Thursday, October 12, 2023

Strange Statutory Interpretation Bedfellows

By John R. Byrne

Often times, when groups of appellate judges disagree on matters of statutory interpretation,  the disputing parties fall into predicable camps (Republican nominees on one side, Democrat nominees on the other). But they can still surprise us! 

Check out the Eleventh Circuit's recent opinion in US v. Pate. The en banc Court examined a federal statute that criminalizes the filing of retaliatory liens against "any officer or employee of the United States." The question was whether the statute covers former civil servants.  A majority of the Court said "no." But the breakdown was interesting. In the majority were Judges Newsom, Brasher, Luck, William Pryor (all nominated by Republicans) and Judges Wilson, Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, and Abudu (all nominated by Democrats). Both Judge Lagoa and Judge Grant, both appointed by Trump, filed dissenting opinions.

Pretty wild fact pattern involving a criminal defendant who had described himself as "heir to the kingdom of Morocco" and filed liens against property owned by the former Commissioner of the IRS and a former Secretary of the Treasury (he went right to the top). But his conviction (at least as to certain counts) was vacated and he'll now get a resentencing. Opinion below.

Pate Opinion.enb by John Byrne on Scribd

4 comments:

Anonymous said...

Bad news for Mark Meadows?

Anonymous said...

It cracks me up that when judges don't like a law they say that following the letter of the law is "illogical" and based on "hypertechnical[ity]" (see Grant's dissent). But when they like the law, they are strict constructionist who just call balls and strikes, and that reading the law any other way would be "judicial activism." LOL

Anonymous said...

Anon has a fun theory but it crumbles under the slightest bit of scrutiny. Why, under his/her theory, would the Court "like" (and therefore strictly construe) the statute at issue in Pate? The Majority's ruling not only limits the scope of a criminal statute but does so in a way that directly affects them as civil servants. If, God forbid, another "Mr. Pate" were to file retaliatory liens against them post-retirement, such an individual would suffer no criminal consequences based on their status as former civil servants. So with many other options to choose from, this decision seems like a strange choice to parrot a theory that personal preference is the Court's primary motivator.

Anonymous said...

10:32 seems to be criticizing the dissents more than the majority. Either way, I think it’s a poor critique since the question presented is tricky and both sides have merit