Mackenzie Garrity selected for the UM School of Law Stuart A. Markus award

Friends and readers of the blog know that my family set up an award in my Dad's name at the University of Miami School of Law after he passed away.  The Stuart A. Markus Award recognizes an individual student each year for outstanding work in one of the School of Law’s in-house clinics. The winner is selected by vote of the in-house, live-client clinic directors.  The first award went to Bethany Bandstra.  Other winners include Lindsay MacDonald, Brittany Hynes, Sarah Bujold, and Romney Manassa.

This year the Markus Award goes to Mackenzie Garrity.  I received this letter from Professor Kele Stewart summarizing her accomplishments:

In the fall 2019, the Innocence Clinic received the State’s response to a federal habeas petition filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Mackenzie naturally emerged as the leader of the group, while dealing with the time pressure and learning about a case the Clinic had been litigating since 2012. The specific law involved in federal habeas petitions is complex, which added to the pressures of the case. Mackenzie remained calm and focused in her work and kept the team calm and focused. Her research and writing on the project was excellent. Her ability to work with other students, while learning the area of federal habeas law was exemplary. She identified the weaknesses in the State’s arguments with a logic that far exceeded her status as a 2L. While this project took the majority of the semester to complete, Mackenzie performed other clinic duties with great detail, care and timeliness.
Mackenzie was also assigned to draft a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in case where the clinic had been waiting for a year to get a ruling on a 3.850 motion. Based on her draft of the Petition, the First District Court of Appeal issued a show cause order which in turn prompted the court to issue its long overdue order. 

The challenges posed by COVID-19 did not diminish Mackenzie’s dedication. She was assigned a case in which the Clinic has represented the client since 2013. The case has been hard-fought and an evidentiary hearing remains to be scheduled due to COVID-19 court restrictions. Mackenzie drafted a motion for the compassionate release of our elderly client who will be 80 in August and has diabetes among other ailments. This puts him at risk of death from COVID-19 according to the CDC. Mackenzie not only drafted the motion, but recognized the time sensitivity and drafted it  expeditiously. While there is no Florida law on the subject, she was able to find some authority and
analogize current federal law on the issue. After the motion was filed, the Judge ordered the State to respond and also ordered a response from the Department of Corrections. Most importantly, the Clinic was contacted by the prosecution to discuss a resolution that would result in the client’s release. Mackenzie has already drafted a response to the State’s forthcoming and anticipated response. Once the State’s response is received, her draft will be edited and a reply will be filed within hours.

Super Impressive.

My dad practiced law in Miami for over 50 years.  Throughout his career, he fought hard for his clients in every area of the law.  He never turned away a person in need, and helped countless people with practical, hands-on advice and representation that went far above and beyond the norm.  The Markus Award is given annually to a student who shares that caring spirit, and who has made a meaningful difference in someone’s life – which is something my dad did every day.

Congratulations to Mackenzie! 

And thanks to Professor Ricardo Bascuas and Georgina Angones for their help in both setting up this award and for looking after it every year.  It means a lot to me and my family.

RIP Albert Krieger (UPDATED with incredible stories from the judiciary and the bar in the comments)

UPDATE -- please take a moment and read the comments, which have wonderful stories and touching memories from judges and lawyers who saw Albert in action (including from Scott Srebnick, Judge Federico Moreno, Judge Milton Hirsch. Marty Weinberg, Jeffrey Kay, and many others).

This is a really sad one... Albert Krieger, one of the founding fathers of criminal defense, has passed away at 96.

After I saw him in court for the first time, I said to myself: "I could never be that good."  His voice.  His demeanor.  The way he crushed cooperating witnesses.  And he was so engaging out of court.  Happy to sit down with young lawyers and guide them.  If you had to craft a criminal defense lawyer, it would be Albert. He inspired so many of us. He will be missed.

He has defended some of the biggest cases in America, including John Gotti and Sal Magluta.  In the Gotti case, he was opposite John Gleeson, the lawyer that was just appointed in the Flynn case.

Check out Albert in this Charlie Rose interview. Classic Albert.  At the 9:30 mark, he explains why he decided to represent Gotti.  And at the 16 minute mark, he explains why maximum security prisons are unacceptable in a civilized society. He will fire you up! The guy was the best.



I will be posting stories and memories of Albert as they come up.  Please either email them to me at dmarkus@markuslaw.com or post them in the comments. 

News & Notes

1. Judge Singhal wrote this interesting and well-written order saying that it wasn't for courts to get involved in the decisions regarding the pandemic, which is left to other branches of government. Unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Judge Singhal said it's up to the government, not the judiciary:

There are no manuals on how to handle crises. However, there is a framework that provides an answer to who handles them. To govern is not the court’s role; rather, the power of judging must be separated from legislative and executive powers. See generally The Federalist, No. 47 (Hamilton). Under our system, leaders elected by the will of the people are entrusted with awesome responsibility. They must act within the framework set forth in our Constitution, using reasonable measures to further public health while safeguarding the citizenry’s inalienable rights. It is a balance, no doubt. And so long as the people’s elected leaders are working within the confines of the people’s constitutional rights, courts are not here to second-guess or micromanage their already unenviable jobs guiding us through profoundly unprecedented challenges.

2. Speaking of well-written and interesting, here's an article that Federal Defender Michael Caruso wrote about the awesome Cathy Wade:

At every court investiture and ceremony, no matter the honoree or occasion, there is one common denominator: a big shout out to Cathy Wade Babyak for making the event a success. But, Cathy, the Court’s Executive Services Administrator, does much more than plan courthouse functions—she is the person who is integral to the successful and smooth operation of one of the busiest federal judicial districts in the country.

There are also some good stories:

As you may imagine, Cathy has some stories to tell about the courthouse. One night at 10 p.m., Cathy received a call from the Warden of the Federal Detention Center. The
warden wanted to know why there were semi-trucks being parked around the courthouse. Apparently, a film crew had been given permission to film a movie in the ceremonial
courtroom. Little did anyone know that the crew would take over the entire 2nd floor of the Courthouse as well as the surrounding streets. In her typical fashion, Cathy stepped in, coordinated with the movie crew, and actually directed the director to be quiet because they were disturbing court. The highlight for Cathy was meeting and
spending time with Bill Murray.

 3.  My friend Lawrence Zimmerman has this thoughtful post on the presumption of innocence on Don Samuel's new blog. You know Don... he's the guy who writes the 11th Circuit Handbook (our federal cheat sheet in court).  The post is worth reading, and the blog is worth following.  Here's the conclusion:

We have a duty to educate the public when we can and not allow the media machine to cloud the public’s view of the trial process - with their instinct to condemn, convict and move on to another story. By failing to give these men accused of heinous crimes a fair trial, we will deprive the community of the justice that was already denied Arbery. Despite the clamor of the rightfully outraged public for a rush to judgment it is our job to uphold the Constitution. And it may take time.

4.   Finally, we have some really great magistrate judges.  One of them is Patrick Hunt who is up for re-appointment.  Jon Sale is heading up the committee.  Please make sure to send him your positive feedback at FLSD_MagistrateJudgeRecruitment@flsd.uscourts.gov

Washington Post opinion piece on Michael Flynn

I wrote this editorial for the Washington Post today.  It was going up on the website just as the news broke that Judge Sullivan appointed Judge Gleeson to argue against DOJ's motion to dismiss.  Really interesting.  I'd love to hear your thoughts.  Here's the introduction:

U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on Tuesday took action to delay the Justice Department’s move to drop charges against former national security adviser Michael Flynn. Sullivan says he expects legal experts and independent groups to weigh in on the department’s decision not to prosecute Flynn for lying to the FBI.

The judge’s ruling was a mistake: He should have immediately dismissed the case. Sullivan certainly should not heed those urging him to deny the Justice Department motion, which would force prosecutors and Flynn to a sentencing hearing or a trial that neither party wants. John Gleeson, a former judge, and two others thoughtfully argued this week that Sullivan should do just that. And on the heels of that opinion, Sullivan has appointed Gleeson to argue against the motion to dismiss and to explore whether Flynn should be held in contempt.

Judges, though, have no special interest in forcing prosecutors to prosecute. The nation’s court system is meant to adjudicate disputes between parties and to protect defendants from overreaching prosecutors. It is an adversary system, meaning that each side is responsible for presenting its own case.

"Why would federal prosecutors exercise the tremendous discretion entrusted to them with such a lack of compassion?"

That’s how Judge Charles Breyer ends this must read opinion in which he rejects a plea agreement where the government tried to get a defendant to agree to waive bringing a compassionate release motion until 180 days after asking BOP.

Breyer makes so many good points in his Order:

— that Congress said compassionate release should be available after 30 days, not 180.  So why should DOJ undue that provision.  (And even the 30 days can be waived in an emergency like this pandemic).

— Compassionate release isn’t only available in times of global crisis, like corona.  But there are lots of other times both for the individual and for other people in the family: “A terminal diagnosis. The death of a parent caring for his or her children alone while their other parent is imprisoned. An accident that renders a person unable to feed, bathe, or move without assistance. Compassionate release exists to address these calamities as well."

— It’s not good enough to say that this is a contract with parties bargaining because those parties are not on equal footing:  "It is no answer to say that Funez Osorto is striking a deal with the Government, and could reject this term if he wanted to, because that statement does not reflect the reality of the bargaining table."  This is one reason why courts should be able to reject plea deals when they are too harsh but not when they are too lenient.  Courts are there to check the government’s immense power, as Breyer is doing in this case.

Read the whole thing.  In the meantime, here’s the introduction and the conclusion:

Must a term of imprisonment be set in stone, no matter what happens after it is imposed? Should a court be able to reduce a sentence when unforeseeable tragedies change its consequences? What if the defendant’s children are effectively orphaned by the death of their other parent? What if a debilitating injury makes it impossible for the defendant to care for him or herself in prison, or recidivate outside of it? What if a terminal diagnosis turns a brief term of imprisonment for a minor crime into a life sentence? What if a global pandemic poses a mortal risk to an immunocompromised inmate who nobody intended to die in jail? When should a court be able to consider such events and revise a previously imposed sentence accordingly? How difficult should it be for a defendant to request this type of relief?
Congress has provided one set of answers to these questions, in the First Step Act of 2019. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The United States attorney’s office has very different answers in this case, for this defendant. See Plea Agreement (dkt. 206) ¶ 5. Because those answers undermine Congressional intent and all but foreclose this defendant’s ability to request a critical form of relief, the Court rejects the proposed Plea Agreement.
***
It is no answer to say that Funez Osorto is striking a deal with the Government, and could reject this term if he wanted to, because that statement does not reflect the reality of the bargaining table. See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1413, 1414–15 (2010). As to terms such as this one, plea agreements are contracts of adhesion. The Government offers the defendant a deal, and the defendant can take it or leave it. Id. (“American prosecutors . . choose whether to engage in plea negotiations and the terms of an acceptable agreement.”). If he leaves it, he does so at his peril. And the peril is real, because on the other side of the offer is the enormous power of the United States Attorney to investigate, to order arrests, to bring a case or to dismiss it, to recommend a sentence or the conditions of supervised release, and on and on. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. Am. Judicature Soc’y 18, 18 (1940). Now imagine the choice the Government has put Funez Osorto to. All that power—and the all too immediate consequences of opposing it—weighed against the chance to request release in desperate and unknowable circumstances that may not come to pass. That Faustian choice is not really a choice at all for a man in the defendant’s shoes. But the Court has a choice, and it will not approve the bargain.
That leaves only one question, which is why? Why would federal prosecutors exercise the tremendous discretion entrusted to them with such a lack of compassion? Defendants released through the compassionate release program are less than a tenth as likely to recidivate as the average federal prisoner. Inspector General Report at 49–50. And the Department of Justice itself estimates that broader use of compassionate release could save taxpayers millions and free desperately needed space in BOP facilities. Id. at 45–48. The waiver of compassionate release is senseless.

The order reminds me of one of the first cases I had as a young public defender before Judge Norman Roettger.  For those of you who don’t know Roettger, he had a handlebar mustache and wore a gun around his ankle in court... The young prosecutor at the time put in an appellate waiver into the plea agreement as was his orders from above.  I told him we couldn’t agree to it.  But the prosecutor told me that he had no discretion to take it out.  Either we go to trial, plead straight up to the indictment, or agree to the provision.  I couldn’t understand why the prosecutor was being so difficult about it.  My supervisor at the time told me that Judge Roettger was vocal about not accepting these provisions and that we should just set it for plea and let the judge know what was happening.  So we show up for court and tell the judge about the proposed deal.  He asked the young prosecutor: “So do you work for the Department of Justice of the Department of INJUSTICE!!?? What if I commit legal error?  Shouldn’t the defendant be permitted to appeal and correct that legal error?!”  He then made the prosecutor scratch out that provision in front of a packed courtroom and took the plea agreement without it.  Quite a moment, especially for a young lawyer who was nervous about the gun making an appearance.

What a week in the world of white collar criminal law (UPDATED)

Last week was white collar law overload. Bridgegate (convictions reversed by SCOTUS). Varsity Blues (motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct denied). Michael Flynn (prosecutors move to dismiss). And more.

Some random thoughts about these cases:

1. Why does it take the Supreme Court (9-0) to continue to reverse fraud convictions. The government is clearly overreaching with these statutes and yet lower courts almost never dismiss.

2. Same with respect to lower courts and prosecutorial misconduct. They almost never dismiss on prosecutorial misconduct claims, so it was no surprise that the district judge did not dismiss the Lori Loughlin case. Why not? How will prosecutors ever get the point that they should not engage in such behavior. Maybe the Loughlin lawyers will now file a motion to dismiss based on Bridgegate. After all, if fraud requires obtaining money or property, then lying to gain college admission may not be enough for wire fraud.

3. There has been lots of criticism for the in the Flynn case. But let's take a step back for a second. Remember that Flynn had moved to vacate his plea because the new DC prosecutors had recently turned over Brady material that had yet to be disclosed. We should be applauding the prosecutors for doing that. (A big shout out to Michael Sherwin, the DC supervisory prosecutor who made sure that disclosure happened after previous prosecutors did not disclose). If the judge had vacated the plea and allowed Flynn to go to trial, would the critics have been happier if the government had gotten spanked at trial? This was a distinct possibility because the lead witness for the government was former agent Peter Strozk. Imagine that cross! Comey would likely have also been a witness... Anyway, let's hope this materiality standard explained by Barr in the Flynn dismissal memo is used across the board for criminal defendants. Wouldn't that be a good thing? Of course our justice system should not be politicized, but there is quite a bit to grab onto in that Flynn motion to dismiss.

4. Some have said that the Flynn judge should deny the motion to dismiss. That is a bad idea and would set a very bad precedent. The Department of Justice brought the case. It's their prerogative to drop the case. That's how the adversary system works. Judges do not dismiss criminal cases when the defense asks. Now they aren't going to dismiss when the prosecutor asks? Rule number 1: never dismiss cases. Rule number 2: when in doubt, see rule number 1.

UPDATE 5. Mary B. McCord, an acting assistant attorney general for national security at the Justice Department from 2016 to 2017, wrote this op-ed in the New York Times, called "Bill Barr Twisted My Words in Dropping the Flynn Case. Here’s the Truth." I have to laugh in reading her piece. She complains that the 302 of her interview is "an interesting read" with "colorful adjectives" that "twist[s] her words." Now that's rich. The criminal defense bar has always said that 302 reports summarizing interviews are wholly unreliable and that interviews should be recorded. Prosecutors and investigative agencies like the FBI and DEA refuse to record and judges let agents testify from these reports about their interviews. McCord worked at DOJ for decades. Under her watch, thousands of non-recorded interviews took place and prosecutions relied on 302 and other interview reports to convict people. Now that she is reading her own 302, she complains. Welcome to the defense bar, Ms. McCord.

Blue Angels fly over Ferguson courthouse

First loop around downtown pic.twitter.com/L2AX1yg86z

— David Oscar Markus (@domarkus) May 8, 2020

Blue Angels flying over downtown Miami pic.twitter.com/ZBXcHVRLcp

— David Oscar Markus (@domarkus) May 8, 2020

Bridgegate convictions reversed

9-0 per Kagan.

Another example of the lower courts not stepping up and letting prosecutors run wild using fraud statutes.

Kagan's introduction:

For four days in September 2013, traffic ground to a halt in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The cause was an unannounced realignment of 12 toll lanes leading to the George Washing-ton Bridge, an entryway into Manhattan administered by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. For decades, three of those access lanes had been reserved during morning rush hour for commuters coming from the streets of Fort Lee. But on these four days—with predictable consequences—only a single lane was set aside. The public officials who ordered that change claimed they were reducing the number of dedicated lanes to conduct a traffic study.In fact, they did so for a political reason—to punish the mayor of Fort Lee for refusing to support the New Jersey Governor’s reelection bid. Exposure of their behavior led to the criminal convictions we review here. The Government charged the responsible officials under the federal statutes prohibiting wire fraud and fraud on a federally funded program or entity. See 18 U. S. C. §§1343, 666(a)(1)(A). Both those laws target fraudulent schemes for obtaining property. See §1343 (barring fraudulent schemes “for obtaining money or property”);§666(a)(1)(A) (making it a crime to “obtain[] by fraud . . . property”). The jury convicted the defendants, and the lower courts upheld the verdicts.The question presented is whether the defendants com-mitted property fraud. The evidence the jury heard no doubt shows wrongdoing—deception, corruption, abuse of power. But the federal fraud statutes at issue do not criminalize all such conduct. Under settled precedent, the offi-cials could violate those laws only if an object of their dis-honesty was to obtain the Port Authority’s money or property. The Government contends it was, because the officials sought both to “commandeer” the Bridge’s access lanes and to divert the wage labor of the Port Authority employees used in that effort. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58. We disagree. The realignment of the toll lanes was an exercise of regulatory power—something this Court has already held fails to meet the statutes’ property requirement. And the employees’ labor was just the incidental cost of that regulation, rather than itself an object of the officials’ scheme. We therefore reverse the convictions.