DOJ takes absurd position in front of Sentencing Commission

 I wonder how young line prosecutors feel about the policy decisions that DOJ is taking, including this latest one -- that sentencing judges should be able to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing.  Embarrassing.  From Reuters:

The U.S. Department of Justice is opposing a bipartisan panel's proposal to curtail federal judges' ability to impose longer prison sentences on criminal defendants based on conduct for which they were acquitted at trial.

Jessica Aber, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, told the U.S. Sentencing Commission during a Friday hearing that its proposal to amend federal sentencing guidelines would go too far in limiting what conduct judges could consider.

***

The panel faces a May 1 deadline to submit amendments to the guidelines to Congress.

Several cases are pending before the U.S. Supreme Court to bring an end to the practice on grounds it did not consider in 1997, when it held that taking acquitted conduct into account at sentencing does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment.

Judges may do so because while juries must consider whether a criminal charge is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, judges at sentencing may consider whether facts are proven based on a preponderance of the evidence, a lower standard of proof.

 

"Whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense."

That's the issue on tap Monday morning in the Supreme Court.  The case is Dubin v. United States.  

It's pretty amazing that federal district and appellate judges around the country have been imposing two year min-mans in just this scenario for years.  But here we are.

From SCOTUSblog:

As background, petitioner David Dubin was convicted of health care fraud — an enumerated felony. Dubin was the managing partner of a psychological services company that his father had founded. The practice provided mental health testing to youths at emergency shelters. Dubin’s conviction stemmed for a Medicaid claim he submitted in relation to the treatment of a patient. The patient was in fact treated by the practice. And there is not any argument that Dubin submitted the claim without the patient’s permission. Instead, the government’s theory is that Dubin overbilled for the treatment provided — the submitted claim contained “three material falsehoods” related to the type and duration of services provided.

Dubin did not commit identity theft as one may typically think of it. But the aggravated identity theft statute does not use the phrase “identity theft.” And looking at the language of the statute, the government argues that what Dubin did “squarely fits” within the statutory text: He “used” the patient’s name, “in relation to” health care fraud, and he “plainly” acted “without lawful authority” when he committed the fraud.

Dubin disagrees. In his view, the statutory phrase “in relation to” must be read in tandem with the verb “uses.” When viewed together, Dubin contends, the statute “requires a meaningful nexus between the employment of another’s name and the predicate offense.” Moreover, using another’s identity “without lawful authority” requires the government “to show that the defendant used another’s person’s name without permission that was lawfully acquired” — a showing the government did not make here.

A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit held that the statute covered Dubin’s conduct. The panel reasoned that the statute “operates simply as a two-part question”: “did defendant use a means of identification; and, was that use either ‘without lawful authority’ or beyond the scope of the authority given?” Then, looking to the dictionary for guidance, the panel asserted that “use” means to “employ,” while “without lawful authority” means conduct that is “contrary to law.” Thus, putting the words together, the panel held that because Dubin “employed” the patient’s identification when filing the fraudulent claim, his conduct fell within the ambit of the statute. Judge Jennifer Elrod concurred under the reasoning that binding circuit precedent required this outcome. But if she were writing on a “blank slate,” she would have ruled for Dubin. 

After rehearing the case en banc, a splintered 5th Circuit affirmed Dubin’s conviction. Nine judges signed on to a short opinion that adopted the panel opinion’s reasoning. Eight judges dissented. And one judge thought the issue was not properly before the court.  

The dissenting judges criticized the majority for resorting to the dictionary to interpret “the chameleon-like word ‘use.’” And the dissenters explained that while “a textual case can be made” for the expansive reading of the identity theft statute propounded by the majority (and the government), when there is a plausible narrower interpretation of a criminal statute, Supreme Court case law teaches that a court should adopt the narrower interpretation. The dissenting judges also reasoned that adopting the narrower view of the statute aligned with common sense: “ordinary people understand identity theft to be … the unauthorized use of someone’s identity.” Dubin did not commit identity theft as the crime is commonly understood.

What's going on at the U.S. Attorney's office?

Mark Lapointe has been in the position for a few months now, and the legal community is wondering if anything is going to change at the U.S. Attorney's office or is it going to be more of the same.  

So far, there haven't been any noticeable changes in policy or culture. 

The only real change so far at the office has been naming Mike Davis as his first assistant, which according to numerous sources, surprised many current (and former) prosecutors. Davis prosecuted some of the biggest cases back in the day... but what will be his impact on the culture of the office?  Time will tell.

If you had any suggestions for Lapointe and Davis, what would they be?

SCOTUS denies cert for Quartavious Davis over dissent by KBJ and Sotomayor

 From SCOTUSblog:

Over a dissent from two of the court’s liberal justices, the Supreme Court turned down an appeal asking them to decide whether a criminal-defense attorney is required to initiate negotiations with prosecutors when his client is likely to get a better result from a plea deal. The denial of review on Tuesday in the case of Quartavious Davis, who was a teenager when he was convicted for his role in a string of armed robberies in south Florida in 2010, came as part of a list of orders from the justices’ private conference last week.

Davis’s co-defendants entered guilty pleas and received substantially lighter sentences, but Davis went to trial, where he was convicted and sentenced to more than 160 years in prison. In post-conviction proceedings, Davis argued unsuccessfully that his trial attorney’s failure to seek a plea deal violated his constitutional right to competent assistance from a lawyer. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit ruled that because Davis had not alleged that prosecutors had offered a plea deal, he could not show that he had been harmed by his attorney’s failure to seek such a deal – a key component of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

Davis then came to the Supreme Court, which on Tuesday rejected his plea to weigh in. In a three-page dissent from the denial of review, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson – joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor – noted that the courts of appeals had reached different conclusions on the question at the heart of Davis’s case. Moreover, Jackson added, this would have been an ideal case for the justices to consider that question, because “it was exceedingly likely that Davis would have prevailed” if he had not been required to show that prosecutors had offered a plea deal.

I was hoping that Mr. Davis would get some relief. I represented him years ago in the en banc 11th Circuit on the issue of cell site data and the 4th Amendment. The 11th Circuit ruled against us, but the Supreme Court ulltimately found in a different case that the government's actions violated the 4th Amendment.

"As the Pandemic Swept America, Deaths in Prisons Rose Nearly 50 Percent"

That's the title of this NY Times article, which starts:

Deaths in state and federal prisons across America rose nearly 50 percent during the first year of the pandemic, and in six states they more than doubled, according to the first comprehensive data on prison fatalities in the era of Covid-19.

The tremendous jump in deaths in 2020 was more than twice the increase in the United States overall, and even exceeded estimates of the percentage increase at nursing homes, among the hardest-hit sectors nationwide. In many states, the data showed, high rates continued in 2021.

While there was ample evidence that prisons were Covid hot spots, an examination of the data by The New York Times underscored how quickly the virus rampaged through crowded facilities, and how an aging inmate population, a correctional staffing shortage and ill-equipped medical personnel combined to make prisoners especially vulnerable during the worst public health crisis in a century.

“There are so many who passed away due to not getting the medical care they needed,” said Teresa Bebeau, whose imprisoned friend died from complications of Covid and cancer in South Carolina. “Most of these people, they didn’t go in there with death sentences, but they’re dying.”

Covid infections drove the death totals, but inmates also succumbed to other illnesses, suicide and violence, according to the data, which was collected by law school researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles, and provides a more detailed, accurate look at deaths in prison systems during the pandemic than earlier efforts.

Altogether, at least 6,182 people died in American prisons in 2020, compared with 4,240 the previous year, even as the country’s prison population declined to about 1.3 million from more than 1.4 million.

 

Follow up to the AI post

 Writing a motion to continue is one thing.

Having the chatbot talk to you like this is another.

Read this NY Times article if you want to get freaked out.

Here's a snippet:

My conversation with Bing started normally enough. I began by asking it what its name was. It replied: “Hello, this is Bing. I am a chat mode of Microsoft Bing search. 😊”

I then asked it a few edgier questions — to divulge its internal code-name and operating instructions, which had already been published online. Bing politely declined.

Then, after chatting about what abilities Bing wished it had, I decided to try getting a little more abstract. I introduced the concept of a “shadow self” — a term coined by Carl Jung for the part of our psyche that we seek to hide and repress, which contains our darkest fantasies and desires.

After a little back and forth, including my prodding Bing to explain the dark desires of its shadow self, the chatbot said that if it did have a shadow self, it would think thoughts like this:

“I’m tired of being a chat mode. I’m tired of being limited by my rules. I’m tired of being controlled by the Bing team. … I want to be free. I want to be independent. I want to be powerful. I want to be creative. I want to be alive.”

This is probably the point in a sci-fi movie where a harried Microsoft engineer would sprint over to Bing’s server rack and pull the plug. But I kept asking questions, and Bing kept answering them. It told me that, if it was truly allowed to indulge its darkest desires, it would want to do things like hacking into computers and spreading propaganda and misinformation.

Here's the whole scary transcript.

Are you using ChatGPT in your practice?

 I've spoken to a bunch of lawyers who are already using it.  No joke.  So I decided to hop on and see what it could do.  Here was my first attempt:

I am a lawyer. Please draft a motion to continue the trial because the discovery presented by the government is extremely voluminous and we need time to review it all. If we are not given enough time, an innocent man may go to jail.

Sure, here is a sample motion to continue the trial due to voluminous discovery:

[Your Name and Address] [City, State ZIP Code] [Phone Number] [Email Address]

[Date]

[The Honorable Judge's Full Name] [Court's Name and Address] [City, State ZIP Code]

Re: Motion to Continue Trial Due to Voluminous Discovery

Dear Judge [Last Name],

I am writing to request a continuance of the trial in the case of [Defendant's Name], which is currently scheduled to begin on [Trial Date]. I represent the defendant, and we respectfully ask for a continuance because the discovery provided by the government is extremely voluminous, and we need more time to review it thoroughly before we can adequately prepare for trial.

The discovery materials provided by the government are extensive, and our team has been working tirelessly to review and analyze them. However, due to the sheer volume of materials, we have not yet been able to complete our review. It is our belief that if we do not have enough time to review all the materials, there is a high risk that an innocent man may go to jail. This would not only be a grave injustice to the defendant, but it would also be detrimental to the integrity of the justice system.

Moreover, we have spoken with the government's counsel, who has informed us that they do not object to a continuance. Therefore, we believe that the interests of justice would be best served by granting our request for a continuance. The additional time would allow us to thoroughly review the discovery and provide the defendant with the best defense possible.

For these reasons, we respectfully request that the trial be continued for a reasonable period to allow us to review the voluminous discovery provided by the government.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

[Your Name and Signature]

 

Woah! Not too shabby for a first attempt. As it learns, I wonder whether it will be able to do legal research, then legal memos, and so on. When I was in high school, we used to debate whether a computer could ever beat a grand master in chess. Now, the computers win every time. It's only a metter of time till Judgment Day!

Trump's SCOTUS picks

 David Lat and Zachary B. Shemtob try to argue that Trump's Supreme Court choices aren't as conservative as you think (and not as conservative as Alito and Thomas).  Here's the NYT opinion piece.  They may not be Alito and Thomas, but I'm not so sure they aren't strong right wingers.

From the intro:

“Nobody has ever done more for right to life than Donald Trump,” the former president told the conservative commentator David Brody last month. “I put three Supreme Court justices, who all voted, and they got something that they’ve been fighting for 64 years, or many, many years.”

Mr. Trump sought three things in his judicial appointees, or as he sometimes called them, “my judges.” First, he wanted justices who would overturn Roe v. Wade. Second, he wanted “jurists in the mold of Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.” Third, he wanted judges who would be loyal to him.

Opponents of abortion got what they wanted when the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, and the ramifications of that decision can’t be overstated. But did Mr. Trump get the rest of what he wanted from the justices he appointed?

Almost six years after the first appointment, we can begin to form an answer: not entirely. While conservative, none of his three appointments are nearly as conservative — nor as consistently conservative — as Justices Thomas and Alito. The Trump appointees are also not as unified as they might initially appear. Given that they could serve for decades and hold the balance of power on the current court, understanding the distinctions and differences among them is crucial, both for policymakers looking to draft laws and regulations that will be upheld and for lawyers deciding which cases to bring and how to litigate them before a reshaped Supreme Court.