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Mrs. Brand then turned to Ms. Velazco and asked for a phone so she could call 911. Ms. Velazco handed Mrs. Brand the home phone. Deputy Pardinas ordered Mrs. Brand to “drop the phone,” but she did not. Instead she announced she was dialing 911. Mrs. Brand began dialing when suddenly and without warning, Deputy Pardinas tased her. The tase caused Mrs. Brand to fall to the floor in “[h]orrible, excruciating” pain.
Deputy Pardinas ordered Mrs. Brand to lie flat on her stomach. Deputy Pardinas began “punching [her] back,” striking Mrs. Brand about three times in an attempt to get her to lie on her stomach. Mrs. Brand said she couldn’t lie flat because she was pregnant. She kept one of her legs “elbowed out” to protect her stomach. Deputy Pardinas kicked Mrs. Brand’s leg several times to get her into a fully prone position.
***
As far as Deputy Pardinas knew, Mrs. Brand was not suspected of any crime when the deputy deployed her taser. Mrs. Brand was not the subject of the arrest warrant. And although Mrs. Brand was eventually arrested by Deputy Casal for obstruction and cruelty to children in the third degree, these alleged offenses were based on conduct that occurred before Deputy Pardinas joined Deputy Casal at the front of the house. Deputy Pardinas did not see, and did not know about, the altercation between Mrs. Brand and Deputy Casal that led to the charges against Mrs. Brand.
7 Those charges do not therefore support the reasonableness of Deputy Pardinas’s use of force. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2002) (“We do not use hindsight to judge the acts of police officers; we look at what they knew . . . at the time of the act.”).
Second, Mrs. Brand did not pose any “immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others” when Deputy Pardinas tased her. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872. It is true Mrs. Brand was “extremely upset [and] agitated” that the officers would not get out of her house. But, under the Brands’ version of events—which we accept at this stage—Mrs. Brand was never violent or aggressive toward the officers. For example, Ms. Velazco reports that Mrs. Brand never even yelled. Indeed, Ms. Velazco testified that “[t]he only aggressive acts came from the officers.” Mrs. Brand was simply standing in her foyer, asking the officers to leave, holding a phone, and attempting to dial 911. The defendants point to the fact that Mrs. Brand disobeyed Deputy Pardinas’s order to “drop the phone.” But there was nothing dangerous about Mrs. Brand holding a phone in the first place, especially where she made clear she was using it only to dial 911. Her refusal to comply with the order to drop the phone did not pose any threat to the safety of the officers, and certainly was not a threat that would necessitate the use of a taser with no warning to Mrs. Brand. Cf. Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1288 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[R]esisting arrest without force does not connote a level of dangerousness that would justify a greater use of force.”).
Third and finally, Mrs. Brand was neither actively resisting arrest nor attempting to escape when Deputy Pardinas tased her. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872. By all accounts, she had not even been told she was under arrest at the time she was tased.
Based on the Brands’ account of the facts, we are persuaded that Deputy Pardinas “used force that was plainly excessive, wholly unnecessary, and, indeed, grossly disproportionate under Graham.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. We therefore conclude that Deputy Pardinas’s tasing of Mrs. Brand constituted excessive force in violation of Mrs. Brand’s Fourth Amendment rights.
And that’s really been the nugget at the core of any defense of Kozinski. He was “only” joking, or that he should get a pass or a mere slap on the wrist because his behavior didn’t cross the line into the physical. But in the new WaPo article more women are coming forward with allegations that seem to cross that line and are deeply unsettling.
Take the story of Christine O.C. Miller, who is now a retired U.S. Court of Federal Claims judge. She says that in 1986 she attended a professional event with Kozinski and shared a car ride home at the end of the evening. During that ride Miller alleges Kozinski asked her to stop at a hotel and have sex. When she rejected his advance, she alleges things turned physical:
“I told him, no, I wasn’t interested and didn’t want to be involved in anything like that,” she said. Kozinski, she said, persisted.
“He said if you won’t sleep with me, I want to touch you, and then he reached over, and — this was the most antiseptic — he grabbed each of my breasts and squeezed them,” Miller said. She said she stared straight ahead, and he soon dropped her off at her home.
In the spring of 1955, my mother boarded a train in Sumter, South Carolina. She was traveling to join my father, who had moved to Detroit shortly after I was born. The plan was that she would join him later. They both knew there was little opportunity for economic advancement for African-Americans in South Carolina. They became part of the great migration — Southern African-Americans moving north from the dangerous, segregated South.
She carried me in her arms. I was 9 months old. She packed and carried enough provisions for both of us for the two-day trip. My mother, as a child of the segregated South, knew that the dining car on the train was not available to her. Whatever we would need on the two-day journey was in her luggage. Food. Clothing. Hygiene. Years later she spoke of the kindness of the Pullman porters, the African-American men that worked on the train. One would surreptitiously take my bottle, warm it and return it to my mother. Another would alert her when the small communal bathroom in the “colored” car was just tidied and available so she could take time to clean herself and me of the traveler’s dirt.
Ten years later, a return trip was very different. My family stopped at a West Virginia Howard Johnson’s on a Southern road trip. We walked into the dining room and were promptly seated, our orders were taken and we were served — without incident, thanks to Constance Baker Motley. Constance Baker Motley, who?
As historian Gary L. Ford Jr. states in his recently published biography, "Constance Baker Motley: One Woman’s Fight for Civil Rights and Equal Justice Under Law":
Many of the people Motley helped had no idea who she was or what she did for them. She operated within the confines of courtrooms where many protesters were either banned or strongly discouraged from attending their trials. She was their unseen and unknown guardian angel.
Ford is an attorney and professor of African studies at Lehman College. His biography of Constance Baker Motley is an interesting read, even for nonscholars. The book is also an excellent reference material. The appendix details Motley’s numerous cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, the various U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts.
Ford’s book is more than a general biography of the woman who would become the first African-American female United States district judge; it presents in vivid detail how her work altered the legal landscape of the United States systematically, case after case, dismantling the Jim Crow laws in the Southern United States. Most of us know that Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”) filed cases to end public school desegregation, defended individuals arrested at sit-ins, and provided legal support and guidance to the early civil rights movement in this country. Most forget that Marshall left the LDF in 1961 when he was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The legal enforcement of Brown v. Board of Education, the desegregation of professional schools and a host of other litigation and civil rights enforcement fell to Motley.
A brief coda: Having endeavored along the way to meet our dissenting colleague’s specific objections, we must respond briefly to his more sweeping charge that we have “disregard[ed]” or cavalierly “passe[d] by” settled procedural rules in a conscious effort to “move to the merits”—only, he says, to adopt a rule that “undermines long-established principles of bankruptcy law and the Code itself, and runs contrary to the purpose of Chapter 13 bankruptcy.” Dissenting Op. at 29– 30, 47. With the utmost respect, none of that is true. The former intimation—that we’ve somehow bent normal procedures in a
headlong rush to parse the U.S. Bankruptcy Code—seems to us to refute itself.
That’s not how courts should operate, and it’s not how we operate—and, let’s just say, the temptation to cut corners is not particularly strong (which is to say nonexistent) when the reward for doing so is an exhaustive assessment of Chapter 13, Georgia’s “pawn” statute, and those laws’ combined import for the fate of a 2006 Dodge Charger. (If anything, the incentives would seem to run in the other direction, but we digress.) Here as always, we’re just doing our best to call ’em like we see ’em. And needless to say, we find no particular joy in concluding that a pawnbroker now owns the car that Mr. Wilber once drove. For better or worse, that’s simply the result that, on our reading, the law requires.
This should be an easy case. The Bankruptcy Code provides—and the Supreme Court and this Circuit agree—that a confirmed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan enjoys a preclusive, binding effect. A creditor may only escape treatment under a plan if it objects to plan confirmation and then appeals the overruling of that objection. Title Max admitted to the bankruptcy judge, on the record, that it did not object, and the bankruptcy judge confirmed the plan. Title Max now says that it did object and that it therefore can elude the plan’s terms. But the law required an objection before plan confirmation, not a retroactive recasting of motions as objections. Therefore, Title Max remains bound by the confirmed plan.
The majority disregards these simple facts, choosing instead to move to the merits. In doing so, the majority rewards Title Max—by allowing it to sidestep the preclusive effects of a confirmed bankruptcy plan—for changing litigation positions on appeal. I am troubled that we would incentivize an attorney’s inconsistent representations before the courts of this Circuit, including before the judges of this panel, and I thus cannot join the majority’s opinion. Aside from these concerns, I am skeptical of the majority’s holding that state law may operate to divest a federally-created bankruptcy estate of a piece of property that all parties, and the majority, admit entered that estate pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. Such a holding undermines long-established principles of bankruptcy law and the Code itself, and runs contrary to the purpose of Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A former clerk for Judge Alex Kozinski said the powerful and well-known jurist, who for many years served as chief judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, called her into his office several times and pulled up pornography on his computer, asking if she thought it was photoshopped or if it aroused her sexually.
Heidi Bond, who clerked for Kozinski from 2006 to 2007, said the porn was not related to any case. One set of images she remembered was of college-age students at a party where “some people were inexplicably naked while everyone else was clothed.” Another was a sort of digital flip book that allowed users to mix and match heads, torsos and legs to create an image of a naked woman.
Bond is one of six women — all former clerks or more junior staffers known as externs in the 9th Circuit — who alleged to The Washington Post in recent weeks that Kozinski, now 67 and still serving as a judge on the court, subjected them to a range of inappropriate sexual conduct or comments. She is one of two former clerks who said Kozinski asked them to view porn in his chambers.
In a statement, Kozinski said: “I have been a judge for 35 years and during that time have had over 500 employees in my chambers. I treat all of my employees as family and work very closely with most of them. I would never intentionally do anything to offend anyone and it is regrettable that a handful have been offended by something I may have said or done.”
Kozinski provided the statement after The Post called and emailed a spokesman with a detailed list of the allegations this story would include. After the story posted online, the judge told the Los Angeles Times, “I don’t remember ever showing pornographic material to my clerks” and, “If this is all they are able to dredge up after 35 years, I am not too worried.”
