Happy Birthday to the blog!

The Southern District of Florida Blog was launched July 4th weekend 2005 with this post. Six years later, this is the 1,863 post. The blog is averaging over 500 visitors a day.

I just wanted to thank all of you (defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges, civil lawyers, and others) for stopping by and reading, and for emailing me tips. The blog wouldn't work without you.

This is the most fun district in the country -- we have the best cases, the most trials, and the most interesting stories.

Have a great 4th of July weekend.

Thanks,

--David Oscar Markus

Judge Cooke finds 300+ year mandatory sentence for juvenile unconstitutional

Here's the money passage:

Here, Mathurin faces a mandatory minimum 307-year sentence. Because Congress has abolished the federal parole system, this sentence gives Mathurin no possibility of release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. A significant portion of this sentence is comprised of mandatory 25-year consecutive sentences required under § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides:

[N]o term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.

Under Graham, this provision of § 924(c)(1)(D) is unconstitutional as applied to Mathurin, a juvenile offender convicted of non-homicide offenses. To apply the statute in accordance with the Eighth Amendment, severance of the constitutionally offensive portion of § 924(c)(1)(D) is necessary.

Judge Cooke ends up finding the rest of the statute can be saved and sentences James Mathurin to 40 years in prison, meaning he will get out in his 50s, instead of spending the rest of his life in jail. Here's the entire order.

Cooke Finds Sentence Unconstitutional

Vanishing precedent

Rojas isn’t gone only from the Eleventh Circuit’s website. It’s gone from Westlaw and apparently everywhere else as well. The Federal Public Defender has been fielding requests for copies of the mysteriously vanished decision. Here it is:
Rojas

“I’m almost speechless. It’s a kinder, gentler day over there. It happens so infrequently.”

That was Judge Altonaga at a hearing on a passport fraud violation for a Navy petty officer after the government offered pretrial diversion. Both the NY Times and the Miami Herald has been covering the case. From the Herald:

While common in state court, pretrial diversions are so rare in the South Florida federal system that Altonaga said it left her “speechless,” and appeared to reflect “a kinder gentler” prosecutorial office.

They happen so infrequently, she added, that it was unclear whether the clerk’s office in the downtown Miami courthouse knew how to process one.

The idea is to give someone facing charges an opportunity to avoid prosecution through a program designed by the U.S. Probation Services, such as doing community service or perhaps taking a civics class.

Without speaking to the specifics of the Dawkins case, Todd W. Mestepey deputy chief of special prosecutions at the Miami U.S. Attorney’s Office, explained it this way Tuesday:

“Participants who successfully complete the program will not be charged or, if charged, will have the charges against them dismissed. Unsuccessful participants are returned for prosecution.”

***

Mestepey said the Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney’s office consult through their chain of command on a “pretrial diversion” package.

“Politics do not play a role in the decision,” he added.

In court, the case prosecutor, Olivia S. Choe, also raised with the judge the issue of what she called “pretrial publicity” in the case. The New York Times, Miami Herald, CNN and Wired magazine had all put a spotlight on the case of the combat vet turned captive, with the Associated Press distributing a version of The Herald’s article.

The judge seemed unconcerned. “I read one,” she replied, without specifying.

I bet it wasn't Wired...

Tuesday News and Notes

1. Mark Cuban files a pretty funny pleading with a picture from the championship.

2. The State AG's office has asked Judge Martinez to reconsider his ruling finding the Florida death penalty unconstitutional.

3. Strangely, the U.S. v. Rojas case (finding the Fair Sentencing Act applied to all defendants sentenced after August 2010) has disappeared from the 11th Circuit website.

"Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat."

Says Justice Scalia in today's 7-2 opinion in California v. Entertainment Merchants Association, striking down a California law that restricted the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.

I wonder if Justice Scalia actually played Mortal Kombat before writing that in footnote 4. At least he ruled for the First Amendment and struck down the statute. More fun from his opinion:

California’s argument would fare better if there were alongstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none. Certainly the books we give children to read—orread to them when they are younger—contain no shortageof gore. Grimm’s Fairy Tales, for example, are grim indeed. As her just deserts for trying to poison Snow White, the wicked queen is made to dance in red hot slippers “till she fell dead on the floor, a sad example of envy and jealousy.” The Complete Brothers Grimm Fairy Tales 198 (2006 ed.). Cinderella’s evil stepsisters have their eyes pecked out by doves. Id., at 95. And Hansel and Gretel (children!) kill their captor by baking her in an oven. Id., at 54.
High-school reading lists are full of similar fare. Homer’s Odysseus blinds Polyphemus the Cyclops bygrinding out his eye with a heated stake. The Odyssey ofHomer, Book IX, p. 125 (S. Butcher & A. Lang transls.1909) (“Even so did we seize the fiery-pointed brand and whirled it round in his eye, and the blood flowed about the heated bar. And the breath of the flame singed his eyelids and brows all about, as the ball of the eye burnt away, and the roots thereof crackled in the flame”). In the Inferno, Dante and Virgil watch corrupt politicians struggle to stay submerged beneath a lake of boiling pitch, lest they beskewered by devils above the surface. Canto XXI, pp.187–189 (A. Mandelbaum transl. Bantam Classic ed.1982). And Golding’s Lord of the Flies recounts how a schoolboy called Piggy is savagely murdered by other children while marooned on an island. W. Golding, Lord of the Flies 208–209 (1997 ed.).FOOTNOTE 4

FOOTNOTE 4: JUSTICE ALITO accuses us of pronouncing that playing violent video games “is not different in ‘kind’ ” from reading violent literature. Post, at 2. Well of course it is different in kind, but not in a way that causesthe provision and viewing of violent video games, unlike the provision and reading of books, not to be expressive activity and hence not toenjoy First Amendment protection. Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat.But these cultural and intellectual differences are not constitutional ones. Crudely violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The Divine Comedy,and restrictions upon them must survive strict scrutiny—a question to which we devote our attention in Part III, infra. Even if we can see in them “nothing of any possible value to society . . . , they are as muchentitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.” Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948).

Big defense wins in the 11th Circuit

Friday afternoon was a rare time in the 11th Circuit -- two published opinions in favor of criminal defendants.

First up is a win by rising star AFPD Sowmya Bharathi in U.S. v. Rojas, No. 10-14662 (11th Cir. June 24, 2011):

The issue in this appeal is whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), applies to defendants who committed crack cocaine offenses before August 3, 2010, the date of its enactment, but who are sentenced thereafter. We conclude that it does.
***
We conclude that the FSA applies to defendants like Vera Rojas who had
not yet been sentenced by the date of the FSA’s enactment. The interest in
honoring clear Congressional intent, as well as principles of fairness, uniformity,
and administrability, necessitate our conclusion. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand to the district court for re-sentencing.

Next up is a win by Richard Klugh in U.S. v. Ladson, No. 10-10151 (11th Cir. June 24, 2011):

Ladson argues that the Government did not file and serve an information
containing notice of an enhanced sentence in accordance with § 851(a)(1). We agree
that he was not served before trial with a copy of the information in accordance with
§ 851(a)(1), and thus the district court lacked authority to impose an enhanced
sentence on Counts I and II under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), (C), and 846.
We therefore vacate Ladson’s mandatory term of life imprisonment on Count I and
ten-year sentence on Count II, and remand with instructions to resentence Ladson on
Counts I and II without the § 851 sentence enhancement under the second
information. We affirm the judgment of conviction on Counts I, II, and IV.

Most quotable AND best dressed

"Their lawsuit is like Castro trying to seize Miami homes from families who fled from Cuba. Their lawsuit, if they win it, will create a precedent that Castro and Chavez can come in and sue every political refugee in Miami and seize their houses." That's Mike Tein on the cover of today's DBR. Plus I love the suit, but could never pull it off.

In other news, the Supreme Court really means what it says in the Confrontation Clause cases. From the WaPo:

The constitutional guarantee that a defendant be able to confront his accusers means prosecutors must produce even the technicians involved in the specific laboratory tests used in his trial, the Supreme Court ruled Thursday.

In a case involving a drunken driver from New Mexico, a majority of the court reinforced its recent decisions that fortified the right of defendants to cross-examine witnesses, established in the Sixth Amendment.

The rulings have scrambled the court’s usual ideological pairings, with Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg the most vigorous defenders of defendants’ rights in such circumstances.

Ginsburg wrote Thursday’s opinion, which said defendant Donald Bullcoming should have had the opportunity to cross-examine the lab analyst who provided the main evidence in his trial: a lab report showing his high blood-alcohol level. New Mexico prosecutors instead had called another analyst who had no role in performing the specific test.

“The Sixth Amendment does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because a court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination,” Ginsburg said.

Scalia and Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan agreed with the decision, but only Scalia joined Ginsburg’s opinion in full.