Justice Scalia called "friend" of criminal defendants...

...by the LA Times. So there, Rumpole. Check it out:

Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court's most outspoken and combative conservative, is not often described as friendly to criminals.

But in recent years, Scalia has led an unusual pro-defendant faction at the high court in reversing convictions for murder, drug dealing, wife beating and drunken driving.

Next up in early December is a Chicago rapist who claims his 6th Amendment right to confront his accusers was violated because prosecutors did not put on the witness stand a lab technician from Maryland who conducted the DNA test that sent him to prison.

This claim might have been a loser even during the court's long-past liberal era. But with the relentless Scalia leading the charge, it may well succeed, a prospect that worries prosecutors and crime lab directors across the nation.

Sometimes, Scalia's insistence on following the "original" Constitution leads to unexpected results. And for him, there are no shades of gray and no halfway measures.

The 6th Amendment to the Constitution says the "accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him." To Scalia, this clause not only gives defendants the right to challenge actual witnesses, but also the right to bar testimony from all those "witnesses" who did not or cannot testify in court. He takes this view even if the witness is dead.

Three years ago, Scalia led the court in reversing the murder conviction of a Los Angeles man who shot and killed his girlfriend. A police officer testified the victim had reported that Dwayne Giles threatened to kill her. Scalia said that testimony violated Giles' rights because he could not confront or cross-examine her.

"We decline to approve an exception to the Confrontation Clause unheard of at the time of the founding," Scalia said for 6-3 majority. This went too far for liberal Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer.

"Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat."

Says Justice Scalia in today's 7-2 opinion in California v. Entertainment Merchants Association, striking down a California law that restricted the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.

I wonder if Justice Scalia actually played Mortal Kombat before writing that in footnote 4. At least he ruled for the First Amendment and struck down the statute. More fun from his opinion:

California’s argument would fare better if there were alongstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none. Certainly the books we give children to read—orread to them when they are younger—contain no shortageof gore. Grimm’s Fairy Tales, for example, are grim indeed. As her just deserts for trying to poison Snow White, the wicked queen is made to dance in red hot slippers “till she fell dead on the floor, a sad example of envy and jealousy.” The Complete Brothers Grimm Fairy Tales 198 (2006 ed.). Cinderella’s evil stepsisters have their eyes pecked out by doves. Id., at 95. And Hansel and Gretel (children!) kill their captor by baking her in an oven. Id., at 54.
High-school reading lists are full of similar fare. Homer’s Odysseus blinds Polyphemus the Cyclops bygrinding out his eye with a heated stake. The Odyssey ofHomer, Book IX, p. 125 (S. Butcher & A. Lang transls.1909) (“Even so did we seize the fiery-pointed brand and whirled it round in his eye, and the blood flowed about the heated bar. And the breath of the flame singed his eyelids and brows all about, as the ball of the eye burnt away, and the roots thereof crackled in the flame”). In the Inferno, Dante and Virgil watch corrupt politicians struggle to stay submerged beneath a lake of boiling pitch, lest they beskewered by devils above the surface. Canto XXI, pp.187–189 (A. Mandelbaum transl. Bantam Classic ed.1982). And Golding’s Lord of the Flies recounts how a schoolboy called Piggy is savagely murdered by other children while marooned on an island. W. Golding, Lord of the Flies 208–209 (1997 ed.).FOOTNOTE 4

FOOTNOTE 4: JUSTICE ALITO accuses us of pronouncing that playing violent video games “is not different in ‘kind’ ” from reading violent literature. Post, at 2. Well of course it is different in kind, but not in a way that causesthe provision and viewing of violent video games, unlike the provision and reading of books, not to be expressive activity and hence not toenjoy First Amendment protection. Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat.But these cultural and intellectual differences are not constitutional ones. Crudely violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The Divine Comedy,and restrictions upon them must survive strict scrutiny—a question to which we devote our attention in Part III, infra. Even if we can see in them “nothing of any possible value to society . . . , they are as muchentitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.” Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948).

Justice Scalia calls other justices insane

I just love it. From his dissent today in Sykes v. United States:

JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting.
As the Court's opinion acknowledges, this case is “an-other in a series,” ante, at 1. More specifically, it is an at-tempt to clarify, for the fourth time since 2007, whatdistinguishes “violent felonies” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C.§924(e)(2)(B)(ii), from other crimes. See James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007); Begay v. United States, 553
U. S. 137 (2008); Chambers v. United States, 555 U. S. 122 (2009). We try to include an ACCA residual-clause case inabout every second or third volume of the United States Reports.

As was perhaps predictable, instead of producing a clar-ification of the Delphic residual clause, today’s opinion produces a fourth ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion. Insanity, it has been said, is doing the samething over and over again, but expecting different results. Four times is enough. We should admit that ACCA’s residual provision is a drafting failure and declare it void for vagueness. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357 (1983).
***
We face a Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of laws in general, and of criminal laws in particular. It should be no surprise that as the volume increases, so do the number of imprecise laws. And no surprise that our indulgence of imprecisions that violate the Constitution encourages imprecisions that violate the Constitution. Fuzzy, leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation is attractive to the Congressman who wants credit for addressing a national problem but does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the nittygritty. In the field of criminal law, at least, it is time to call a halt. I do not think it would be a radical step — indeed, I think it would be highly responsible — to limit ACCA to the named violent crimes. Congress can quickly add what it wishes. Because the majority prefers to let vagueness reign, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Scalia gets ticket in car accident

Apparently he was following a little too closely to the car in front of him:

The accident happened just before 9 a.m. on what was to be a big day for the jurist: The nation’s highest court was hearing arguments in the massive Wal-Mart gender discrimination case. According to U.S. Park Police, Scalia was driving south on the parkway approaching Roosevelt Bridge when he rear-ended a car that had stopped for traffic, triggering a chain reaction. Brooke Salkoff saw it all go down. The former NBC reporter told us she was just behind Scalia’s vehicle, a shiny black BMW in the left lane. “It slammed into the car in front of his, which pushed the other two forward,” and caused them all to skew into the right lane, she said. Now, just as when you're in a fancy restaurant and everyone turns their head to see who walked in, it’s only natural that everyone driving along a major commuter route out of McLean would want to rubberneck at something like this. Salkoff did, as her car inched past, and was rewarded by a surprising glimpse of a familiar face. Scalia was in a dress shirt, no jacket, with an unknotted bowtie hanging around his neck — and, interestingly enough, turned out to be driving himself. The car in front of his appeared pretty badly banged up, the other two less so. Scalia made it to the bench, though, in time for arguments at 10 a.m., a court spokeswoman said. No doubt in Salkoff’s mind that Scalia was at fault, as the driver who failed to brake. “I think that’s an originalist interpretation,” she quipped. Indeed, said the Park Police’s Sgt. David Schlosser, the justice got a ticket for following too closely. Fine: $70, plus a $20 special assessment, or, said Schlosser, “he can contest it in court.”

I volunteer to represent him for free.

"Why don’t we just abolish the exclusionary rule? That would be really simple. Whatever evidence tends to prove the truth comes in.”

Uh-oh. That was Justice Scalia this morning in Davis v. United States:

JUSTICE SCALIA: Actually, why don't we just abolish the exclusionary rule? That would be really simple. Whatever evidence tends to prove the truth comes in. That would be a very simple system if we're looking for just simplicity, wouldn't it?

MR. DREEBEN: It would be an extremely simple system.

JUSTICE SCALIA: You're not proposing that, though?

MR. DREEBEN: Not in this case, because this case represents only an application of existing doctrine in the Court with respect to the purposes of the exclusionary rule.

As much as Scalia is the best friend of criminal defendants in 6th Amendment and sentencing cases, he is no friend of the 4th Amendment.

Volokh conspirator Orin Kerr argued for Mr. Davis in a case out of the 11th Circuit, and definitely held his own in a very difficult case. According to ScotusBlog:

Kerr, asking the Court to avoid simple labels, said the main problem with expanding the “good faith” exception so as to allow police to rely on Circuit Court precedent was that it would compromise the effect of the later Supreme Court ruling rejecting that precedent. Lawyers, the professor contended, would be discouraged from taking test cases to the Supreme Court to try to get new rules of Fourth Amendment law if it turned out that their client could not benefit from it: as soon as they asked for a new rule, the prosecution would counter that the “good faith” exception would take hold, and the client would lose anyway — even while winning on the constitutional point. That scenario, Kerr said, would mean the Supreme Court was merely issuing “advisory opinions,” and defense lawyers would see no reason to go for such unhelpful results.

The whole transcript is here. It's an interesting read.

In other SCOTUS news, the 9th Circuit got slapped. The LA Times:

The U.S. Supreme Court reinstated a Sacramento man's conviction and life sentence Monday for the rape of a 72-year-old woman in her apartment, dismissing an appellate court's decision that the prosecutor may have had racial reasons for removing two African Americans from the jury.

The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco had granted a new trial to Steven Frank Jackson in July. The court said the prosecutor at Jackson's 2004 trial had used pretexts to justify his challenges to the two African American jurors, because the reasons he gave could have applied to jurors he left on the panel.

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous ruling, called the appeals court decision "inexplicable." The appellate judges should have deferred to state court rulings that upheld the prosecutor's explanations, the high court said.
***
"There was simply no basis for the Ninth Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive manner," the court said.

Yikes.

While we're on the Supreme Court, it granted cert today in a sad case from the 11th, Maples v. Alabama. The issue: Whether the Eleventh Circuit properly held that there was no “cause” to excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless for the default, the state's own conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner's attorneys of record were no longer functioning as his agents at the time of any default.

Pretty crazy what happened in the case -- a death-row inmate missed a filing deadline that he never knew about because a BigLaw mailroom clerk messed up. The 11th Circuit said the Alabama courts were correct to procedurally default Maples, saying that finality wins out. Off you go to get your needle. No joke. Judge Barkett dissented and the Supremes took cert. (Judge Barkett's dissents are paying off). Here is the NY Times coverage of the case after former SG Gregory Garre of Latham & Watkins filed the cert petition.

Full disclosure -- I worked on the NACDL amicus brief filed in the 11th Circuit. Lisa Blatt of Arnold & Porter wrote excellent amicus briefs in the case.

UPDATED -- The New York Times covers the grant here. This is shocking to me: Troy King, Alabama’s attorney general, wrote that Mr. Maples had been represented by “a team of attorneys from a multimillion-dollar law firm” who should know that rules are rules.

“Filing deadlines apply to death row inmates,” Mr. King wrote. “Countless attorneys have missed filing deadlines over the years, and state and federal courts routinely dismissed their client’s tardy appeal as a consequence. This case is no different, and it presents nothing new or nationally compelling.”

Um, no different?! A man's life is on the line. Jeez.

Justice Scalia issues strong dissent in favor of criminal defendant

Here is his intro in Michigan v. Bryant:

Today’s tale—a story of five officers conducting successive examinations of a dying man with the primary purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his testimony regarding his killer, but of protecting him, them, and others from a murderer somewhere on the loose—is so transparently false that professing to believe it demeans this institution. But reaching a patently incorrect conclusion on the facts is a relatively benign judicial mischief; it affects, after all, only the case at hand. In its vain attempt to make the incredible plausible, however—or perhaps as an intended second goal—today’s opinion distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort. Because I continue to adhere to the Confrontation Clause that the Peoplea dopted, as described in Crawford v. Washington, 541
U. S. 36 (2004), I dissent.

The conclusion is strong too:

Judicial decisions, like the Constitution itself, are nothing more than “parchment barriers,” 5 Writings of James Madison 269, 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). Both depend on a judicial culture that understands its constitutionally assigned role, has the courage to persist in that role when it means announcing unpopular decisions, and has the modesty to persist when it produces results that go against the judges’ policy preferences. Today’s opinion falls far short of living up to that obligation—short on the facts, and short on the law. For all I know, Bryant has received his just deserts. But he surely has not received them pursuant to the procedures that our Constitution requires. And what has been taken away from him has been taken away from us all.

Justice Ginsburg also dissented in a short opinion.

Justice Sotomayor, a former prosecutor, wrote the majority opinion, which held:

[The witness] Covington’s identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were not testimonial statements because they had a “primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an on-going emergency.” Davis, 547 U. S., at 822. Therefore, their admission at Bryant’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

Yikes. I stick to what I have said before that Justice Scalia is the criminal defendant's best friend on this Court. I know that's not saying much, but it's true.

Justice Scalia complains of an “Alfred Hitchcock line of…jurisprudence.”

A unanimous Supreme Court (per Alito) in NASA v. Nelson upheld the government's right to conduct background checks on employees. Justice Scalia (along with Justice Thomas) concurred, saying that the Court again refused to answer the main questions presented by the case and that the minimalist strategy of the Court is bad for lower courts and others trying to figure out what the case means. From the NY Times:

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Clarence Thomas, issued a caustic concurrence. He said he “of course” agreed with the result in the case, saying the plaintiffs’ objections to the background checks were ridiculous.

“The contention that a right deeply rooted in our history and tradition bars the government from ensuring that the Hubble telescope is not used by recovering drug addicts” is, he said, “farcical.”

But Justice Scalia aimed his harshest criticism at the six justices who signed the majority opinion, returning to a theme he pressed last year — that the court is violating its duty and harming its reputation in issuing vague decisions.

“Whatever the virtues of judicial minimalism,” he wrote, “it cannot justify judicial incoherence.”

The majority opinion, he continued, “provides no guidance whatsoever for lower courts” and “will dramatically increase the number of lawsuits claiming violations of the right to informational privacy.” Though the court ruled against the plaintiffs, he said, the majority opinion amounts to “a generous gift to the plaintiffs’ bar.”

Justice Scalia said he would have taken a simpler approach in the case, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530.

“I would simply hold that there is no constitutional right to ‘informational privacy,’ ” Justice Scalia wrote.

“Like many other desirable things not included in the Constitution,” he wrote, “ ‘informational privacy’ seems liked a good idea.” But he said it should be enacted through legislation rather than imposed by judges through constitutional interpretation.

While we are on the subject of fun writing, Judge Carnes is at it again, this time in Carolyn Zisser v. The Florida Bar. The intro:

This case reminds us of the observation of the Grand Inquisitor in Gilbert and Sullivan’s The Gondoliers. Upon finding that all ranks of commoners and servants have been promoted to the nobility, he protests that there is a need for distinction, explaining that: “When everyone is somebody, then no one’s anybody.”* The same is true of a state bar’s certification process. If every attorney who practices in an area is certified in it, then no one is anybody in that
field. The easier it is to be certified, the less that certification means. The goal of the Florida Bar’s certification process is to recognize in various fields of specialization exceptional attorneys, meaning those who stand out from others in all of the ways that make an attorney outstanding. To ensure that certification achieves its purpose, the Bar has established a body of rules and procedures, including a confidential peer review process, so that an attorney
certified in an area of practice truly is “somebody” in that field. Without such rules and procedures, the process, the decisions it produces, and the resulting recognition would not amount to much.

*W. S. Gilbert, The Savoy Operas 543 (Wordsworth Editions 1994) (1889) (spelling altered).

Unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia is a techie

I posted last week about how Justice Breyer didn't really understand text messaging or Facebook. Well, Justice Scalia is different -- he even has an iPad and an iPod! From ABT:

By this point, the conversation started to shift into the home stretch, so Jan Crawford turned to fun stuff and lighter fare. She asked Justice Scalia: Do you have an iPod?
One might have expected Scalia, whose jurisprudence often involves traveling back in time to when particular constitutional provisions were enacted, to declare that he listens to all his music on a Victrola — but no. As it turns out, he does have an iPod!
This response seemed to catch Crawford by surprise. She asked him if he uploads the music himself; he said that he does, and that his playlist consists mostly of classical music and opera.
(It’s amusing to imagine Justice Scalia, one of the greatest legal minds in our nation, loading up his own iPod like a mere mortal. Couldn’t he ask a staffer to do it, or maybe one of his many grandchildren? But then again, if Justice Elena Kagan can fetch her own pizza, then Justice Scalia can load his own iPod.)
As it turns out, Scalia is more tech-savvy than one might have expected from a 74-year-old. He composes his opinions on a computer (unlike Chief Justice Roberts, who writes in longhand). In fact, said Scalia, “I can hardly write in longhand anymore” — which he’s reminded of whenever he has to write a handwritten condolence note.
When he has to take materials home for work, he uses a thumb drive, or accesses the Court computer system remotely. And perhaps most excitingly, as I previously reported on Twitter, Scalia has an iPad! He uses it for working at home; staff members load the parties’ briefs on to it.

I wonder whether the SDFLA judges are more like Breyer or Scalia. I know many of them email from their phones (I actually saw one judge recently in her car emailing as she was driving), but do they Facebook, Twitter, read the blogs, etc?

There's lots more fun stuff at ABT on Scalia, so go check it out.

"Some of the Grimm’s fairy tales are quite grim." -- Justice Scalia during oral argument yesterday

So were some of those election results...

Here's the NY Times article on the violent video game argument in the Supreme Court:

The law would impose $1,000 fines on stores that sell violent video games to people under 18. It defined violent games as those “in which the range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering or sexually assaulting an image of a human being” in a way that is “patently offensive,” appeals to minors’ “deviant or morbid interests” and lacks “serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”
“What’s a deviant violent video game?” asked Justice Antonin Scalia, who was the law’s most vocal opponent on Tuesday. “As opposed to what? A normal violent video game?”
“Some of the Grimm’s fairy tales are quite grim,” he added. “Are you going to ban them, too?”
Justice Stephen G. Breyer took the other side. He said common sense should allow the government to help parents protect children from games that include depictions of “gratuitous, painful, excruciating, torturing violence upon small children and women.”

Scalia got the better of Alito in this exchange:

But Justice Scalia said there was nothing in the tradition of American free speech that would allow the government to ban depictions of violence. The thought, he said, would have been foreign to the drafters of the First Amendment, drawing a needling comment from Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., the lone dissenter in the Stevens case.
“What Justice Scalia wants to know,” Justice Alito said, “is what James Madison thought about video games.”
“No,” Justice Scalia responded, “I want to know what James Madison thought about violence.”

And they better not ban Mortal Kombat!

Justice Elena Kagan, the court’s newest and youngest member, seemed to be the only justice with even a passing familiarity with the genre under review, even if it was secondhand.
“You think Mortal Kombat is prohibited by this statute?” she asked Mr. Morazzini. It is, she added, “an iconic game which I am sure half the clerks who work for us spent considerable time in their adolescence playing.”
Mr. Morazzini said the game was “a candidate” for government regulation.

There was another big oral argument yesterday -- US v. Skilling:

A three-judge appeals court panel grilled attorneys for former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling and the government on Monday, trying to decide whether to throw out or order new trials on any of Skilling's 19 convictions.
His defense lawyer, Daniel Petrocelli, argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision that the government was wrong to use a particular legal theory in charging Skilling with conspiracy means that charge and the remaining 18 should be thrown out.
The government contends that a rational jury would have convicted even without the faulty theory that he deprived Enron of his "honest services," because evidence overwhelmingly supported Skilling's guilt.
But the hearing, in which each side had 30 minutes to provide oral arguments, was more about the judges' questions than the lawyers' answers.
Judge Edward Prado asked if it would make more sense for the federal district court where Skilling was tried in 2006 to decide the issues raised by the Supreme Court decision.
Determining if the "honest services" theory tainted the other charges would involve digging into the voluminous details of the five-month trial, Prado said.
Petrocelli said nothing would prevent the appeals court from sending the issue to the trial judge, but that the question is one of law.
"The court isn't being asked to act as a 13th juror," or guess what the original jury was thinking, Petrocelli said. Rather it needs to look at the court record and determine if a "reasonable jury" could find Skilling not guilty based on the evidence.
"The record is filled with acquittal evidence," Petrocelli said.

You can access the audio of yesterday's Fifth Circuit oral argument via this link (53.7MB Windows Media audio file). Why don't we have that in the 11th Circuit?

I'm back

Thanks to my guest bloggers -- SFL, Rumpole, and Rick B.

Now back to work.... I hope everyone enjoys the last good week of traffic because school starts in one week and then US1 and I-95 turn back into parking lots.

A couple of quick hits to start your week:

1. Blago jury still out.

2. Justice Sotomayor jokingly compares herself to J.Lo.

3. Blogger convicted after three tries for threatening comments about federal judges.

4. Justice Ginsburg wants the good ol' days back in the Senate.

5. Justice Scalia OK after tripping.

6. Neal Katyal likely to become 10th Justice.

7. A must read dissent by Judge Kozinski on GPS tracking and the 4th Amendment. The intro:

Having previously decimated the protections the Fourth
Amendment accords to the home itself, United States v.
Lemus, 596 F.3d 512 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc); United States v.
Black, 482 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc), our court now proceeds
to dismantle the zone of privacy we enjoy in the home’s curtilage
and in public. The needs of law enforcement, to which
my colleagues seem inclined to refuse nothing, are quickly
making personal privacy a distant memory. 1984 may have
come a bit later than predicted, but it’s here at last.

And the conclusion:

I don’t think that most people in the United States would
agree with the panel that someone who leaves his car parked
in his driveway outside the door of his home invites people
to crawl under it and attach a device that will track the vehicle’s
every movement and transmit that information to total
strangers. There is something creepy and un-American about
such clandestine and underhanded behavior. To those of us
who have lived under a totalitarian regime, there is an eerie
feeling of déjà vu. This case, if any, deserves the comprehensive,
mature and diverse consideration that an en banc panel
can provide. We are taking a giant leap into the unknown, and
the consequences for ourselves and our children may be dire
and irreversible. Some day, soon, we may wake up and find
we’re living in Oceania.

Beat LA (and Rumpole)

Running around like crazy the last few days, and then I see this straw man put up and knocked down by Rumpole on his blog. I will respond when I have a minute.

In the meantime, let me say that I obviously do not agree with Scalia's dissent in Holland, and I have not taken the position that Scalia is friendly to criminal defendants -- what I have said is that Scalia is the best friend that criminal defendants have on the Supreme Court (here's one of the first posts that got the debate started). That's not such high praise when the voting patterns of this Court are examined.

Anyway, more on this later when I have time to respond, and congrats to Todd Scher for the big victory.

Here are the 5 opinions that were decided today.

More on Scalia vs. Alito

I've often said that Justice Scalia is the most criminal-defense friendly Justice, while Justice Alito is the least. More support for this argument from yesterday's opinion in USA v. Curtis Johnson. The Court ruled 7-2 that a “violent felony” under federal law requires the use of physical violence, thereby reversing and remanding the lower court which found that a misdemeanor battery counted. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, while Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justice Thomas. The full opinion is here. The case came out of the Middle District of Florida, and I was lucky enough to attend the Supreme Court argument. (Here are my comments from after the argument).

It's always fun reading a Scalia opinion. Here's a taste from one footnote:

Even further afield is the dissent’s argument, post, at 2–3, that since §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires conduct that "presents a serious potential riskof physical injury to another," §924(e)(2)(B)(i) must not. That is rather like saying a provision which includes (i) apples and (ii) overripe oranges must exclude overripe apples. It does not follow.

Rothstein racked up 20 Million AMEX points

Damn....

In other news, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts -- the confrontation case from last term that said lab reports were subject to Crawford and the Confrontation Clause -- may be on the chopping block. From Tony Mauro at Law.com:

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who was not on the Court for the Melendez-Diaz case, sent out mixed signals on whether she would provide the vote needed for reversal. (Her predecessor David Souter was in the majority.) As has become her custom, Sotomayor actively questioned both sides during Monday's argument in Briscoe v. Virginia.
Meanwhile Justice Antonin Scalia, who authored last year's ruling, fought vociferously to save it during the hourlong hearing, and he strongly implied that the four dissenters in Melendez-Diaz had voted to review Briscoe just to overturn the precedent. "Why is this case here except as an opportunity to upset Melendez-Diaz?" Scalia asked, later adding, "I'm criticizing us for taking the case."
In the case before the Court, Mark Briscoe and Sheldon Cypress were prosecuted in Virginia courts on drug charges based in part on "certificates of analysis" from the state laboratory attesting to the amount and type of drugs found during their arrests. They both invoked the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, which gives defendants the right to be confronted with the witnesses against them. They argued that the drug evidence needed to be presented in person so it could be subjected to cross-examination. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld use of the written certificates because state law allows defendants to call the forensic analysts as witnesses, and Briscoe and Cypress had not done so.
The Court in Melendez-Diaz indicated that an approach like Virginia's, shifting the burden of calling the witness to the defendant, would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment.
Upholding the Virginia approach, said the defendants' lawyer Richard Friedman, would "severely impair the confrontation right and threaten a fundamental transformation in the way Anglo-American trials have been conducted for hundreds of years."
But a brief (pdf) filed by state attorneys general asking that Melendez-Diaz be overturned was on the mind of several justices. The brief said the decision has already had an "overwhelming negative impact" on drug prosecutions by requiring short-staffed and underfunded state labs to spend too much time in courtrooms.
When Friedman said that, in fact, "the expense is not inordinate," Justice Samuel Alito Jr. snapped, "How can you say that? We have an amicus brief from 26 states and the District of Columbia arguing exactly the contrary."
Virginia Solicitor General Stephen McCullough, joined by Leondra Kruger, an assistant to the U.S. solicitor general, argued that a system in which the defendant has the burden of calling the forensic witness satisfies the Constitution.
McCullough said that, since the Melendez-Diaz ruling was handed down, Virginia has seen "extensive gamesmanship" by criminal defense lawyers using the requirement of in-person testimony to their advantage.
Sitting at the defendants' counsel table with Friedman was Stanford Law School professor Jeffrey Fisher. Either Fisher or Friedman has argued the defense side in a series of cases that, since 2004, have revived the confrontation clause as a tool for defendants.

UPDATE -- at the argument, there was some talk about the word orthogonal:

University of Michigan law professor Richard Friedman was trying to define the scope of the confrontation clause in oral arguments yesterday when he was called on to define another term: orthogonal.
Friedman used the word when he indicated that a justice’s question was not pertinent to the present case, according to The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times and the Washington Post. "I think that issue is entirely orthogonal to the issue here," he said. The word is a math term meaning things are perpendicular or at right angles, but Friedman used it to mean that two propositions are irrelevant, the BLT says.
That got the attention of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. "I'm sorry. Entirely what?" he said.
"Orthogonal,” Friedman replied. “Right angle. Unrelated. Irrelevant."
Friedman tried to continue, but Justice Antonin Scalia jumped in. "What was that adjective? I liked that," he said.
"I think we should use that in the opinion," Scalia later added. “Or the dissent,” said Roberts.

Do as I say, not as I do

From the oral arguments on Tuesday of this week in the Supreme Court:

MR. BARNHOUSE: The lawsuit would be -- the lawsuit itself would be property, but the -- but any recovery would not be property until it became choate, until there was an amount of money assigned to it.

JUSTICE SCALIA: There is no such adjective -- I know we have used it, but there is no such adjective as "choate." There is "inchoate," but the opposite of "inchoate" is not "choate."

MR. BARNHOUSE: All right.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Any more than the -- I don't know.
(Laughter.)

MR. BARNHOUSE: Well, I'm wrong on the -- on the -

JUSTICE SCALIA: Exactly. Yes. It's like "gruntled."

MR. BARNHOUSE: But I think I am right on the law, Your Honor.

Scalia was apparently trying to make the point that some people mistakenly assume the opposite of “disgruntled” is “gruntled.” Well, Josh Blackmun says gruntled is a word:

Oxford English Dictionary Confirms, gruntled seems to be the opposite of disgruntled.
Definition: Pleased, satisfied, contented.

A law professor responds:

Gruntled is indeed in the dictionary, as the opposite of disgruntled. But it’s pretty clearly not idiomatic, as a Google search shows. So it’s not a mistake to assume that there is a word “gruntled” that’s the opposite of “disgruntled.” But it is a mistake to assume that there is such a word in common usage, and especially in common serious usage (since “gruntled” as the opposite of “disgruntled” has a humorous connotation, I think).

Anyway, a bit closer to home, Dan Christensen has a couple interesting posts about Zachariah P. Zachariah, a top Republican fundraiser.

And of course, everyone is talking and writing about Scott Rothstein and his inner sanctum and intercom and autographs and on and on and on. I find the whole mob mentality a bit sickening. Here's my Friday morning question to you all: Should Scott Rothstein get a bond when he gets arrested?

A bunch of people have been sending me this video, which is unbelievable:

Scalia likes My Cousin Vinny and Marisa Tomei

Here's a piece of the article (HT: ABL):

Before signing copies of his book, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges, (which came out more than a year ago) Scalia dished a few pointers to the spillover crowd of mostly senior citizens who gathered at the Friendship Heights Village Center in Chevy Chase, Md. "Don't beat a dead horse," the justice advised lawyers who are making oral arguments. "Be brief. And when your time expires, shut up and sit down."

To make his point, Scalia said the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist "used to stop you mid-sentence when the red light went on" in the Supreme Court.

Another pet peeve? Acronyms in brief writing and oral arguments, Scalia said, advising lawyers "Don't burden your reader." In the book, co-authored by Bryan Garner, the two also recommend that lawyers study a judge's background and likes and dislikes before they appear in court. "At the very least, these details will humanize the judge before you, so that you will be arguing to a human being instead of a chair."

On My Cousin Vinny and Marisa Tomei:

But he did get some hearty laughter when he was asked to reveal what his favorite legal movie is.

Scalia didn't hesitate: "My Cousin Vinny," he replied. "I can watch that over and over again."

Then, speaking about the character actress Marisa Tomei played in the movie, Scalia added, "God, she's a killer."

Why Professor Dershowitz Rocks

The challenge. This time to Scalia on his dissent, blogged about a couple of days ago by one of our favorite readers:

I hereby challenge Justice Scalia to a debate on whether Catholic doctrine permits the execution of a factually innocent person who has been tried, without constitutional flaw, but whose innocence is clearly established by new and indisputable evidence. Justice Scalia is always willing to debate issues involving religious teachings. He has done so, for example, with the great Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, and with others as well. He also has debated me at the Harvard Law School. Although I am neither a rabbi nor a priest, I am confident that I am right and he is wrong under Catholic Doctrine. Perhaps it takes chutzpah to challenge a practicing Catholic on the teachings of his own faith, but that is a quality we share.
I invite him to participate in the debate at Harvard Law School, at Georgetown Law School, or anywhere else of his choosing. The stakes are high, because if he loses—if it is clear that his constitutional views permitting the execution of factually innocent defendants are inconsistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church—then, pursuant to his own published writings, he would have no choice but to conform his constitutional views to the teachings of the Catholic Church or to resign from the Supreme Court.

Dersh is one of the best debaters around as is Scalia. I would pay an awful lot to see this matchup. Hat Tip: ATL.

UPDATE -- I just emailed with Dersh and asked him whether he had ever debated a Supreme Court Justice before and he said yes -- he debated Scalia in his class a few years back (he mentions that debate in the article linked to above). I also asked him what he thought his most famous debate was and he said probably his debate with Rabbi Meir David Kahane:



SECOND UPDATE -- A friendly reader points out that it is "interesting that the dissent which sparked the SCOTUS ruling was issued by a former Catholic nun (Judge Barkett)."

They write letters

(Okay, so we stole the title from our brother blogger, South Florida Lawyer). While everyone is talking about Ricci and Madoff, the story that interests me is Justice Souter's last day on the bench. Here's the letter from the Chief Justice, signed by all of the Justices, wishing Souter well. And here's Souter's response, which starts "Your generous letter touched me more than I can say..." Lots of love!

The post below about Ma'am or Judge/Your Honor has gotten quite a bit of response. While we're on the topic of what works in court, Justice Scalia explains what peeves him here and here, including when lawyers say that a hypo is different than the facts of the actual case. Scalia: "I know it's not this case, you idiot."

On using italics: "If you’re constantly italicizing words, it sort of reads like a high school girl’s diary."

On using latin words: "Oh, God. It’s a Latin word that means connection. Say 'connection.’ You make it sound scientific."

And on being likable: "No judge likes to give a case to a mean-spirited person. I’ll do it if the law requires it."

SCALIA.

Rumpole, check out the 2 criminal law opinions this morning. Justice Scalia wrote a 5-4 opinion (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts) in favor of a criminal defendant on a confrontation clause issue and in another case (Safford v. Redding), joined Justice Souter's opinion in favor of a high school student challenging a strip search on Fourth Amendment grounds. More to follow...

(Still waiting on my $100).

Justice Scalia and Rumpole

Rumpole is getting all hot and bothered by Justice Scalia's recent decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, overruling Michigan v. Jackson. I don't agree with the result either, but I have taken issue with Rumpole's attack on Scalia as a "dangerous" Justice and with Rumpole's defense of stare decisis.

As an initial matter, as a criminal defense lawyer, Rumpole should be cheering Scalia, who is by far the most friendly Justice to criminal defendants. I'm sure I'm forgetting some of his recent defense friendly opinions, but to name a few:

• Crawford v. Washington -- Justice Scalia breathed life back into the Confrontation Clause and did away with some really bad cases allowing prosecutors to get away with convictions based on hearsay.
• Blakely v. Washington (Apprendi, Booker, etc) -- criminal practitioners rejoiced when Scalia started the revolt against the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.
• Arizona v. Gant -- Scalia rules in favor of criminal defendant on 4th amendment issue concerning a car search, overruling NY v. Belton.
• Begay v. United States -- finding in a concurring opinion that DUI was not a violent felony based on the rule of lenity.
• United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez -- Scalia finds (5-4) that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel of his choice. This was his quote at oral argument: “I don’t want a ‘competent’ lawyer. I want a lawyer to get me off. I want a lawyer to invent the Twinkie defense. I want to win.”
• United States v. Santos -- Scalia finds that the money laundering statute is ambiguous and rules for criminal defendant that it means proceeds, not profits.
• I'll end with Sorich v. United States in which Scalia dissents from denial of cert on honest services case. Here's part of his opinion:

[T]his Court has long recognized the“basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.” Bouie v. City ofColumbia, 378 U. S. 347, 350 (1964). There is a serious argument that §1346 is nothing more than an invitation for federal courts to develop a common-law crime of unethical conduct. But "the notion of a common-law crime is utterly anathema today," Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U. S. 451, 476 (2001) (SCALIA, J., dissenting), and for good reason. It is simply not fair to prosecute someone for a crime that has not been defined until the judicial decision that sends him to jail. “How can the public be expected to know what the statute means when the judges and prosecutors themselves do not know, or must make it up as they go along?” Rybicki, supra, at 160 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). . . . It may be true that petitioners here, like the defendants in other “honest services” cases, have acted improperly. But “[b]ad men, like good men, are entitled to be tried and sentenced in accordance with law.” Green v. United States, 365 U. S. 301, 309 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). In light of the conflicts among the Circuits; the longstanding confusion over the scope of the statute; and the serious due process and federalism interests affected by the expansion of criminal liability that this case exemplifies, I would grant the petition for certiorari and squarely confront both the meaning and the constitutionality of §1346. Indeed, it seems to me quite irresponsible to let the current chaos prevail.

(A couple weeks after Scalia wrote this dissent, the Court granted cert in the Conrad Black case to figure out the reach of the honest services statute. I'd bet Rumpole that Scalia will rule for Black, but he still hasn't paid me on the last $100...)

And these are just a few off the top of my head in the last few years. I'm happy when Justice Scalia isn't a prisoner to stare decisis. If he was, we wouldn't have Crawford, Blakely, Gant, etc. I'm glad he's questioning cases that have been on the books for years because the law is more pro-government right now than it has ever been. The pendulum has started swinging back the other way, and it's due in part to Justice Scalia. Yes, criminal defendants are going to lose some too -- like Michican v. Jackson -- but I'll take the above cases with that one. (Has any lawyer ever even filed a Jackson motion to suppress?)

If I had to rank the Justices in order of defense friendly, here's my list:

Scalia, Stevens, Souter (for another couple weeks), Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, Alito.

A Hispanic judge is nominated to the Court...

...but alas not one from Florida. Sonia Sotomayor is the pick.... No real surprise here.

I was rooting for Harvard (Elena Kagan) instead of Yale, but another spot will open up soon.

Sotomayor has more courtroom experience (she was a prosecutor and a district judge) than any of the other justices and many are calling her the liberal Sam Alito (both went to Princeton and Yale, both were prosecutors, both were Circuit judges, and both were appointed by Bush I). Sotomayor would be the only Justice who was a district judge. Still no former criminal defense lawyers on the Court...

The blogosphere is unbelievable when you want instant information, especially about legal news. Tom Goldstein at ScotusBlog has a ton of stuff, including this interesting post. Jan Crawford Greenberg has this scoop about the interview process and the 4 finalists. The right already is gearing up to fight her (using videos like this) but as Goldstein explains, she easily will be confirmed. Volokh has a bunch of posts about the nomination and How Appealing has every article written about Sotomayor. And if you are a baseball fan, Judge Sotomayor is your pick.

It's amazing to me that the interest groups are claiming that she isn't smart enough to be on the Court. What else can she do to prove herself -- she finished first in her high school class, second in her college class and was the editor of the Yale Law Journal.

Even though she is being compared to Alito, I sure hope she is more intellectually honest than he is. Today, the Supreme Court, 5-4, overruled Michigan v. Jackson -- a case on the books for 23 years. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion and Justice Alito concurred. His concurrence was remarkable because just a couple of weeks ago, he dissented in Arizona v. Gant. There, Justice Scalia again wrote the majority opinion, receding from the holding in New York v. Belton. Belton had been on the books for 28 years, and Alito's dissent focused on stare decisis. So this time around, he would dissent againt, right? And find that stare decisis required a finding that Jackson was still good law, right? Forget it -- Alito joined Justice Scalia in overturning a long-standing precedent. Why? Because this time he was ruling against the criminal defendant. Unlike Scalia who often rules for criminal defendants (and is still in my view the most pro-defendant Justice -- although that theory took a hit today), Alito has never once ruled in favor of a criminal defendant. Not once! When stare decisis helps the government, he invokes it. When it's bad for the government, what's stare decisis. Bizarro world!

Anyway, back to Sotomayor -- from what I've read about her, she seems like a solid (and safe) pick. She's obviously qualified and she will get confirmed. I think at the end of the day, she'll end up very similar to Souter, so the Court won't change that much.