Sunday, May 09, 2021

11th Circuit shows again that it is an outlier and the most conservative federal appellate court -- by a lot.

 This time the case is United States v. Thomas Bryant, a 2-1 decision, that holds -- contrary to 7 unanimous Circuit Court rulings -- although the First Step Act allows courts to decide compassionate release motions, they are not permitted to decide what compelling and extraordinary circumstances are.  Only BOP can do that, says the lone two judges in the country (Brasher wrote the opinion and Luck joined), who make up the majority opinion in this case.  

Judge Martin rightfully dissents and explains in her intro:

Today’s majority opinion establishes the Eleventh Circuit as the only circuit to limit an inmate’s ability to get compassionate release from incarceration solely to those “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that are pre-approved by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Our precedent now allows no independent or individualized consideration by a federal judge as plainly intended by the First Step Act. And this limitation on compassionate release is based on an outdated policy statement from a Sentencing Commission that has lacked a quorum since the First Step Act became law.1 The problems that arise from the majority’s reliance on the outdated policy statement are compounded by the majority’s express decision to strike (or ignore) language from the policy statement. Sadly, this result reinstates the exact problem the First Step Act was intended to remedy: compassionate release decisions had been left under the control of a government agency that showed no interest in properly administering it. With all respect due, I dissent. 

Let's see if the 11th Circuit takes the case en banc, which it obviously should when it is the one in a 7-1 split, or if the religious freedom issue is the only time a defendant will be able to get en banc review in the 11th.  

Thursday, May 06, 2021

Blockbuster en banc opinion in U.S. v. Corrine Brown

If I had told you that an African American congresswoman convicted of fraud would obtain en banc review and win in the 11th Circuit by having her conviction vacated, you would tell me that I was crazy and that it was literally a million to one shot.  After all, the 11th Circuit is the most conservative appellate court in the country, it grants en banc review to defendants who lose once every decade (at most), and has never ruled for a defendant in an en banc opinion since I've been covering the court.  (Please correct me if I'm wrong!). But this wasn't any normal issue before the 11th Circuit.  It involved the religious beliefs of a juror who was told by the Holy Spirit to vote not guilty.  The district judge struck that juror.  Brown was convicted and then appealed.  The panel in a 2-1 decision affirmed the conviction (Rosenbaum for the majority and Pryor for the dissent).  The en banc court lined up as you would expect it, with the 7 conservative judges saying you can't strike a juror based on a religious vote, while the 4 moderate judges dissented (Jill Pryor recused and did not participate). 

You can access the 98 pages of opinions here

The lineup:

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, LUCK, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges, joined.

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion, in which GRANT, Circuit Judge, joined. 

BRASHER, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion, in which BRANCH, Circuit Judge, joined. 

WILSON, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARTIN, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, joined. 

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion, in which WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, joined. 

I come out a little different than both camps.  I'm fine with a juror voting not guilty based on really whatever they want.  In my view, nullification should be permissible.  Jurors should be able to say no to the government at a jury trial for whatever reason they wish.  But I'm not okay with a conviction based on nullification. In other words, if Satan told a juror to convict even though the evidence was not there, that would be a reason to remove the juror.  If the Holy Spirit told a juror to acquit even though there was overwhelming evidence, that should be permitted.  

Let's get to the opinions.

From Pryor's introduction:

This appeal requires us to decide whether a district judge abused his discretion by removing a juror who expressed, after the start of deliberations, that the Holy Spirit told him that the defendant, Corrine Brown, was not guilty on all charges. The juror also repeatedly assured the district judge that he was following the jury instructions and basing his decision on the evidence admitted at trial, and the district judge found him to be sincere and credible. But the district judge concluded that the juror’s statements about receiving divine guidance were categorically disqualifying. Because the record establishes a substantial possibility that the juror was rendering proper jury service, the district judge abused his discretion by dismissing the juror. The removal violated Brown’s right under the Sixth Amendment to a unanimous jury verdict. We vacate Brown’s convictions and sentence and remand for a new trial.

More:

Juror No. 13’s vernacular that the Holy Spirit “told” him Brown was “not guilty on all charges” was no more disqualifying by itself than a secular juror’s statement that his conscience or gut “told” him the same. Of course, neither a religious nor secular juror may convict or acquit a defendant using his internal decision-making processes without regard to the evidence. But Juror No. 13 repeatedly explained that he was, in fact, reviewing and deliberating over the evidence. His statements are not proof that he “abandon[ed] his . . . judgment to what he . . . perceive[d] to be oracular signs.” DeMille, 756 P.2d at 84. And just as a juror may say at the beginning of deliberations that he “thinks” a defendant is “not guilty on all charges,” and perhaps later change his mind, Juror No. 13 could say that the Holy Spirit “told” him the same without violating his oath. There is no evidence that Juror No. 13 believed himself unshakably bound to his initial understanding of the Holy Spirit’s guidance, contrary to the district judge’s assumption that Juror No. 13’s “religious beliefs compelled him to disregard” the jury instructions. Cf. United States v. Salvador, 740 F.2d 752, 754– 55 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming declaration of mistrial where juror stopped deliberating and refused to move from decision made through religious inspiration). Juror No. 13 may have, for instance, discerned upon further deliberation and review of the evidence, that his preliminary view was mistaken. See Luhrmann, When God Talks Back, at 41 (“These evangelical Christians . . . have to pick out the thoughts that count as God’s and . . . do so in a way that does not violate the realistic demands of the everyday world.”). Let us not forget that “[t]he very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves.” Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896); see also PeƱaRodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861 (“[E]xperience shows that fair and impartial verdicts can be reached if the jury . . . undertakes deliberations that are honest, candid, robust, and based on common sense.”). We must guard against the removal of a juror who, in vernacular commonly used by religious and racial minorities, expresses a view among jurors who “may well come to view the ‘holdout’ . . . not only as unreasonable, but as unwilling to follow the court’s instructions on the law.” Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622. And we must take care that judges, “who do not speak the language of ordinary people and may not understand or appreciate the way ordinary people live their lives,” PeƱa-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting), do not remove a juror solely because his vernacular led the judge to the same conclusion. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing the absence of “a single evangelical Christian” on the “select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine” that is the Supreme Court).

Newsom is concerned with how the case will be reported:

First, notwithstanding how it will likely be reported, this is not a case about the single statement, “[T]he Holy Spirit told me . . . that Corrine Brown was not guilty on all charges”—it’s a case about the context in which that statement was made and the entire record before us. And the entire record—which the Court meticulously traces over the course of 14 pages—establishes (at the very least) a “substantial possibility” that Juror No. 13 was rendering proper jury service, basing his decision on the evidence. See Maj. Op. at 5–18. Second, and again notwithstanding how it will likely be reported, this is not a case about religious jurors—it’s a case about all jurors. It would come out exactly the same way if Juror No. 13’s comments had touched on some other topic. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 611, 623–24 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cabranes, J.) (reversing a district court’s dismissal of a juror who reportedly had favored acquittal on the ground that “the defendants were his ‘people’” but who was also said to be discussing and evaluating the evidence).

Brasher says there should have been no inquiry at all here:

I agree with the way the Court applies our precedents to Juror 13’s testimony about why he preliminarily voted to acquit the defendant. But I write separately to explain that, in my view, this record should not have been created. There was no cause for Juror 13 to testify at an evidentiary hearing about his religious convictions, his view of the evidence, or his understanding of a juror’s role. The trial judge should not have inquired into Juror 13’s thoughts in the first place. A juror’s initial view of the case is not what matters. 

Wilson dissents:

On the majority’s reading of a cold transcript, there was a substantial possibility that Juror No. 13 was basing his decision solely on the evidence and the law. The district court—able to hear live testimony and observe the juror’s tone, inflection, and demeanor—came to the contrary conclusion. Because the district court was “uniquely situated” to make this determination, I would not supplant its judgment with my own. See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2014). District judges walk a tightrope when deciding whether to remove a juror mid-deliberations. A misstep in one direction—improperly removing a holdout juror—imperils the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict. A misstep in the opposite direction—allowing a juror to vote without regard to the merits of the case—undermines each party’s right to a verdict based on the evidence and threatens the rule of law. See Robinson v. Polk, 444 F.3d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 2006) (mem.) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Juries have legitimacy in a democracy because, despite the variety of jurors’ beliefs, they are united in the common endeavor of legal judgment. Any contrary perception threatens the most basic premise of the rule of law.”). 

And Rosenbaum's additional dissent:

Every judge of this Court agrees on this much: the same rule governs dismissal of both the juror who says his religious authority told him the defendant is not guilty on all charges and the one who says his religious authority told him the defendant is guilty on all charges. So let’s be clear about what we’re really doing today: we are holding that a district judge is powerless to dismiss a juror who, on a record like this one, says the Holy Spirit told him the defendant is guilty on all charges and he trusts the Holy Spirit—even though the judge finds after investigation that the juror is not capable of basing his guilty verdict on the evidence but instead will base his verdict on what he perceives to be a divine revelation.2 Just think about that. We are prohibiting district judges, on records like this one, from dismissing jurors they find beyond a reasonable doubt will return a guilty verdict that is not based on the evidence. Why bother with the trial? Yet while the Majority Opinion guarantees this result, it invokes the grandeur of the right to a jury trial, ironically dedicating an entire section to how its decision protects the rights of defendants to unanimous jury verdicts. See Maj. Op. at Section III.A. But a unanimous jury’s guilty verdict is worth less than nothing to a convicted defendant if the jurors who returned the verdict did not base it on the evidence. And even if only a single juror voted guilty because he believed his religious authority instructed him to do so, without regard to the evidence, the guilty verdict of the jury he sat on is not the unanimous verdict our Founders and the Constitution contemplated; in that case, at best, only eleven jurors, not twelve, based their verdict on the evidence presented at trial. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) (“A verdict, taken from eleven, [is] no verdict at all.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). So though the Majority Opinion’s take on the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict may leave a reader with the impression that our decision today is a soaring eagle, that is but an illusion. Today’s decision is in fact a skulking serpent: it dooms the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict in at least some critical circumstances—namely, when a jury returns a guilty verdict not unanimously based on the evidence.

FN2 To put it in even starker terms, at oral argument, Judge Jordan asked Brown’s counsel whether the rule the Majority Opinion adopts today would also prevent the district judge from dismissing a juror who, on a record like this one, says that Satan told him the defendant is guilty on all charges and he trusts Satan—even if the judge finds after investigation that the juror is not capable of basing his guilty verdict on the evidence but instead will base it on what he thinks is a Satanic revelation. Brown’s counsel conceded the rule would preclude the juror’s dismissal. And not a single judge of this Court disagrees; the same rule must govern whether the juror says he’s told by the Holy Spirit or by Satan and whether he says he’s told the defendant is not guilty or guilty on all charges.

 


Wednesday, May 05, 2021

Breaking -- Congressional JNC sets interviews

Below is the list for District Judge.  They also have set interviews for U.S. Attorney.  Good luck to all.



Tuesday, May 04, 2021

AFPD Andrew Adler in the Supreme Court

Congrats to AFPD Andy Adler for his Supreme Court argument today in Tarahrick Terry v. United StatesFrom Reuters:
U.S. Supreme Court justices on Tuesday seemed skeptical that low-level crack cocaine offenders can benefit under a 2018 federal law that reduced certain prison sentences in part to address racial disparities detrimental to Black defendants.

The nine justices heard their final arguments of the court's nine-month term that began last October in a case involving a Florida man named Tarahrick Terry that tests the scope of the First Step Act signed into law by former President Donald Trump.

The provision in question made retroactive a 2010 law called the Fair Sentencing Act that reduced a disparity that made sentencing for crack cocaine crimes more severe than for powder cocaine crimes.

Black defendants were far more likely to face crack cocaine charges than white defendants, who were more apt to face powder cocaine charges. Terry, scheduled to be released from prison in September, is Black.

***

Liberal Justice Stephen Breyer indicated sympathy toward the idea that lower-level offenders should have benefited from the law, but said its language did not appear to support that interpretation.

"I mean I think they were much too high. I understand that," Breyer said of the long sentences. "But I can't get away from this statute."

Federal public defender Andrew Adler, representing Terry, told conservative Chief Justice John Roberts that the law unambiguously applies only to low-level crack offenders, not those convicted of other drug offenses.  

Even though the Government joined Adler's position, the Court appointed amicus to take the other side and sadly seemed inclined to rule against the defendant.  No matter how it comes out, what a cool accomplishment to argue in the High Court.

May the 4th be with you!


 After Festivus, this is my favorite holiday.

Things are starting to open back up with courts around the country.  Here in SDFLA, we will have the pilot trial before Judge Ungaro next week.  It's a short civil case, but it will be a big test to see if we can get going again.  Good luck to Judge Ungaro and the litigants.  

Sunday, May 02, 2021

RIP Judge Joseph Hatchett

 What a life.  The first African American to serve on the Florida Supreme Court and the first to serve as a Circuit Judge (the former 5th and then the 11th) in the South.  


From the Miami Herald:

When a young Joseph W. Hatchett took the Florida Bar exam in 1960, he could not stay in the Miami hotel in which the test was given because of Jim Crow regulations.

Within 15 years, Hatchett would become the first African American to serve on the Florida Supreme Court.

Former Florida Supreme Court Justice Hatchett died in Tallahassee on Friday, April 30, Florida Supreme Court spokesman Craig Waters said in a post Saturday morning. Hatchett was 88 and Florida’s 65th justice since statehood was granted in 1845.

Hatchett was appointed to Florida’s highest court by Gov. Reubin Askew in 1975. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter named him to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, where, the Florida Supreme Court notes, “he became the first African American to serve in a federal circuit that covered the Deep South at the time.”

Twenty years later, after retiring in 1999, Hatchett took on another challenge when he joined with the NAACP to be lead attorney in the fight to preserve statewide preference programs for minorities and women in Florida.

“This is to continue to ensure that all Floridians have an equal opportunity to succeed, and that’s affirmative action,” Hatchett told the Miami Herald at the time.

That earlier indignity at the Miami hotel during his bar exam endured. Hatchett was determined that other promising young Black law students could one day not only eat lunch in the same dining room as their white counterparts — something he was warned not to do when he took the test — but that they, too, could one day ascend as he had.

“I can remember when I became a young lawyer he pulled me aside and told me, basically, that what other people thought of my dreams were none of my business,” said attorney H.T. Smith, the founding director of the Trial Advocacy Program at Florida International University College of Law.

“His whole philosophy was that group of Black lawyers in Florida in the 1960s and 1970s, we had a responsibility to open the vaults of opportunity for ourselves and for people coming behind us,” Smith said. 

Thursday, April 29, 2021

Judge Altman interviews Judge Singhal at Federal Bar Association event


 It was a wonderful interview.  Two great guys just talking.  Relaxed and interesting.  What makes them both great is that they are real people.  We learned lots about Judge Singhal -- his love of trials, comics, Presidents, and the law.  His unbelievable background and parents.  We need more judges like him.  I'm glad so many of you were able to see it as I am told it was the best attended event of the pandemic.

Wednesday, April 28, 2021

How are federal judges and U.S. Attorney going to be selected?

 

No one knows. Jay Weaver covers a lot of the competing interests in this piece. The article starts this way:

When Joe Biden won the presidency, Florida’s congressional Democrats thought they might finally get a chance to serve up his picks for federal judges.

But they had a significant hurdle: Florida’s two Republican senators still dominated the commission that scrutinizes judicial candidates to be nominated by the Democratic president.

So, in an unprecedented move, longtime Democratic Reps. Alcee Hastings and Debbie Wasserman Schultz created their own Florida judicial nominating commission earlier this year to compete with the GOP-controlled Senate panel — even though the House of Representatives has no authority to confirm federal judges for lifetime appointments. The Senate has that power.

The shifting political landscape has caused confusion for judicial candidates seeking to fill two openings for federal judges in the Southern District of Florida and a new vacancy for the U.S. attorney’s job in the same region. Some said it is not clear who will have the last word in recommending finalists for each of the coveted positions.

The judicial openings in South Florida have been created by two U.S. District Court judges assuming “senior status,” Federico Moreno and Ursula Ungaro. The U.S. attorney’s post became vacant with the recent resignation of Trump-appointed U.S. Attorney Ariana Fajardo Orshan.


Among the several candidates who have expressed interest in applying for the judges’ two seats: U.S. Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Becerra, Federal Public Defender Michael Caruso, Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Lisa S. Walsh, Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Tanya Brinkley and Miami-Dade County Judge Ayana Harris.

The U.S. attorney’s post has drawn the interest of former South Florida federal prosecutors Jacqueline Arango, Andres Rivero, David Buckner and Markenzy Lapointe, along with Palm Beach County State Attorney Dave Aronberg.

In the end, President Biden has the sole authority to nominate whomever he wants to be a federal judge or U.S. attorney. But as senators, Florida’s two Republicans, Marco Rubio and Rick Scott, have the unique power to block anyone from being confirmed by the Senate. During the Obama administration, Rubio refused to issue a “blue slip” for two of the Democratic president’s nominees for federal judges in South Florida, Miami-Dade Circuit Judges William Thomas and Mary Barzee, preventing them from going through Senate confirmation hearings. As a result, their nominations stalled.