Could the CEO of Coca-Cola win dismissal of a suit that contends he personally put mice in soda bottles?

That's the hypo that Justice Breyer presented at a recent oral argument. From the ABA Journal, which has been providing great coverage lately:

The issue before the court is whether Javaid Iqbal’s suit against former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI director Robert Mueller is specific enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the New York Times reports. Igbal contends that after Sept. 11 he was put in jail where he was beaten and subjected to extreme temperatures and constant light. He pleaded guilty to identity fraud and was deported to Pakistan, but was cleared of any involvement in terrorism, according to the Washington Post.
Iqbal claims Ashcroft and Mueller formulated policies that singled him out because of his nationality and religion. Most of the justices who spoke appeared sympathetic to the government’s argument in favor of dismissal, report the Los Angeles Times and Legal Times. Only Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David H. Souter spoke in favor of allowing the suit.
One of those appearing to side with the government was Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who advanced the mouse-in-a-bottle hypothetical. Breyer explained the hypo this way, according to a separate Legal Times story:
"Jones sues the president of Coca-Cola. His claim is the president personally put a mouse in the bottle. Now, he has no reason for thinking that. Then his lawyer says: 'OK, I'm now going to take seven depositions of the president of Coca-Cola.' The president of Coca-Cola says: 'You know, I don't have time for this; there is no basis. ... I don't want to go and spend the time to answer questions.' "
Breyer asked if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would allow dismissal. Solicitor General Gregory Garre said the suit could be tossed under Rule 8. He noted the Supreme Court 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, which interpreted the rule as requiring plaintiffs to “show a plausible entitlement to relief."

"If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."

Cheryl Stein has a nice op-ed in the Washington Times regarding Herring v. United States, a case the Supreme Court will hear on Tuesday. (Today is the first Monday in October -- Yippeee!) It raises the following question: whether courts must suppress evidence seized during an arrest made as a result of faulty information provided by another law enforcement agency.

Stein argues that the Supreme Court should not abandon the exclusionary rule. Here is her conclusion:

The contention that we should not allow a blunder by the police to confer a benefit on a criminal defendant would be reasonable only if most illegal searches are the result of good-faith mistakes. The sad fact is, however, that the vast majority of illegal searches are the result of deliberate misconduct by the police.

Political commentators and law professors who have never been in a courtroom except to defend their own traffic tickets may not understand that fact, but every practicing criminal defense lawyer knows it to be true. The rule provides the only legal brake on police misconduct. Without its sanctions, the Constitution's guarantee against unreasonable searches would be empty.

Finally, the critics fail to address one of the most important reasons the rule was adopted in the first place: to preserve the integrity of our court system. The Supreme Court explained its necessity more than 40 years ago: "If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." The rule "gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice." To forget that teaching is to abandon all that is best and brightest about our system of government.

Supreme Court Term is over

There aren't many jobs where you get the entire summer off -- school teachers and.... Supreme Court Justices.

Here's Linda Greenhouse's summary of the October 2007 Term. She is retiring, so this may be her last article.

Here's a cool graphic from the article on the major cases of the Term:

Exciting week at the Supreme Court

This is the last week for Supreme Court action, and it has been an exciting one. SCOTUSblog is the place to be, and they've added to the drama with their live-blogging feature each morning at 10am. It's worth checking out -- you'll have to see it tomorrow as that will be the last day for decisions. The big one to be decided tomorrow is the gun case, Heller. Today was also big as the Court ruled that the death penalty cannot be imposed in a child rape case (and any other case) that does not result in death to the victim. 5-4, with Kennedy writing for the majority of usual suspects, and Alito writing for the 4 dissenters. The other big case today was the Exxon punitive damages case in which the Court found that punis were limited to compensatory damages.

Here is SCOTUSBlog on the child rape case:

Barring the death penalty for any crime that does not take the life of an individual victim, the Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for the crime of raping a child. If the victim does not die and death was not intended, capital punishment for that crime violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court ruled in an opinion by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. The case was Patrick Kennedy v. Louisiana (07-343). The broad declaration that death sentences should be reserved “for crimes that take the life of the victim” will apply, the Court said, to crimes against individuals — thus leaving intact, for example, a possible death sentence for treason.Part of the Court’s rationale for nullifying a death sentence for raping a child was that the child victim gets enlisted, perhaps repeatedly, to recount the crime, forcing on the child “a moral choice” that the youngster is not mature enough to make. “The way the death penalty here involves the child victim in its enforcement can compromise a decent legal system,” Justice Kennedy wrote.
The decision split the Court 5-4. It nullified a Louisiana law that provided capital punishment for raping a child under age 12. The law was since amended to apply to raping a child under age 13. Five other states have similar laws.
At the close of Wednesday’s public session, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., announced that the Court will issue all remaining decisions for the Term at 10 a.m. Thursday. The test case on whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a gun is among those remaining (District of Columbia v. Heller, 07-290). The others still pending are cases on the constitutionality of the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment” on campaign finance (Davis v. FEC, 07-320), and on federal regulators’ power to undo wholesale energy sales contracts (Morgan Stanley Capital v. Public Utility District, 06-1457, and a companion case).
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in the Louisiana capital case was supported by Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter and John Paul Stevens. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote for the dissenters; he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Justice Alito, rejecting the majority view that there is now a national consensus against executing one who rapes a child, argued that the focus should not be on the fact that only six states now have such laws. More might have taken the step, Alito argued, if the Supreme Court in barring execution for raping an adult in 1977 had not given state legislators “good reason to fear” that they never could pass such a law. The broad dicta in that case, Alito said, was not supported by all of those in the majority in Coker v. Georgia. Since then, the Justice added, state courts have read the Coker opinion in its widest sweep, “stunting legislative consideration” of the death penalty when a child was the victim.

Supreme Court decides US v. Williams

You all remember this case -- the child pornography case that our own Rick Diaz and Lou Guerra argued before the High Court.

The Court ruled 7-2 against Diaz's client.

Here's a summary from SCOTUSBlog:

In a second major ruling, the Court — after years of repeatedly nullifying Congress’ efforts to stamp out child pornography on the Internet — finally upheld such a law, a 2003 statute that Congress shaped in a way that it hopes would spare it from the same fate as earlier attempts. In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court found that the 2003 law did not reach too far and that it was not vague in its scope. The decision came on a 7-2 vote in United States v. Williams (06-694).

Here is Justice Scalia's opinion.

Joking at the Supreme Court

The WSJ Blog points out funny exchanges at the Supreme Court. I reprint their fun post here (by the way, our funniest judge -- according to the poll at the right -- is Chief Judge Moreno, by a wide margin...):

The Law Blog’s Laugh-In At the Supreme Court: Wow

Posted by Peter Lattman

The big news out of the Supreme Court yesterday concerned what they didn’t do. The justices declined to hear an appeal of a D.C. Circuit ruling that terminally ill patients who have run out of medical options have a constitutional right to try experimental drugs that have not yet received FDA approval. Here’s the NYT story and prior Law Blog coverage.

On the lighter side, let’s bring back a Law Blog feature in very low demand — The Law Blog’s Laugh-In At the Supreme Court! The decidedly unfunny issue on the docket yesterday: federalism. The question, as stated by the Times: What happens when a state chooses to give criminal suspects more protection than the federal Constitution requires?

Leave it to Justice Scalia to make federalism funny. Yesterday, he asked Stephen McCullough, a lawyer for the state Virginia, about the line between valid and invalid state searches. With that, an avalanche of laughter ensued. Get ready to giggle, Law Blog readers!

Justice Scalia: Mr. McCullough, the proposition that you’re arguing, does it apply at the Federal level as well? Suppose — suppose I think that my neighbor next door is growing marijuana and I have probable cause to believe that, all right? So I go in and search his house; and sure enough, there is marijuana. And I bring it to the police’s attention, and they eventually arrest him. Is that lawful search?

McCullough: If there is State action –

Justice Scalia: I’m a State actor, I guess. You know –
(Laughter.)

McCullough: If you have State actors –

Justice Scalia: You know, a Supreme Court Justice should not be –
(Laughter.)

Justice Scalia: — should not be living next door to somebody growing marijuana. It doesn’t seem right.

McCullough: That’s not a smart neighbor.
(Laughter.)

McCullough: If you have State action and you enter into someone’s home, then the Constitution affords a heightened level of protection. But –

Justice Scalia: Don’t dance around. Is it — is it rendered an unreasonable search by the fact that I’m not a law enforcement officer at all?

McCullough: I don’t think the fact of — no. The fact that –

Justice Scalia: So any Federal employee can go crashing around conducting searches and seizures?

McCullough: So long –

Justice Scalia: So long as he has probable cause?

McCullough: That’s correct.

Justice Scalia: That’s fantastic.
(Laughter.)

Justice Scalia: Do you really think that?

McCullough: I think if there is State action, it doesn’t matter that you’re wearing a badge or that you’ve gone through the police academy.

Justice Scalia: Or that you are an administrative law judge at the, you know, Bureau of Customs? It doesn’t matter?

McCullough: I think that’s right. That if you have — if the State -

Justice Scalia: What about a janitor? You’re a janitor, a federally employed janitor.

McCullough: Your Honor –

Justice Scalia: His neighbor is growing marijuana, and he’s just as offended as a Supreme Court Justice would be. Can he conduct a search?

McCullough: I think if he’s doing it on behalf of the State, the answer is yes.

Justice Scalia: Wow.

Justice Jordan?

When we first started the blog, we argued that the upcoming High Court vacancies should be filled by a Floridian. And during that Supreme Court mania, some of our own judges, like Cecilia Altonaga and Federico Moreno (and 11th Cir. Judge Marcus and Fla. Sup. Ct. Justice Cantero) were mentioned. But instead we got Roberts and Alito...

Now Tom Goldstein, of SCOTUSBlog, theorizes who will be on the shortlist should a Democrat take the White House in 2008. Here is his original post and his follow-up post.

On the list -- Judge Adalberto Jordan! Goldstein says that Jordan makes the shortlist assuming that he quickly ascends to the Eleventh Circuit. Very exciting...

Our old poll on the subject is still up. The current results for the top three:


Stanley Marcus 38%

Federico Moreno 36%

Adalberto Jordan 9%

"The value of freedom is found not only in the larger issues of life but also in the fanciful and strange."

So said Judge Middlebrooks about a naked protester in a case that went all the way to the Supreme Court.

The case involved what it means to be the prevailing party in a civil rights case. Here's David Savage, from the LA Times on the case:

The Supreme Court's first ruling on an Iraq war protest is not likely to be remembered as a landmark in the law. In a 9-0 ruling, the justices rejected a claim for legal fees filed on behalf of a Florida nudist who wanted to form a peace symbol out of naked bodies on a state beach.Toni Anne Wyner's planned demonstration ran afoul of the state's Bathing Suit Rule, which, as its name suggests, requires beachgoers to cover up. In February 2003, she went to court to challenge this rule as a violation of her 1st Amendment right to free expression. In the past, the Supreme Court has said that nudity and nude dancing can be a form of expressive conduct, though it can be regulated. At first, a judge saw merit to her complaint and allowed the nude protest to take place — but behind a screen, to shield other beach patrons at John D. MacArthur Beach State Park in Palm Beach County. "The value of freedom is found not only in the larger issues of life but also in the fanciful and strange," said U.S. District Judge Donald Middlebrooks. He continued: "Protesting a potential war through naked protest seems a bit quixotic, but it is also part of the freedom that both those supporting the war and those who oppose it seek to protect."After forming their peace symbol behind the screen, the nudists went into the water naked. When Wyner went back to court seeking a permanent order allowing such protests, the judge refused and ruled for the state. However, he said that the civil liberties lawyers who represented Wyner were entitled to be paid because they had won at least one round of the litigation. The Supreme Court reversed that decision Monday in Sole vs. Wyner. Federal law entitles the "prevailing party" in a civil rights or civil liberties case to obtain legal fees from the government. "Wyner is not a prevailing party, we conclude, for her initial victory was ephemeral," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the court. A plaintiff who wins a preliminary injunction, then loses on the merits, wins a battle but loses a war, Ginsburg wrote.

Sparring with Scalia

One of my former (and one of my favorite) law professors, Arthur Miller, took a shot at Justice Scalia during an oral argument today and Scalia took a shot back. Here's the Washington Post's coverage of the fun exchanges:

A Bit of Brooklyn in the Supreme Court
Thursday, March 29, 2007; A17
Deference, with maybe just a touch of obsequiousness, is the rule for lawyers taking their cases before the nine justices of the Supreme Court.
So when Harvard law professor Arthur R. Miller yesterday mixed it up a little with the court's ever-ready pugilist Antonin Scalia, some of those in the packed courtroom later talked about it as one of those did-you-hear-that moments at the court.
Miller, whose white hair and dark, bushy eyebrows are familiar from his legal commentaries on ABC and his debate-style shows on PBS, is representing investors who want to sue Tellabs, alleging securities fraud. [Story, Page D3.]
Congress has set a high bar for such lawsuits: Plaintiffs must show not just credible allegations but a "strong inference" that the company acted with wrongful intent.
The justices wondered whether you could assign a percentage to such a "strong inference," a 33 percent chance plaintiffs could convince a jury the allegations were true, a more than 50 percent chance?
"I think it's 66 2/3 ," Scalia said, pulling another number out of the air.
"Is that because you never met a plaintiff you really liked?" Miller asked the conservative Scalia.
The room erupted in laughter. Scalia smiled. A little.
Miller backpedaled. A little. "I took a liberty there with the justice," Miller said.
But it was not over.
Scalia's chance came later, when Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. prepared to pounce on one of Miller's arguments. Miller stopped him first.
"Don't take me literally on that," Miller said. "For heaven's sakes, I'm from Brooklyn. I'm very colloquial. I'm very sorry about that.''
"Let me write that down," Scalia said with a satisfied smile. "We should not take you literally. All right."
Roberts was set to rule. "Okay, you two are even now."
-- Robert Barnes

Cert granted

The United States Supreme Court has taken a case from the Southern District of Florida, U.S. v. Williams, a case about the constitutionality of a child pornography law:

The [11th Circuit] court panel found the pandering provision of the PROTECT Act of 2003 was overbroad and impermissibly vague, saying that it criminalizes the speech of someone who touts material as child pornography when in fact it is clean or nonexistent.In the appeals court's view, the pandering provision could apply to an e-mail entitled "Good pics of kids in bed" sent by a grandparent, with innocent pictures attached of grandchildren in pajamas. One sender might be a proud grandparent while another might be a convicted child molester who hopes to trade for more graphic photos with like-minded recipients, the appeals court said. In asking the court to take the case, the Bush administration said the appeals court read the law's language more broadly than is warranted.

Judge Middlebrooks initially found the law was constitutional. Judges Barkett, Wilson and Reavley were the 11th Circuit panel that reversed (in an opinion by Judge Reavley,who was visiting from the Fifth Circuit), finding the Protect Act vague and overbroad. Rick Diaz and Lou Guerra represented Mr. Williams, who is now headed to Washington...

Cert from SDFLA

Our appellate correspondent, Richard Rosenthal, writes in:


On Friday the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert on a fascinating case that originated right here in S.D. Fla. Without delving too much into details -- those interested can go to Wyner v. Struhs, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (S.D. Fla. 2003) -- Judge Middlebrooks awarded "prevailing party" attorneys' fees to the ACLU of Florida after it successfully obtained a preliminary injunction that allowed a nude anti-war protest in a public park. But the catch is that after "winning" the preliminary injunction, the ACLU "lost" its request for a permanent injunction because the protest was was one-time deal, rather than a recurring performance. The Eleventh Circuit -- in an unsigned, unpublished opinion -- affirmed Judge Middlebrooks's award of attorneys' fees. Wyner v. Struhs, 179 Fed. Appx. 566 (11th Cir. 2006). Although that unpublished affirmance is not even binding precent within the Eleventh Circuit, it nevertheless conflicted with a Fourth Circuit ruling (Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 2002)), and the Supreme Court has now stepped in to resolve the conflict. After the Supreme Court's virtual elimination of attorneys' fees under the "catalyst theory," a Supreme Court ruling in this case could deliver yet another serious blow to civil rights organizations and other "do-gooder" litigants. Stay tuned.....

Appoint a Floridian

What better way to start the Southern District of Florida blog than with a post suggesting that the next Supreme Court Justice come from sunny South Florida. A couple months ago, I wrote an oped for the Miami Herald suggesting just that. I reproduce it below. Although the oped suggests a Floridian in general, the Southern District should be a fertile place for President Bush to look if he is looking (as the rumors suggest) for bright young Hispanic conservative jurists. It was Justice O'Connor, in fact, who suggested that diversity benefited the institution. Here it is:


Appoint a Floridian
BY DAVID OSCAR MARKUS
http://www.markuslaw.com

The nine justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have served together longer than any other nine justices in recent history.

Nevertheless, President Bush may have the opportunity to appoint up to four justices to the court during his second term. Speculation has been increasing ever since Chief Justice William Rehnquist was diagnosed with thyroid cancer, requiring him to work from home and to participate only on a limited basis. The pundits have also pointed to Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor and Ruth Ginsburg as potential retirees.

There has been a great deal of discussion about whom Bush should appoint. But perhaps an equally important question is where this jurist should come from. Florida is the best choice.
No Floridian has ever been appointed to the Supreme Court. True, 18 other states are also unrepresented, but Florida's population is more than three times the size of the next largest of the 18, Wisconsin.

The current court is made up of justices from Arizona (Rehnquist and O'Connor), Illinois (Stevens), New York (Ginsburg), Massachusetts (Stephen Breyer), California (Anthony Kennedy), Georgia (Clarence Thomas), Virginia (Antonin Scalia) and New Hampshire (David Souter). Certainly there is a place for a Floridian. Consider the fact that we have produced some of the major cases to go before the court (Bush vs. Gore) and that we have more than 75,000 lawyers and judges to choose from. Only California (55), New York (31) and Texas (34) have more electoral votes than Florida (27).

In 1978, William J. Daniels attempted to discuss why the 19 states were not represented on the court, saying: ``The 19 states which have not yet had a person appointed to the court have tended to be the least populated of their region.''

O'Connor tried to explain it this way: ''The Supreme Court and other appellate courts benefit by having judges from diverse backgrounds and experiences.'' Unfortunately, ``there are fewer people of rural backgrounds to go around, on the bench or elsewhere.''

With all due respect to Idaho and the Dakotas, Florida seems to have bucked the rural label quite some time ago. And as for diversity, there is no more diverse state than Florida.
Back in 1978, Daniels concluded by saying, ``One can reasonably expect that presidents will continue to be concerned with the geographic factor, and that officials from the as yet unrepresented states will continue to call attention to their status when vacancies occur on the court.''

So here's an issue that all Floridians -- Republican, Democrat or independent -- can support: The next Supreme Court justice should come from our great state.

David Markus is a Miami criminal trial and appellate attorney at David Oscar Markus PLLC.