Wesley Snipes loses bid for new trial in the 11th Circuit

Here's the unpublished opinion affirming the denial of his motion for new trial.

From the AP:

The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the appeal by Snipes, who was convicted in 2008 on three misdemeanor counts of willful failure to file income tax returns.

His defense lawyers contended they received emails from former jurors reporting misconduct among other members of the panel. One of the former jurors said in the email that three other jurors acknowledged they had determined Snipes was guilty before the trial began.

A federal court rejected the request for a new trial and noted that there were reasons to question the veracity of the allegations made in the emails. The 11th Circuit upheld the ruling on Tuesday, finding that there wasn't "strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence" that would warrant a new trial.

Cert denied for Wesley Snipes

Via AP:

The high court refused Monday to hear an appeal from Snipes, convicted in 2008 on three misdemeanor counts of willful failure to file income tax returns.

Snipes started a three-year term in a federal minimum security prison in December. He has appeared in dozens of films, from "White Men Can't Jump" and "Demolition Man" in the early 1990s to the blockbuster Blade trilogy.

Snipes wanted his trial held in New York City, where he says he lived, but the government brought charges against him in Florida, where Snipes held a driver's license. The lower courts refused to let him have an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

Wesley Snipes surrenders

The judge said it was time: "The defendant Snipes had a fair trial; he has had a full, fair and thorough review of his conviction and sentence. ... The time has come for the judgment to be enforced," the judge wrote in his 16-page decision.

From Bop.gov: 1. WESLEY TRENT SNIPES 43355-018 48-Black-M UNKNOWN IN TRANSIT

Wesley Snipes' conviction and 3-year sentence affirmed

Wesley Snipes was only convicted of three misdemeanors (and acquitted of all the felonies), yet the 11th Circuit has affirmed his 3-year sentence.  That seems harsh to me, especially because he was sentenced based on the relevant conduct for which he was acquitted.  From the reasonableness portion of the opinion:

Here, the district court carefully complied with the sentencing procedures. The judge conducted an extensive sentencing hearing and listened to Snipes’s allocution, several character witnesses, and argument about sentencing. The court correctly calculated the guideline range and, again, noted that the guidelines were advisory. The sentencing transcript reveals that the judge weighed each factor embodied in the Section 3553(a) calculus before pronouncing the sentence, which was within the recommended guideline range. The sentence was not procedurally unreasonable.


Next, we “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “[W]e will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the judge accorded to a given factor . . . [under § 3553(a)], as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” Id. at 1191 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The party challenging a sentence has the burden of establishing that it was unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).


The district court gave ample consideration to each of the relevant considerations found in 3553(a). Although the discussion about general deterrence was somewhat longer than the discussion of the other factors, its length corresponds with the emphasis the Sentencing Guidelines placed on deterrence in the criminal tax context. The introductory commentary to the Tax section of the Sentencing Guidelines explains that 

[b]ecause of the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions relative to the estimated incidence of such violations, deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary consideration underlying these guidelines. Recognition that the sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent to would-be violators. U.S.S.G. Ch. 2 Pt. T, intro. Comment (emphasis added).

Moreover, “[w]hen the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory