Monday morning notes

1. The Supreme Court will hear the GPS case tomorrow. Really interesting issues. SCOTUS Blog has all the news and analysis.

2. Speaking of SCOTUS Blog, there is an excellent interview of Justice Stevens posted there. His former clerk Jeffrey Fisher asks some intriguing questions:

Question: Turning to the different chapters of the book, one of the things that leaps out to me are the different internal procedures the Court has used over the years. For example, you mention that when you were a law clerk under Chief Justice Vinson, the Court’s conferences [at which the Justices cast their initial votes on cases and vote on cert. petitions] ran differently than they do now. Back then, there was a rule that everybody had a chance to speak once before anyone voted. Now, by contrast, Justices vote in conjunction with making their initial comments. Do you think that difference matters in terms of outcomes?

Justice Stevens: I think there might well be cases in which the outcome could be affected. I remember debating this with Byron White, among others, who said, “Well really the vote is never firm until the whole conference is over — in fact until the opinion is released.” And, as you know, votes change from time to time.

But I do think that the old model tends to give the junior Justice a better opportunity to convince more senior members of the Court if everybody has withheld his or her vote until everybody has had something to say. It just seems to me it’s a better way to proceed. And as I think I say in the book, Bill Rehnquist and I used to sit next to each other in the conference when I was a junior Justice and he was next most junior, and we both raised it once or twice, and he felt the same way then. But he became Chief, and he changed his view.

Question: What do you think changed his view?

Justice Stevens: He became Chief.

Question: He wanted to vote first, do you think?

Justice Stevens: I think — that’s right, he recognized the fact that the order of precedence may have an impact.

3. Could hackers free everyone at FDC:

Federal authorities are concerned about new research showing U.S. prisons are vulnerable to computer hackers, who could remotely open cell doors to aid jailbreaks.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons is “aware of this research and taking it very seriously,” spokesman Chris Burke told The Washington Times.

Mr. Burke was reacting to research by private experts who found that the security systems in most American prisons are run by computer software vulnerable to hackers.

“You could open every cell door, and the system would be telling the control room they are all closed,” said John J. Strauchs, a former CIA operations officer who helped develop a cyber-attack on a simulated prison computer system and described it at a hackers’ convention in Miami last week.

The security systems in most American prisons are run by special computer equipment called industrial control systems, or ICS. They are also used to control power plants, water treatment facilities and other critical national infrastructure. ICS has increasingly been targeted by hackers because an attack on one such system successfully sabotaged Iran’s nuclear program in 2009.
A malicious cyber-intruder could “destroy the doors,” by overloading the electrical system that controls them, locking them permanently open, said Mr. Strauchs, now a consultant who has designed security systems for dozens of state and federal prisons..

Hackers could “shut down secure communications” through the prison intercom system and crash the facility’s closed-circuit television system, blanking out all the monitors, he added.

4. Should those who view child porn on the internet get the same sentence (life) as murderers? The NY Times examines that question here:

A circuit court judge in Florida clearly thinks so: On Thursday, he sentenced Daniel Enrique Guevara Vilca, a 26-year-old stockroom worker whose home computer was found to contain hundreds of pornographic images of children, to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

But the severity of the justice meted out to Mr. Vilca, who had no previous criminal record, has led some criminal justice experts to question whether increasingly harsh penalties delivered in cases involving the viewing of pornography really fit the crime. Had Mr. Vilca actually molested a child, they note, he might well have received a lighter sentence.

“To me, a failure to distinguish between people who look at these dirty pictures and people who commit contact offenses lacks the nuance and proportionality I think our law demands,” said Douglas Berman, a law professor at Ohio State University, who highlighted Mr. Vilca’s case on his blog, Sentencing and Law Policy.

Sexual offenses involving children enrage most Americans, and lawmakers have not hesitated to impose lengthy prison terms for offenders. In Florida, possession of child pornography is a third-degree felony, punishable by up to five years in prison. Mr. Vilca was charged with 454 counts of possession, each count representing one image found on the computer.

5. Can police set up a fake cell phone tower to get information from your phone without a warrant? Via Wired:

Federal authorities used a fake Verizon cellphone tower to zero in on a suspect’s wireless card, and say they were perfectly within their rights to do so, even without a warrant.

But the feds don’t seem to want that legal logic challenged in court by the alleged identity thief they nabbed using the spoofing device, known generically as a stingray. So the government is telling a court for the first time that spoofing a legitimate wireless tower in order to conduct surveillance could be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment in this particular case, and that its use was legal, thanks to a court order and warrant that investigators used to get similar location data from Verizon’s own towers.

The government is likely using the argument to avoid a court showdown that might reveal how stingrays work and open debate into the tool’s legality.

Stingrays spoof a legitimate cellphone tower in order to trick nearby cellphones and other wireless communication devices into connecting to the tower, as they would to a real cellphone tower. When devices connect, stingrays can see and record their unique ID numbers and traffic data, as well as information that points to a device’s location. To prevent detection by suspects, the stingray sends the data to a real tower so that traffic continues to flow.

By gathering the wireless device’s signal strength from various locations, authorities can pinpoint where the device is being used with much more precision than they can get through data obtained from the mobile network provider’s fixed tower location.

Back to work...

Hope everyone had a nice new year. It's good to be back. A quick look at what was missed the last week:

1. The Cuban Spies strike back... against their lawyers. From the Miami Herald:

In his appeal, Hernandez, 45, contends that his trial attorney, Paul McKenna, mishandled his defense at a 2001 Miami federal trial by focusing so much on the shoot-down location.

That strategy overshadowed evidence that Hernandez purportedly did not know in advance about the deadly Cuban plot over the Florida Straits, the appeal asserts. Evidence of his advance knowledge was crucial to proving his role in the murder conspiracy.

"In short, Hernandez's lawyer was his worst enemy in the courtroom," his appellate attorneys wrote in a habeas corpus petition filed in Miami federal court.

2. Judge Carnes vs. Judge Tjoflat in Floride Norelus v. Denny's Inc.

Both SFL and Kosher Meatball cover this 2-1 case about sanctions against the Amlongs for a 63-page errata sheet. From Judge Carnes' intro:

No one’s memory is perfect. People forget things or get confused, and anyone can make an innocent misstatement or two. Or maybe even three or four. But not 868 of them. In this case, the plaintiff’s attorneys, William and Karen Amlong, filed a sixty-three page errata sheet containing 868 attempted changes to their client’s deposition testimony, which was the sole source of evidentiary support for their client’s claims. The district court exercised its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to sanction the Amlongs. This is their appeal, or more specifically their second appeal.

But what struck me was not so much Judge Carnes' colorful way of writing about the case (agree with his decisions or not, he makes reading them fun), but instead how he engages Judge Tjoflat (the concurring judge, District Judge Bowen, did not join in any of these remarks):

• As the magistrate judge found and no one (with the possible exception of the
  dissenting judge on this panel) seriously contests, the improper submission of the
  massive errata document rendered the eight days spent on Norelus’ deposition a
  waste of time and money to say nothing of the time the attorneys were forced to
  spend on the issues created by the document itself.
• Up to this point, we have addressed the issues related to the errata document
  and the award of sanctions as those issues have been raised and defined since that
  document was submitted fourteen years ago. Our dissenting colleague, by contrast, has hatched a brand new theory—a theory that was never raised by the parties, never considered by the district court, and never argued to this Court. The theory
  that he has conjured up is that the errata sheet was really nothing more than a
  “letter” from Karen Amlong to defense counsel. It was not, he insists, an errata
  sheet because he thinks it was never presented to the court reporter or affixed to
  Norelus’ deposition as, he thinks, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 requires. Dissenting Op. at 1. He is wrong on his premises and wrong in his conclusion.
• Instead of recognizing the obvious import of Norelus’ own certification or following our precedent about who has the burden on appeal where there are any ambiguities, the dissenting judge would remake the case entirely along different factual lines, lines that only he sees.
• From its inception, the errata document has been understood by all, except our dissenting colleague, to be a Rule 30 errata sheet.
• That certification itself and its use to assert “exceptions” to the deposition belies the dissent’s far-fetched assertion that the errata sheet was nothing more than a letter from one attorney to another. And there is more.
• The Amlongs, the defendants, the magistrate judge, the district court judge, all three judges of this Court in Amlong I, everyone in the district court after the remand, and both parties in briefing and arguing the present appeal have understood that. Everyone has understood it—except for our dissenting colleague.
• Now, after almost a decade-and-a-half of litigation, he has been able to discern what everyone else has overlooked: that the Rule 30 errata sheet is not really a Rule 30 errata sheet, but it is instead “a document, although entitled ‘errata sheet,’ [which] had no more legal efficacy than a letter.” Dissenting Op. at 22. During a period of almost fifteen years of looking at the document, no one else has ever thought it was just a letter. And no wonder. Treating the errata sheet as nothing more than a letter is like arguing after Gettysburg that the warring sides had been mistaken all along about the bombardment of Fort Sumter, that it was actually nothing more than a diplomatic overture.
• And the dissenting judge’s extraordinary perception does not end there. He
  is even able to perceive that everyone else’s inability to see that the errata sheet isnot really an errata sheet is not the fault of the Amlongs, who designated it an
  errata sheet and have been arguing for almost a decade and a half that is what it is, and not the fault of all the judges who have consistently treated it as an errata sheet, but instead is the fault of—who else is left? Defense counsel, of course. See Dissenting Op. at 2, 19–20, 22–23.
• Even beyond the facts, there is another problem with the dissent’s attempt to inject the not-an-errata-sheet-but-just-a-letter issue into the case at this point. The issue has been defaulted about as many times and in about as many ways as any issue can be.

Sorry for all the bullets, but wow. Is it me, or was that opinion something more than a "diplomatic overture"?

3. SFL won the blog fantasy football league this year. Well done!

4. Mona and I won the Above the Law fantasy football league.

5. I beat Rumpole in the regular season head-to-head football challenge, but we will continue it into the playoffs. It was a fun battle, especially because watching the Dolphins was torture.

6. Tom Goldstein of ScotusBlog is leaving Akin Gump and is going back out on his own. (Via ATL)

News and Notes

1. Liberty City 6, part 3, starts today. (via Herald)

2. The Cuban Spies are petitioning for cert and have brought in super Supreme Court lawyer, Tom Goldstein (of ScotusBlog fame). They are also trying to work out a political resolution to the case. (via Herald)

3. John Pacenti at the DBR covers the Mutual Benefits lawyers who were indicted.

4. The Congressional delegation from South Florida is being sworn in at the new courthouse this morning. Here's a picture of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from the proceedings.

Exciting week at the Supreme Court

This is the last week for Supreme Court action, and it has been an exciting one. SCOTUSblog is the place to be, and they've added to the drama with their live-blogging feature each morning at 10am. It's worth checking out -- you'll have to see it tomorrow as that will be the last day for decisions. The big one to be decided tomorrow is the gun case, Heller. Today was also big as the Court ruled that the death penalty cannot be imposed in a child rape case (and any other case) that does not result in death to the victim. 5-4, with Kennedy writing for the majority of usual suspects, and Alito writing for the 4 dissenters. The other big case today was the Exxon punitive damages case in which the Court found that punis were limited to compensatory damages.

Here is SCOTUSBlog on the child rape case:

Barring the death penalty for any crime that does not take the life of an individual victim, the Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for the crime of raping a child. If the victim does not die and death was not intended, capital punishment for that crime violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court ruled in an opinion by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. The case was Patrick Kennedy v. Louisiana (07-343). The broad declaration that death sentences should be reserved “for crimes that take the life of the victim” will apply, the Court said, to crimes against individuals — thus leaving intact, for example, a possible death sentence for treason.Part of the Court’s rationale for nullifying a death sentence for raping a child was that the child victim gets enlisted, perhaps repeatedly, to recount the crime, forcing on the child “a moral choice” that the youngster is not mature enough to make. “The way the death penalty here involves the child victim in its enforcement can compromise a decent legal system,” Justice Kennedy wrote.
The decision split the Court 5-4. It nullified a Louisiana law that provided capital punishment for raping a child under age 12. The law was since amended to apply to raping a child under age 13. Five other states have similar laws.
At the close of Wednesday’s public session, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., announced that the Court will issue all remaining decisions for the Term at 10 a.m. Thursday. The test case on whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a gun is among those remaining (District of Columbia v. Heller, 07-290). The others still pending are cases on the constitutionality of the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment” on campaign finance (Davis v. FEC, 07-320), and on federal regulators’ power to undo wholesale energy sales contracts (Morgan Stanley Capital v. Public Utility District, 06-1457, and a companion case).
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in the Louisiana capital case was supported by Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter and John Paul Stevens. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote for the dissenters; he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Justice Alito, rejecting the majority view that there is now a national consensus against executing one who rapes a child, argued that the focus should not be on the fact that only six states now have such laws. More might have taken the step, Alito argued, if the Supreme Court in barring execution for raping an adult in 1977 had not given state legislators “good reason to fear” that they never could pass such a law. The broad dicta in that case, Alito said, was not supported by all of those in the majority in Coker v. Georgia. Since then, the Justice added, state courts have read the Coker opinion in its widest sweep, “stunting legislative consideration” of the death penalty when a child was the victim.