98-0

That was the vote confirming Darrin Gayles to the District bench.  Congratulations to Judge Gayles!

Judge Gayles to be confirmed tomorrow!

He has his final Senate vote tomorrow.  Good luck to Judge Gayles! (My sources tell me he was moved up to this group for the historic vote of two openly gay judges and that Beth Bloom will be in the next group.)

In less exciting news, Chief Judge Moreno has abolished the bankruptcy appeals case assignment wheel in administrative order 2014-57: "After consideration of relevant circumstances and after consultation with the Judge of this District, the Court has determined that the administration of justice at this time would be best served by returning to the purely random assignment of Bankruptcy Appeals that existed prior to the establishment of the pilot project for assignment of Bankruptcy Appeals."

Meantime, the Court surprised Judge Moreno with a party last week, recognizing his incredible 7-year tenure as Chief Judge of this District.  Amazingly, Judge Moreno seemed genuinely surprised, which was cool.   Here's a picture by 3rd DCA Judge Kevin Emas of yours truly and Judge Moreno:     

Also last week, Judge Huck had his yearly seminar with the summer and young associates.  It was really well-attended.  Below is a picture of a panel with Judge Huck moderating Judges Altonaga, Scola, and Goodman:

So you wanna be a district judge?

The JNC is now taking applications for Judge Rosenbaum's seat.  They are due July 30.  Interviews will be September 4 and the finalists will be sent to the senators by September 8. 

11th Circuit & SDFLA judicial happenings, including big opinion on cell site data

The Senate will be moving forward with the Georgia 11th Circuit nominees (Pryor & Carnes), but for now, the district nominee of Michael Boggs is stalled.  From HuffPost:

Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the committee, announced Wednesday that he is adding six of the seven pending nominees for federal court seats in Georgia to this week's agenda.
Georgia's two Republican senators, Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson, "asked that I move forward with the Georgia nominees who were ready for a Committee vote," Leahy said in a statement. "I thank both of them for their willingness to move forward with these important nominations."
Boggs' nomination will remain pending before the committee.
"More time is needed to follow up on his recent testimony before his nomination will be scheduled for a vote," Leahy said.

 Also up for full consideration of the judiciary committee is Robin Rosenberg for our District.

While all of this is going, the 11th Circuit is still issuing opinions.  Here's an opinion of first impression from the court today on cell site data and the Fourth Amendment:

Before MARTIN, DUBINA, and SENTELLE,* Circuit Judges.
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Quartavius Davis was convicted by a jury on several counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), (3), conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and knowing possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. The district court entered judgment on the verdict, sentencing Davis to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 1,941 months. Davis appeals, assigning several grounds for reversal. His principal argument is that the court admitted location evidence based on stored cell site information obtained by the prosecution without a warrant, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He assigns other grounds of error going to prosecutorial misconduct, evidentiary sufficiency, and sentencing. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that there is no reversible error, although we do find merit in one argument that the sentence was improperly enhanced. We therefore affirm the judgment below in large part, but vacate a sentencing enhancement regarding “brandishing” a firearm.

 Although the reversal on the brandishing is important, the real discussion is regarding the cell site location data, which the Court holds is protected by the Fourth Amendment:

Having determined that the privacy theory of Fourth Amendment protection governs this controversy, we conclude that the appellant correctly asserts that the government’s warrantless gathering of his cell site location information violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. The government argues that the gathering of cell site location information is factually distinguishable from the GPS data at issue in Jones. We agree that it is distinguishable; however, we believe the distinctions operate against the government’s case rather than in favor of it.

Jones, as we noted, involved the movements of the defendant’s automobile on the public streets and highways. Indeed, the district court allowed the defendant’s motion to suppress information obtained when the automobile was not in public places. The circuit opinion and the separate opinions in the Supreme Court concluded that a reasonable expectation of privacy had been established by the aggregation of the points of data, not by the obtaining of individual points. Such a mosaic theory is not necessary to establish the invasion of privacy in the case of cell site location data.

One’s car, when it is not garaged in a private place, is visible to the public, and it is only the aggregation of many instances of the public seeing it that make it particularly invasive of privacy to secure GPS evidence of its location. As the circuit and some justices reasoned, the car owner can reasonably expect that although his individual movements may be observed, there will not be a “tiny constable” hiding in his vehicle to maintain a log of his movements. 132 S. Ct. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring). In contrast, even on a person’s first visit to a gynecologist, a psychiatrist, a bookie, or a priest, one may assume that the visit is private if it was not conducted in a public way. One’s cell phone, unlike an automobile, can accompany its owner anywhere. Thus, the exposure of the cell site location information can convert what would otherwise be a private event into a public one. When one’s whereabouts are not public, then one may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those whereabouts. Therefore, while it may be the case that even in light of the Jones opinion, GPS location information on an automobile would be protected only in the case of aggregated data, even one point of cell site location data can be within a reasonable expectation of privacy. In that sense, cell site data is more like communications data than it is like GPS information. That is, it is private in nature rather than being public data that warrants privacy protection only when its collection creates a sufficient mosaic to expose that which would otherwise be private.

The United States further argues that cell site location information is less protected than GPS data because it is less precise. We are not sure why this should be significant. We do not doubt that there may be a difference in precision, but that is not to say that the difference in precision has constitutional significance. While it is perhaps possible that information could be sufficiently vague as to escape the zone of reasonable expectation of privacy, that does not appear to be the case here. The prosecutor at trial stressed how the cell phone use of the defendant established that he was near each of six crime scenes. While committing a crime is certainly not within a legitimate expectation of privacy, if the cell site location data could place him near those scenes, it could place him near any other scene. There is a reasonable privacy interest in being near the home of a lover, or a dispensary of medication, or a place of worship, or a house of ill repute. Again, we do not see the factual distinction as taking Davis’s location outside his expectation of privacy. That information obtained by an invasion of privacy may not be entirely precise does not change the calculus as to whether obtaining it was in fact an invasion of privacy.

Of course there's no reversal on this issue because it is governed by the good faith exception.... 
 

"Pull your pants up!"

That's what a sign in Judge Wayne Maura's courtroom says.  And for violating the too low pants rule, one defendant was fined $50. 

Here's the Morning Call:

Maura recounted the incident that prompted the citation, saying the waistband of Dennis' pants was "completely below his buttocks," leaving only a "very thin layer" of fabric between his posterior and the courtroom bench.
..."I think Mr. Dennis is old enough to understand when he's in a public courtroom, there's a reason he was told to leave and fix the way he's dressed," Maura said.
Maura said he routinely sees people in court wearing low-slung pants, calling them a sign of disrespect for the courts and taxpayers.
After the hearing, Makoul called the judge's ruling "disappointing" and said she likely will appeal the sentence after she speaks to Dennis.
In several places in Maura's courtroom and office, a sign is displayed that has a cartoon drawing showing the backsides of three people all wearing pants well below waist level with their underwear exposed. The sign says, "Pull your pants up!"
Maura's Bethlehem office also includes a second sign warning that visitors may not appear in the courtroom or be waited on by staff if they are wearing baggy pants with "exposed undergarments" or "excessive exposure of any private body areas."
Maura declined to comment after Monday's hearing. When asked about the signs in his courtroom, he would only say "they speak for themselves."

Below is the offensive sign at issue:

“There is very little heart and soul in Judge Breyer’s opinions. Quite clearly, he is a rather cold fish.”

Yikes, that's Ian Gershengorn, now deputy Solicitor General, who helped then President Bill Clinton vet then 1st Circuit Judge Breyer.  From the WSJ:

“Nothing in Judge Breyer’s opinions suggests that he would be a great Supreme Court justice,” Mr. Gershengorn, then fresh out of Harvard Law School, and another attorney, Tom Perrelli, wrote in a June 1993 memo to White House lawyer Joel Klein. “There is very little heart and soul in Judge Breyer’s opinions. Quite clearly, he is a rather cold fish.”
The memo was released Friday in the fifth batch of documents from the Clinton Presidential Library, along with 2,000 pages of material that had been previously withheld for legal reasons that no longer apply.
The memo assesses then-Judge Breyer’s opinions in the areas of civil rights, privacy and national security law. It finds it “most remarkable that virtually none” of his rulings turned on substantive issues, instead being decided on administrative or procedural grounds.
“Nonetheless, the dearth of commentary about the substantive issues at stake indicates that Judge Breyer has no real interest in the area of civil rights; it is all but impossible to imagine him being an innovator on the Supreme Court on these issues.,” the memo said.
His decisions are “often reasonable and perhaps legally correct, but there is such a lack of vigor in his jurisprudence that one suspects he does not have (or refuses to utilize) any innate sense of justice,” the memo went on.
“Conservatives will be thrilled if Judge Breyer is appointed,” while “liberals would be very upset at this selection,” the memo concludes
“Everyone has regrets from his 20s,” Mr. Gershengorn said Friday. “Suffice to say, I have the highest respect for Justice Breyer and believe he has proven to be a terrific justice. As Earl Weaver once said, ‘It is what you learn after you know it all that counts.’”
His co-author, Mr. Perrelli, said the 1993 memo shows “why you don’t have second-year associates writing evaluations of potential Supreme Court nominees.” Mr. Perrelli spent three years as associate attorney general in the Obama administration, and now is back in at his old law firm, Jenner & Block.
Justice Breyer couldn’t be reached for comment.
Mr. Perrelli said that in 1993 he was a young lawyer at Jenner, where Mr. Gershengorn worked with him as a summer associate. The two were among a group of private attorneys recruited by the Clinton White House to assess candidates for the high court, he said.
President Clinton passed over Justice Breyer for a 1993 vacancy, instead selecting another federal appeals judge, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for the slot. The following year, however, Mr. Clinton gave him the nod when another court seat came open.

You know who is not a cold fish?  Lebron.  Go Heat.

Go Heat & other SDFLA News & Notes

1.  Lewis Tein and Paul Calli are dominating the proceedings before Judge Cooke.  The latest victory -- disqualification of the Tribe's lawyer -- is reported in the DBR:

She said Cortiñas as Lehtinen's former law partner would be familiar with all of the small firm's business with the tribe and agreed with Lehtinen that it amounted to an "unfair informational advantage."She said this perceived conflict was reason enough to disqualify Cortiñas. "How does it look for those on the outside who are not lawyers?" Cooke asked. "How do we police ourselves?"Cooke ruled Cortiñas did not violate ethics rules by representing the tribe after hearing similar issues while an appellate judge. Though she added his appearance "disturbs me."As a result, she ruled the Gunster firm was not disqualified from representing the tribe or its attorneys at the evidentiary hearing on sanctions.Cortiñas told Cooke before his disqualification that the tribe's former attorneys were afraid of his legal prowess. "The reason they really don't want me here is I know fraud cases very well," Cortiñas said.Cooke said the comment somewhat indicated the tribe may have had incompetent counsel in Roman and his associates.

2.  Check out this order from the 11th. The defendant's lawyer challenged (on rehearing) the fact that the panel had two visiting district judges.  The same panel consisting of only one active 11th Circuit judge said no problem.  Well, the court is getting Judge Rosenbaum now.  I wonder if the order allowing two visiting judges still applies.


3.  Meantime, Judge Rosenbaum's elevation has caused an emergency on the district court....