SCOTUS decides a 4th Amendment case

It's been a while! The decision is Case v. Montana, which held: Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case. From SCOTUSblog:

The Supreme Court on Wednesday upheld the conviction of a Montana man who was convicted of assaulting a police officer. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Elena Kagan, the court ruled in Case v. Montana that police officers in Anaconda, Montana, did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered William Case’s home without a warrant, rejecting Case’s contention that the police officers needed “probable cause” to go into his house. Under the Supreme Court’s earlier cases, Kagan wrote, it was enough that the police officers reasonably believed that Case – whose former girlfriend had called them to tell them that Case had threatened to commit suicide – needed emergency assistance.

The case began in 2021, when Case told his former girlfriend, identified in court papers as J.H., that he “was going to kill himself” and would also shoot any police officers who came to his house. J.H. called 9-1-1, which sent three police officers to the scene for a “welfare check on a suicidal male.”

Although Case did not answer when police officers knocked on the door or yelled into an open window, the police officers saw empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and what they believed to be a suicide note in the house. The police officers were also aware that Case had threatened to commit suicide before; on another occasion, police officers believed that Case was trying to goad them into shooting him.

Roughly 40 minutes after they arrived, the police officers entered the home. Case was hiding in a closet in an upstairs bedroom, where he was holding a black object that officers believed was a gun. One officer shot Case in the abdomen; another officer discovered a handgun in a laundry hamper near Case.

Case asked the trial court to exclude the evidence that law enforcement officials obtained after they entered his house, arguing that police officers should have had a warrant. But the state courts rejected that argument, prompting Case to come to the Supreme Court.

Case contended that if police officers enter a home without a warrant to provide emergency assistance, they must have probable cause “to believe someone is in urgent need of help.” On Wednesday the Supreme Court disagreed. In an 11-page opinion, Kagan acknowledged that the sanctity of the home is at the core of the Fourth Amendment, which protects the people from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” As a general rule, she explained, “[w]hen the intru­sion is into that most private place, ‘reasonableness’ usu­ally means having a warrant.” But there are exceptions to that general rule, she continued, including “the need to provide an occupant with emergency aid.”

Speaking of SCOTUSblog, its founder Tom Goldstein started his trial this week. I think they opened today. More on that soon.

First Amendment and UF

Really interesting First Amendment order out of the 11th Circuit involving a UF law student and some really horrible speech.  2-1 in favor of UF.  Branch write the opinion, Lagoa joins, and Newsom dissents.

From the introduction:

The University of Florida ("UF") expelled Preston Damsky,
a law student, for posts he made on X (formerly Twitter), including
one post that stated, "Jews must be abolished by any means necessary." Damsky then sued Chris Summerlin, UF's Dean of Students, arguing that UF violated his First Amendment rights. UF
now appeals the district court's order granting Damsky a
preliminary injunction and requiring UF to reinstate him as a
student. We find that UF is likely to succeed on the merits because
Damsky' s speech was likely not protected by the First Amendment.
UF was allowed to regulate Damsky's speech because, particularly
when read in context, his statements were reasonably interpreted
as a call for extralegal violence that caused a serious disruption to
other students' educational experiences and the school's ability to
provide its services. Accordingly, we grant UF's motion for a stay
of the district court's injunction pending appeal.

From the dissent:

Based on a post that Preston Damsky published on his
personal "X'' account,* the University of Florida ("University" or
"UF") expelled him from its law school, just a semester shy of his
expected graduation. Damsky sued on the ground that his
expulsion violated the First Amendment, and he sought a
preliminary injunction requiring the University to reinstate him. In
a thorough opinion, Judge Allen Winsor granted Damsky
preliminary injunctive relief, prohibiting the University from
"continuing to take adverse actions against" him and ordering him
returned to "normal standing" at the law school. Dist. Ct. Order,
Nov. 24, 2025, at 28.
Today, this Court stays Judge Winsor's order. I respectfully
dissent. The University hasn't shown a reasonable likelihood that
it will succeed in its effort to vacate or modify the injunction,
which, to my mind, correctly concludes that Damsky's posthowever
disgusting- enjoys constitutional protection. 

 

*Both the majority and the dissent explain that Twitter is now X.  I think everyone knows that now, just like we all know that opinions from the old 5th Circuit control per Bonner!

Magistrate Judge News

 Congratulations are in order for two good people -- first to Detra Shaw-Wilder on her investiture. 

And second to Yeney Hernandez, who the judges voted on at their judges' meeting today to be our newest magistrate judge.  

Have a great weekend and GO CANES!

Andy Adler wins in SCOTUS -- again

Congrats to AFPD Andy Adler for this 5-4 habeas victory in the Supreme Court, which held: Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) does not bar this Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive Section 2255 motion for postconviction relief, and Subsection 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions filed under Section 2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences.

Adler convinced Roberts and Kavanaugh to join the 3 moderate Justices for the majority, which starts this way (per Sotomayor):

Congress has created a comprehensive scheme to address when and how state and federal prisoners can seek postconviction relief in federal courts.  A state prisoner can file an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254. A federal prisoner, by contrast, can file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under §2255.  Each provision contains its own procedural and substantive requirements that an individual must satisfy. This case concerns the more complicated situation when a prisoner returns to federal court after a prior attempt for relief has failed. In this situation, Congress has enlisted the courts of appeals to play a gatekeeping role in the consideration of second or successive filings brought by federal and state prisoners. Under this system, before a prisoner can bring such a filing in a district court, a court of appeals must certify that the filing meets certain threshold conditions. Section 2244 governs authorization requests made by state prisoners, and §2255(h), in turn, governs requests made by federal prisoners. The two have distinct requirements, but through a limited cross-reference in §2255(h) to §2244 for how a filing is “certified” by a “panel,” Congress has borrowed certain of the procedures that apply to state prisoners and applies them to federal prisoners too. This case presents two questions regarding which aspects of §2244 fall within the scope of §2255(h)’s cross-reference. The first is whether §2244(b)(3)(E), which prohibits the “denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application” from being the “subject of a petition for . . . a writ of certiorari,” bars this Court’s review of authorization decisions concerning the motions of federal prisoners. If it does, this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear this case. The Court holds that it does not.  In the narrow cross-reference to the procedures in §2244, Congress has not clearly indicated that it intended to incorporate §2244(b)(3)(E)’s certiorari bar. The second question is whether §2244(b)(1), which directs courts to dismiss a claim “presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application,” applies to motions filed by federal prisoners. It does not: Section 2244(b)(1), by its express terms, applies only to state prisoners’ habeas applications under §2254, not to federal prisoners’ motions under §2255. 

Should 92 year old Judge Hellerstein preside over the Maduro case?

 Jeffrey Toobin says no here:

There is no simple procedural mechanism for lawyers, or the public, to challenge the fitness of judges. A culture of deference — and the fear, especially among active lawyers, of courting retribution — limits most inquiries into the abilities of aging judges. The parties can ask a judge to recuse himself for bias, but that is not the issue here. What tends to happen, rather, is that peers tend to step in informally and gently encourage a judicial colleague to step aside. The chief judge of the Southern District of New York, Laura Taylor Swain, should make such an overture to Judge Hellerstein if he does not himself recognize the need to face reality.

We've had the issue come up in our District three times that I can think of... I wonder how they will handle it in NY. 

"Justice For Venezuela at Last"

 That's the title of this WSJ op-ed by our very own Judge Roy Altman.  It starts this way:

My family in Caracas awoke to loud explosions on Saturday morning. They came to learn, at daybreak, that the country’s repressive dictator, Nicolas Maduro, had been seized in a daring raid by American commandos. “God willing,” my cousin whispered into a phone, still afraid of who might be listening, “this is the end of our decades-long nightmare.” 

That’s a hope my family shares with the millions of Venezuelans who have been exiled over the past two decades.

I’m only the second Venezuelan-born federal judge in U.S. history. A few years ago, at the end of an emotional and lengthy federal-murder trial, I went to thank the jurors for their weekslong service to our country. When I entered the jury room, I found the foreman, a man in his mid-40s, fighting back tears. He explained that he had read about my own family’s journey from Caracas to South Florida, that he too had fled Venezuela with his family and that he only wished his grandfather—a lawyer who had been forced to escape the Maduro regime—could have lived long enough to witness what our jurors had seen: an important federal trial in America, presided over by a free Venezuelan-American judge and a free Venezuelan-American foreman.

“One day,” I promised as I embraced him, “you’ll live to see a free Venezuelan justice system too.”

Judge Eaton

 By John R. Byrne

First portrait post of 2026 is Judge Joseph Oscar Eaton. He was a state senator before his time as a judge. FBA write up below.

Judge Joseph Oscar Eaton was nominated by President Lyndon B. Johnson and served on the district court from 1967-2008. Prior to his judicial service, Judge Eaton served in the U.S. Air Force, reaching the rank of major. In Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1973), a three-judge panel including Judge Eaton struck down the five-year continuous residency requirement for non-citizens seeking Medicare supplemental insurance, holding that it violated the Fifth Amendment due process clause by discriminatorily excluding lawful immigrant seniors—such as Cuban refugees—from essential medical benefits without a rational basis.

Year end reviews are in

We have one from the Chief Justice.

One from the U.S. Attorney.

And even one from Markus/Moss!

Blog contributor John Byrne has one as well from his firm here.

The Chief Justice's ends this way:

As we approach the semiquincentennial of

our Nation’s birth, it is worth recalling the

words of President Calvin Coolidge spoken a

century ago on the occasion of America’s ses-

quicentennial: “Amid all the clash of conflict-

ing interests, amid all the welter of partisan

politics, every American can turn for solace and

consolation to the Declaration of Independence

and the Constitution of the United States with

the assurance and confidence that those two

great charters of freedom and justice remain

firm and unshaken.” True then; true now.

As always, I am privileged and honored to

thank all the judges, court staff, and other ju-

dicial branch personnel throughout the Nation

for their commitment to public service and

their dedication to upholding the rule of law.