The SDFLA Blog is dedicated to providing news and notes regarding federal practice in the Southern District of Florida. The New Times calls the blog "the definitive source on South Florida's federal court system." All tips on court happenings are welcome and will remain anonymous. Please email David Markus at dmarkus@markuslaw.com
Thursday, August 25, 2011
11th Circuit considers Liberty City Seven
Jay Weaver has the details about this interesting issue:
The judge’s removal of a woman from the federal jury in one of the nation’s most controversial terrorism trials dominated oral arguments Tuesday, in the appeal of five Miami men convicted of conspiring to aid al-Qaida.
The unidentified woman, known only as Juror No. 4, was dismissed by U.S. District Judge Joan Lenard after deliberating for nearly three days in late April 2009 because the other 11 jurors said she refused to discuss the fate of the remaining defendants in a group originally dubbed the “Liberty City Seven.’’
The ruling led to the juror’s replacement by an alternate juror, a man, and the eventual conviction of the five defendants on material-support conspiracy charges. One other defendant was acquitted.
The removal of Juror No. 4 from the 12-person panel carried great consequences.
Had she been allowed to hold out as the minority juror, prompting a third mistrial in the controversial case, the five defendants could have walked out of the courtroom free, because the U.S. attorney’s office had already said it wouldn’t try them a fourth time.
Defense lawyers said Tuesday that Lenard made a major error about Juror No. 4 that should compel the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to throw out the convictions and order a new trial. A decision could take months.
Juror No. 4 “goes in there and makes up her mind,” said attorney Ana Jhones, who represented the ringleader in the Liberty City group. “Does that mean she’s not deliberating? There is evidence that Juror No. 4 was, in fact, deliberating.”
She also said the woman was intimidated by the foreman in the jury room.
But a prosecutor with the U.S. attorney’s office disagreed.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Colan said Juror No. 4 indicated to a courtroom deputy even before the start of deliberations that she didn’t want to discuss the evidence. She just wanted to express her opinion.
“Every other juror [questioned by the judge] gave consistent testimony that she turned her back and wouldn’t follow the law,” Colan said.
The convictions of the five men followed two earlier mistrials, which had resulted in the acquittal of one other defendant.
Tuesday, August 23, 2011
Monday, August 22, 2011
Slow blogging today
Your friendly neighborhood blogger is in court today, so I won't have much on the web until much later. Until then, your moment of zen:
| The Daily Show With Jon Stewart | Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c | |||
| Moment of Zen - Anderson Cooper Cracks Up | ||||
| ||||
Friday, August 19, 2011
Defense Verdicts of the Week
The USAO is very good at issuing press releases when there is an arrest or a conviction. Not so much when there is an acquittal. And there were some acquittals and a hung jury this week:
1. Sabrina Puglisi and Margot Moss got a not guilty before Judge Jordan in a drug case in which their client testified.*
2. AFPDs Aimee Ferrer and Jan Smith won before Judge Seitz in a gun case.
3. AFPD Miguel Caridad and David Joffe hung a jury before Judge Cooke. Apparently, Joffe's client originally pled guilty but was permitted to withdraw the plea and now is going for round 2.
*Full disclosure -- I share space with Sabrina and Margot is my law partner.
1. Sabrina Puglisi and Margot Moss got a not guilty before Judge Jordan in a drug case in which their client testified.*
2. AFPDs Aimee Ferrer and Jan Smith won before Judge Seitz in a gun case.
3. AFPD Miguel Caridad and David Joffe hung a jury before Judge Cooke. Apparently, Joffe's client originally pled guilty but was permitted to withdraw the plea and now is going for round 2.
*Full disclosure -- I share space with Sabrina and Margot is my law partner.
Judge makes mistake and goes after criminal defense lawyer
This story really amazes me:
This investigation reminds me of the old F. Lee Bailey quote after he was charged with mail fraud: In England, a criminal defense lawyer is apt to be knighted, in America, he is apt to be indicted.
This is especially true where the criminal defense lawyer is representing an unpopular defendant like Casey. The Florida Bar should quickly clear Jose Baez.
At issue: Anthony pleaded guilty to 13 charges in a check fraud case in January 2010. Judge Stan Strickland sentenced her to time-served in jail, and a year of probation after her jail release.
But last month, when Anthony was acquitted of murder and released from the Orange County Jail, she wasn't put on probation. The Department of Corrections said Anthony served that probation in jail while she was awaiting the murder trial.
Soon after her release, Strickland amended his original order clarifying his intentions, which were clear in video and transcripts from the January 2010 sentencing.
Anthony's defense team objected, and Perry heard arguments from attorneys earlier this month.
Perry asked the defense team if they knew Anthony was serving her probation while she was in jail. One of Anthony's attorneys admitted that they did, but didn't think it was their burden to notify the court.
Perry eventually issued an order stating Anthony does have to report to probation.
In that order, Perry took up the issue with the attorneys too, saying that, "the failure to abide by that order and the failure to notify the court of a known scrivener's error in the order may be a violation of an attorney's duty of candor."
"No attorney should conduct himself or herself in a way that impedes an order of the court. ... Our system of justice should never be in the position of rewarding someone who willfully hides the ball."
This investigation reminds me of the old F. Lee Bailey quote after he was charged with mail fraud: In England, a criminal defense lawyer is apt to be knighted, in America, he is apt to be indicted.
This is especially true where the criminal defense lawyer is representing an unpopular defendant like Casey. The Florida Bar should quickly clear Jose Baez.
Wednesday, August 17, 2011
Judge Milton Hirsch finds Florida drug law unconstitutional
Milt Hirsch wrote a compelling (and very entertaining) order finding Florida's drug statute unconstitutional, following the decision in Shelton. The whole order is worth a read. Here is the intro and conclusion, and a link to the whole order at the bottom:
"[F]or there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."
--William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act II sc. 2
I. Introduction
The 39 defendants captioned above are similarly circumstanced in that all are charged with violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13. In light of the recent decision in Shelton v. Department of Corrections, No. 6:07-cv-839-Orl-35-KRS, 2011 WL 3236040 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2011), finding '893.13 unconstitutional, all defendants move for dismissal. I have consolidated these cases for purposes of these motions only.
Shelton has produced a category-five hurricane in the Florida criminal practice community. A storm-surge of pretrial motions (such as those at bar) must surely follow. It is, therefore, essential that I adjudicate the present motions promptly. This order has been written in great haste and under great time pressure. As Mark Twain is alleged to have said: "If I'd had more time, I could have written you a shorter letter."
***
V. Conclusion
The immediate effect of the present order is the dismissal of charges against all movants – the overwhelming majority of whom may have known perfectly well that their acts of possession or delivery were contrary to law. Viewed in that light, these movants are unworthy, utterly unworthy, of this windfall exoneration. But as no less a constitutional scholar than Justice Felix Frankfurter observed, "It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end." Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Like the court in Shelton, I find that Florida Statute § 893.13 is facially violative of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution; and, accordingly, that any prosecution brought pursuant to that statute is subject to dismissal.
In the comments the other day, there was a discussion about whether Shelton was binding. Judge Hirsch has a lot to say about that, including this conclusion:
In the absence of such particularization I am obliged as a Florida trial court to presume that Florida appellate courts relied upon a Florida-law-based guarantee of due process, whether constitutional or common-law. No Florida case has decided the issue presently before me: whether '893.13 is unconstitutional by operation of the 14th Amendment to the federal Constitution. The Shelton court reached the same conclusion: A[N]o Florida appellate [court] ... has addressed the constitutionality of ['893.13] under the federal Constitution,@ Shelton, 2011 WL 3236040, at *12; and the Florida cases that appear to give passing consideration to the issue of the constitutionality or not of the statute Acontain no analysis of or citation to the tripartite constitutional analysis@ required by Staples and other U.S. Supreme Court authorities, and employed in Shelton. Id. See also supra note 3. Accordingly, I am bound to follow Shelton=s holding that '893.13 violates the 14th Amendment=s due process guarantee.
Hirsch Order
"[F]or there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."
--William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act II sc. 2
I. Introduction
The 39 defendants captioned above are similarly circumstanced in that all are charged with violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13. In light of the recent decision in Shelton v. Department of Corrections, No. 6:07-cv-839-Orl-35-KRS, 2011 WL 3236040 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2011), finding '893.13 unconstitutional, all defendants move for dismissal. I have consolidated these cases for purposes of these motions only.
Shelton has produced a category-five hurricane in the Florida criminal practice community. A storm-surge of pretrial motions (such as those at bar) must surely follow. It is, therefore, essential that I adjudicate the present motions promptly. This order has been written in great haste and under great time pressure. As Mark Twain is alleged to have said: "If I'd had more time, I could have written you a shorter letter."
***
V. Conclusion
The immediate effect of the present order is the dismissal of charges against all movants – the overwhelming majority of whom may have known perfectly well that their acts of possession or delivery were contrary to law. Viewed in that light, these movants are unworthy, utterly unworthy, of this windfall exoneration. But as no less a constitutional scholar than Justice Felix Frankfurter observed, "It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end." Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Like the court in Shelton, I find that Florida Statute § 893.13 is facially violative of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution; and, accordingly, that any prosecution brought pursuant to that statute is subject to dismissal.
In the comments the other day, there was a discussion about whether Shelton was binding. Judge Hirsch has a lot to say about that, including this conclusion:
In the absence of such particularization I am obliged as a Florida trial court to presume that Florida appellate courts relied upon a Florida-law-based guarantee of due process, whether constitutional or common-law. No Florida case has decided the issue presently before me: whether '893.13 is unconstitutional by operation of the 14th Amendment to the federal Constitution. The Shelton court reached the same conclusion: A[N]o Florida appellate [court] ... has addressed the constitutionality of ['893.13] under the federal Constitution,@ Shelton, 2011 WL 3236040, at *12; and the Florida cases that appear to give passing consideration to the issue of the constitutionality or not of the statute Acontain no analysis of or citation to the tripartite constitutional analysis@ required by Staples and other U.S. Supreme Court authorities, and employed in Shelton. Id. See also supra note 3. Accordingly, I am bound to follow Shelton=s holding that '893.13 violates the 14th Amendment=s due process guarantee.
Hirsch Order
Tuesday, August 16, 2011
11th Circuit discusses THUG MANSION
Per Judge Carnes:
This appeal stems from a violent drug conspiracy in South Florida that involved a number of criminals, most of whom have aliases or nicknames. The four whose joint trial led to this appeal were Daniel “D.V.” Varela, Liana “The Negra” Lopez, Ricardo “Rick” Sanchez, and Daniel “Homer” Troya. Showing a keen appreciation for their own character, they referred to the townhouse where they lived as the “Thug Mansion.” During their crime wave two of the self-styled thugs, Troya and Sanchez, carjacked a fellow drug dealer and shot him to death. What would have been unfortunate became triply tragic when they also gunned down the drug dealer’s wife and their two children, ages three and four. Troya and Sanchez left all four bodies on the side of the road.
The ensuing police investigation led to the Thug Mansion, which was located in a gated residential community. Officers executed a search warrant there and found evidence of the murder and the on-going drug conspiracy. An indictment and two superseding indictments followed, and then a trial at which the four defendants were convicted on all counts. Lopez and Varela, who brought this appeal, raise several issues, the primary one being that they should not have been jointly tried with Troya and Sanchez, who committed the murders. (Sanchez and Troya were convicted of those murders and sentenced to death, and they have filed appeals that are proceeding separately from this one.)
Who wants to guess how this one came out?
Here's Tupac discussing "Thugz Mansion" (NSFW):
This appeal stems from a violent drug conspiracy in South Florida that involved a number of criminals, most of whom have aliases or nicknames. The four whose joint trial led to this appeal were Daniel “D.V.” Varela, Liana “The Negra” Lopez, Ricardo “Rick” Sanchez, and Daniel “Homer” Troya. Showing a keen appreciation for their own character, they referred to the townhouse where they lived as the “Thug Mansion.” During their crime wave two of the self-styled thugs, Troya and Sanchez, carjacked a fellow drug dealer and shot him to death. What would have been unfortunate became triply tragic when they also gunned down the drug dealer’s wife and their two children, ages three and four. Troya and Sanchez left all four bodies on the side of the road.
The ensuing police investigation led to the Thug Mansion, which was located in a gated residential community. Officers executed a search warrant there and found evidence of the murder and the on-going drug conspiracy. An indictment and two superseding indictments followed, and then a trial at which the four defendants were convicted on all counts. Lopez and Varela, who brought this appeal, raise several issues, the primary one being that they should not have been jointly tried with Troya and Sanchez, who committed the murders. (Sanchez and Troya were convicted of those murders and sentenced to death, and they have filed appeals that are proceeding separately from this one.)
Who wants to guess how this one came out?
Here's Tupac discussing "Thugz Mansion" (NSFW):
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