Initial Florida Bar vote finds 2255 waivers unethical

Last week, the Florida Bar's Professional Ethics Committee voted 13-11 that criminal defense lawyers could not ethically advise their clients to waive their 2255 (habeas) rights in a plea agreement. Staff from the Florida Bar will now draft an advisory opinion for the committee's consideration, and the committee will consider it at its next meeting (sometime next year). The government will oppose the proposed ethics opinion.

But why? Why do prosecutors attempt to have criminal defense lawyers waive their clients' 2255 rights in a plea agreement? How can a criminal defense ethically tell his client that the client should waive a claim that he (the lawyer) is ineffective? There are conflict issues both for the prosecutor and the defense lawyer here. And yet, the government pushes these waivers, forcing the lawyer in most cases to either plead straight up.

Judge Roettger was great on these issues. He never let a defendant waive his appellate rights. Back then prosecutors didn't ask for 2255 waivers (or Booker waivers). Judge Roettger would cross the appellate waiver out of the plea agreements and ask prosecutors whether they worked for the Department of Justice or Injustice. He asked them why shouldn't an appellate court review his rulings at sentencing. What if he made a mistake?

So, SDFLA readers, what do you think? Should the government be asking for 2255 (and other waivers) or is Judge Roettger (and the Florida Bar) right that these waivers are unethical.

News and Notes

1. Lots of people (91 in total and 45 in Miami!) charged with Medicare Fraud today.

2. Psychics get bond. But they knew that already.

3. Check out this footnote at the end of the opinion in United States v. Smith, which held that an appellate waiver was enforceable: After this opinion was written, the government filed a motion to withdraw its previously filed brief, which had argued that the appeal waiver applies, to vacate the sentence, and to remand for resentencing under the decision in United States v. Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2011). The motion admits that the sentencing appeal waiver does apply but states that the government has now “determined that it is appropriate under the circumstances to forego reliance upon the appeal waiver provision in this case.” OK, now what?

UPDATE -- I missed the continuation of the footnote on the next page:

The primary circumstance cited in the government’s motion is that Attorney General Eric Holder has changed the Department of Justice’s policy on whether the Fair Sentencing Act applies to cases in which the defendant was sentenced after enactment of that legislation. There has not, however, been any change in the law concerning sentence appeal waivers, and it is on the basis of the waiver that we are deciding this case. Sentence appeal waivers serve interests of the judiciary as well as interests of the government and defendants. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2006) (interests of the government and defendants); cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1627 (1977) (recognizing
that plea bargains benefit all concerned, including the judiciary). And once an appeal arrives in this Court it is our responsibility to see that it is decided correctly under the law. For these reasons, the government’s motion is denied.

Wow.