to all of it: It is just the sentence, not the judgment, being challenged. Finality is not implicated. Once that dawns, lines like this seem ludicrous: “A federal prisoner’s right to have errors in the calculation of his sentence corrected is not without limits.” No? Well, why not? You can’t just apply the new Supreme Court case and reset the sentence? What’s the big deal? It’s not like anyone’s asking for a trial or anything.

What must have driven Judge Hill to write the scathing dissent D.O.M. quoted at some length the other day is this reduction—this cheapening—of the judicial function from guardian of fairness to administrator of burdens. To claim that there is a higher value than ensuring that Americans are not capriciously incarcerated and that value is finality “of judgment” when really you mean “of penalty” is to abandon excellence as an aspiration. (And they know it; by violently distorting Holmes in ¶ 1, the majority seeks to cloak its abdication with excellence-by-association.) The fright for the future and lack of faith in our institutions that this abandonment symptomizes is so commonplace now that it escapes our notice—until we contrapose it with an image like Roy Black has painted with his essay.

Yesterday at the courthouse

The SEC got a split verdict yesterday in a civil case tried to a jury before Magistrate Judge McAliley. The amended complaint alleged that four people bought Neff Rental stock after receiving inside information that the company was to be acquired.

In December, two of the original defendants entered into settlements, signed by Judge Jordan, that included permanent injunctions against future violations of law. The SEC loves its permanent injunctions because they effectively reduce the burden of proof down to probable cause. But here’s a little nugget of law for defense attorneys and district judges (and future district judges): injunctions against violations of law are neither routine nor automatic. See S.E.C. v. Globus Group, 117 F.Supp.2d 1345 (S.D.Fla. 2000) (Jordan, J.).

The defendant found not liable yesterday was Dr. Sebastian de la Maza, 71-year-old father-in-law to then-Neff CEO and Miami Law graduate Juan Carlos Mas. The theory of defense de la Maza’s attorneys, James Sallah and Jeff Cox, put forth was that de la Maza had followed the stock for years.

And experts get knowledge how exactly?

A new Eleventh Circuit opinion is out today, and it’s the sort of thing that makes you hope for a writ of cert. The government pulled a guy out of prison and had him testify to the jury about how mortgage fraud works. Seriously, that’s just what happened:

Key, a former real estate attorney who was serving time in prison, was called as a witness for the government, and he testified about mortgage fraud.

Let’s pause and reflect for a minute on the fact that we live in a time where federal judges do not even blink when federal prosecutors do this sort of thing; it’s perfectly commonplace.

Okay, ready for the holding now? Here it is:

The district court did not err in permitting Key to testify as a lay witness. Because the part of Key’s testimony that was elicited by the government was based on his own personal knowledge of mortgage fraud, which he had acquired through his experience as a former real estate closing attorney who had engaged in fraudulent transactions of that nature, he did not have to be qualified as an expert under Fed. R. Evid. 702.

What? How do you possibly square that holding with the rule itself which specifically says that experts are people who gain specialized knowledge through “experience, training, or education”? Has no one on the Eleventh Circuit ever seen My Cousin Vinny?

Something about a civil case

Magistrate Judge Torres entered judgment for the defendants, some music-industry personalities I’ve vaguely heard of but couldn’t pick out of a line-up, in a copyright case brought by some Finns:

Torres on Tuesday approved a motion by Miami-based Timbaland, whose real name is Timothy Mosley, and Nelly Furtado, for summary judgment and refused to allow the Finnish group to seek an overdue copyright and amend its complaint.

Can you make it sound even more boring?

"We're very happy," said GrayRobinson partner Karen Stetson, who represents Timbaland. "We thought from the beginning that this issue was an important one and followed the plain language of the federal Copyright Act. But the other side was trying to get away from the plain language of the Copyright Act."

Can you make it seem utterly crazy?

Stetson, whose co-counsel was Jonathan Gaines from GrayRobinson, said her client spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on discovery and litigation.

Speaking of the music industry and people you’ve never heard of, P.J. Pacifico, whose band used to play in New Haven way back in the day, has a new album out (available on iTunes) that I highly recommend. (Check out his entire oeuvre. You’ll thank me later, as Monk used to say.)

Truthiness at law

D.O.M. has been much pressed for time of late, so I’m going to look at some dissents he’s noted and ultimately make good on his promise to revisit Gilbert. These opinions present a problem I can’t tackle in a single post, so I have to proceed episodically. I want to suggest that what Stephen Colbert dubbed truthiness is spreading through the law like a nasty virus and that, whatever harm truthiness inflicts when spewed by politicians and propagandists, its employ in opinions may be even worse. And the dissenters are sounding the alarm.

D.O.M.’s quote from Judge Wilson’s Duke v. Allen dissent shows that the majority's affirmance of the state courts’ facts is indefensible. “But,” as Justice Scalia recently wrote, “reaching a patently incorrect conclusion on the facts is a relatively benign judicial mischief; it affects, after all, only the case at hand.” Far more grave is this claim by the Duke majority: defense counsel’s saying “‘let the record reflect that the district attorney pointed straight at the defendant when he said that,’ is just an oral motion made by a lawyer; it does not establish the fact of a gesture having been made.”

Leaves you dumbstruck, right? The law now considers a plain statement of fact—let the record reflect—to be a motion. If you’re the dissenting judge, what do you say to that? How do you explain how a record is made to someone who seemingly doesn’t grasp it from the word “record” itself? My first thought was that one could cite a few of the thousands of reported cases where a judge uses the phrase (and maybe for emphasis allude to the scene in My Cousin Vinny where the judge says to the court reporter, “Let the record reflect that counsel is holding up two fingers.”). A judge would hardly make a motion to himself (or to a court reporter), ergo the phrase must not signal a motion.

Judge Wilson chose another tack. In addition to a couple of cases in which counsel used the phrase, he cited evidence gurus Mueller & Kirkpatrick for the proposition that a statement for the record is no motion. But he didn’t cite M&K’s authoritative five-volume Federal Evidence treatise. No, he cited page 17 of their law school textbook, the one I use to teach evidence to UM’s 2Ls and 3Ls. Maybe I’m seeing more than what’s there, but I think that when, in a published case, one judge disputes another judge’s holding with reference to a law school textbook, there’s a veiled message there.