Salomon Melgen granted bail on appeal by Judge Marra (and breaking news re a cert grant from the SDFLA)

New judge, new lawyers, new bond hearing.  Judge Marra did the right thing here and reversed the detention order by the magistrate judge.  From the Palm Beach Post:

North Palm Beach ophthalmologist Salomon Melgen will be allowed to post bond and leave jail pending his trial on charges that he bilked Medicare out of $105 million, a federal judge decided Friday.
But the wealthy 61-year-old physician won’t be released before a hearing Monday for U.S. Magistrate James Hopkins to set the size of the bond. U.S. prosecutors are asking that he be required to pay $20 million to secure his release from the federal detention center in Miami.
While leaving that task up to Hopkins, U.S. District Judge Kenneth Marra said Friday he was putting conditions in place to help reduce prosecutors’ fears that Melgen would flee to his native Dominican Republic or seek refuge elsewhere on the globe.
Melgen, who has been held in custody without bond since his April arrest on charges that he falsely diagnosed and treated hundreds of patients for macular degeneration to illegally inflate his Medicare billings, will be held on house arrest with electronic monitoring once he has posted bond, Marra ruled. But, he said, Melgen won’t be staying at his $2.3 million waterfront home in Captain’s Key near Juno Beach.
“Defendant shall not reside at a location adjacent to or with access to a waterway,” he said in the four-page ruling. Melgen will also will be stripped of any ability to use his boat or private jet.
Marra also ordered the doctor to provide a written declaration from Dominican government leaders, pledging that they won’t block his extradition should he seek safe harbor in his homeland.
...“The court concludes that nature and notoriety of the charges (Melgen) is facing in New Jersey, and the fact that he is a co-defendant with a United States Senator, makes it unlikely that any attempt to flee would be successful,” he wrote. “Great diplomatic and political pressure would be brought to bear on any country that might consider shielding (Melgen) from extradition.”
In addition, he said, Melgen’s wife, son and daughter will be required to pledge their assets to guarantee his return. The possibility that he would leave his family “financially devastated” should curb any desire to escape prosecution, Marra wrote.
Melgen, he said, has had months, if not years, to flee. For at least two years, he has been under investigation for health-care fraud and for his relationship with Menendez. Weeks before he was alerted by prosecutors in New Jersey that his indictment there was imminent, he traveled to the Dominican Republic for a wedding and returned, Menchel said.
“Certainly,” Marra wrote, “if (Melgen) intended to flee, he had his chances.”

I'm not sure I understand sending it back for a determination by the magistrate judge to set the actual bond amount, but I am sure that the new defense team is thrilled that their client is getting out.

Meantime, check out this article in the Washington Post about sentencing.  What has happened to our system?

And in breaking news, the Supreme Court this morning granted cert in Sila Luis v. United States, Howard Srebnick's follow up case to Kaley. This time he paired up with brother Scott Srebnick.  Here is the 11th Circuit unpublished opinion, which affirmed Judge Huck.  The question will address whether the pretrial restraint of forfeitable substitute assets needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. 

Early coverage from the AP:

The Supreme Court agreed Monday to decide whether the government can put a hold on untainted money and property that a criminal defendant needs to hire a lawyer.

The justices said that they will review the case of Sila Luis of Miami-Dade County, Florida, who has been indicted on fraud charges involving $45 million in allegedly improper Medicare payments. On the same day Luis was indicted in 2012, federal prosecutors froze her assets.

Luis said the freeze includes money with no ties to the charges against her and that she has a constitutional right to use the funds to hire a lawyer to mount a defense. Lower courts ruled against her.

...The new case goes to whether untainted money can be frozen when the defendant needs it to hire a lawyer. The Justice Department said the assets can be frozen even if they are untainted. In this case, the government said it sought to freeze substitute assets that would be forfeited after a conviction because Luis already has spent the ill-gotten gains on luxury items and travel.

Did the Eleventh Circuit Just Make It Harder to Attain Summary Judgment in Diversity Cases?

Last week, the Eleventh Circuit handed a major victory to Florida FedEx drivers who brought claims for back pay against FedEx. The claims of these and of other FedEx drivers around the country were consolidated as an MDL, and the MDL court certified a Florida-driver class. But the court then granted FedEx’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the drivers were independent contractors and not -- as the Florida drivers alleged -- employees. After a few of the Florida drivers lost their individual claims, the Florida drivers appealed from the grant of summary judgment, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the question whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors under Florida law was for the jury to decide.

Judge Jordan’s comprehensive opinion for the court in Carlson will surely serve as the go-to source for employee–independent contractor questions under Florida law. But -- even outside the employment context -- it may also serve as a principal source for how close summary-judgment questions are resolved in cases by district courts sitting in diversity. Not only did the court apply Florida substantive law on determining when somebody’s an employee, but the court also appeared to defer quite heavily to how Florida courts would make that determination on summary judgment -- an apparently procedural inquiry.

Here’s the first full paragraph on page 7 of the opinion:

The claims of the Florida drivers stand or fall on the common question of whether FedEx properly classified them as independent contractors. In Florida, “[i]t is well-established that the question of an employer/employee relationship is generally a question of fact, and therefore a question for the trier of fact.” Pate v. Gilmore, 647 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Accord Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 853 (Fla. 2003) (“The existence of an agency relationship is normally one for the trier of fact to decide.”). Nevertheless, the general default rule does not always apply, and Florida courts have not hesitated to grant summary judgment on the employee/independent contractor question when the circumstances warrant. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. 1956).

The court then reviewed Florida case law, the facts before it, and concluded that although the material facts were “largely undisputed,” the “inferences that can be drawn from those facts are not.” Summary judgment, the court held, was inappropriate.

The court -- relying squarely on established circuit precedent that all inferences are drawn in the non-movant’s favor -- could’ve stopped the opinion there and reversed. But it went on:

After all, employee/independent contractor cases are necessarily fact-intensive, and the general rule in Florida is that whether a worker is an employee is usually a question of fact. Factually speaking, Del Pilar [where an appellate court reversed a grant of summary judgment] is the closest Florida opinion we have, and we cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court would have decided that case different…. Although we recognize that Del Pilar is not binding in the Rule 56/summary judgment sense -- because federal law determines whether the evidence suffices to entitle a party to summary judgment -- it is nevertheless highly informative given that it involves the same package delivery industry and that Florida’s summary judgment standard is very similar to that of Rule 56.

Erie and its progeny have opted for vertical uniformity in diversity cases, so that with respect to substantive law a case filed in federal court will be handled in the same way as it would be in the courts of the state where the federal court sits. By ruling consistently with Del Pilar, we ensure that this case is decided in a Florida federal court as it would be in a Florida state court, and thereby discourage forum shopping as between federal and state courts in Florida and prevent the inequitable administration of the law.

Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must “apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). And in Carlson the court certainly did that -- it applied Florida substantive law to whether the drivers were employees and it applied federal procedural law to whether summary judgment was properly granted. But the court appeared to apply that federal procedural law with a healthy dose of Florida procedural law, too.

For example, the court accepted -- if not outright adopted -- Florida courts’ characterizations that the employee–independent contractor issue is “generally a question of fact” “for the trier of fact,” and referred to this as a “general default rule” and a “general rule.” Whether it should have done so is unclear. On the one hand, a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit seems to support this approach. See EncompassIns. Co. v. Coast Nat’l Ins. Co., 764 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Whether an issue is a question of law or a question of fact is a substantive question, to which state law applies. Once we determine whether an issue is a question of law or a question of fact, however, the proper standard of review is a question of federal procedure and is governed by federal law.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But a treatise leans in the other direction: “[c]haracterization as fact or law is governed by federal law, because it implicates the relationship between judge and jury.” 19 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4511 (2d ed. Apr. 2015). The Seventh Circuit, too, has stated that “the fixing of the boundary between questions of law and questions of fact[] is a matter of federal procedural law and therefore governed by federal rather than state law in diversity as in other federal suits.” Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 1996). In the light of the Carlson court’s statements, a judge who might otherwise conclude that no genuine dispute exists about whether a plaintiff is an employee might instead leave that question to the jury.

Further, although the panel in Carlson stated it wasn’t bound by a Florida court’s decision in the “Rule 56/summary judgment sense,” it nonetheless found desirable ruling consistently with it (that is, against summary judgment) to discourage forum shopping. But other authorities suggest -- at least in broad language -- that similar cases might indeed be decided differently on summary judgment depending on the forum in which the case was brought. See McEwen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 919 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Erie does not require a federal court to employ the state’s rules on the allocation of issues between judge and jury.... Federal courts may grant summary judgment under Rule 56 on concluding that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the party opposing the motion, even if the state would require the judge to submit an identical case to the jury.”).

Carlson is an important employment-law decision. But it might be an even more important summary-judgment decision, and it could influence -- it arguably requires -- lower courts sitting in diversity in the Eleventh Circuit to consider how state courts would handle motions for summary judgment. Most of the time, to be sure, the result will unquestionably be the same. But given how many issues Florida courts regard as questions of fact for the jury to decide (according to a quick Westlaw search in the Florida state database, courts have characterized as fact issues intent, causation, whether touching is “offensive” so as to make it a tort, the value of property, and the existence of a partnership, to name a few), summary judgment in some diversity cases may now be harder to attain.

Thursday News & Notes

1.  N.D.Fla Judge John Richard Smoak Jr. has reassigned all of his cases.  Anyone know what's going on?

2.  Should DOJ be prosecuting Hastert and FIFA?  Here's an editorial from the Washington Post:

Not every bad act is a crime. Not every bad act that can technically be categorized as a crime should be pursued by prosecutors. And not every bad act that clearly amounts to a crime should be pursued by prosecutors in the United States.
Those thoughts are sparked by the recent indictments of international soccer officials on bribery and corruption charges and of former House speaker Dennis Hastert on charges of structuring hush money payments to avoid bank reporting laws and then lying to the FBI about his conduct.

Ruth Marcus is a columnist and editorial writer for The Post, specializing in American politics and domestic policy. 

For different reasons, I find both indictments unsettling — not necessarily wrong, but worth thinking through whether they ought to have been brought.
The indictment of FIFA officials raises questions about the exercise of U.S. authority to pursue international corruption whose chief harm does not seem to be to U.S. interests or citizens.
The Hastert indictment raises questions even more gut-wrenching: about the proper use of the criminal law; the degree to which technical statutes should be employed to punish alleged conduct that is offensive but uncharged; and the role that celebrity and prominence should play in making prosecutorial decisions.

3.  The 11th Circuit sides with jail officials in a lawsuit involving a suicide of an inmate.  From the Ocala Star Banner:

A federal appeals court on Wednesday found that seven Marion County jail officers cannot be held liable in the 2007 suicide of an inmate who hanged himself with a bed sheet.

Vivian Jackson, the mother of inmate Darius Johnell James, filed a lawsuit alleging that 10 officers violated James’ constitutional due process rights by failing to prevent his death. A U.S. district judge said three of the officers were shielded by what is known as “qualified immunity” but allowed the lawsuit to proceed against the other seven.
James, 22, was arrested in 2007 on robbery and home-invasion robbery charges and was initially assigned to a suicide-prevention section before being moved to another area of the jail, according to Wednesday’s ruling by the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The 24-page ruling detailed a series of incidents involving James at the jail but found that the lawsuit failed to prove that the seven remaining officers showed “deliberate indifference” to the risk that he would commit suicide.
“This case is troubling,” said the ruling, written by appeals court Judge Beverly Martin and joined by judges Robin Rosenbaum and L. Scott Coogler.
“The Marion County Jail tragically failed to keep Mr. James safe while he was incarcerated. Under our precedent, however, an officer is liable … for the suicide of an inmate only if he had subjective knowledge of a serious risk that the inmate would commit suicide and he disregarded that known risk.”

4.  And we have this piece by Paula McMahon about a swallower.  I like the intro:

A spoonful of sugar makes the medicine go down, but it takes honey to swallow 54 pellets filled with nearly 1.5 pounds of cocaine, according to a Broward County drug mule suspect.
Regis Walker, 28, of Pembroke Pines, spent five days in a hospital "passing" the drug pellets after she was arrested last week at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.

containing nearly 1.5 pounds of cocaine before she boarded a flight to Fort Lauderdale from Jamaica.
(Sun Sentinel / Broward Sheriff's Office Handout)

"Walker said she used honey to swallow the pellets, an idea she learned by watching the movie 'The Mule' on Netflix," Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Jeanne Neill wrote in court records.
Walker, a U.S. citizen, arrived last Thursday on a flight from Montego Bay, Jamaica. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials took her aside for a baggage search and interview.
She told them she had spent four days in Jamaica visiting her husband. She was taken to Broward Health Medical Center in Fort Lauderdale after agreeing to be X-rayed.

"The X-ray revealed that Walker appeared to be a drug mule carrying drug pellets within her body," investigators wrote.

 

"One of the wonderful things about graduating the eighth grade is that you have a chance — the best chance that you will ever have in life — to become what you want to become."

That was Justice Sotomayor at Pompano Beach Middle School yesterday.  The Sun-Sentinel has the details:

Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor was greeted by a standing ovation and thunderous applause from students and parents as she took the stage at the Pompano Beach Middle School end-of-year award ceremony Monday evening.
Sotomayor spoke for about five minutes to an auditorium of about 1,000 students and families during the event at Pompano High.
Sotomayor briefly spoke of her childhood in the Bronx and of the decisions ahead for the Supreme Court this session. She closed her remarks by congratulating her niece, Michelle Zuniga, and wishing her and her fellow students "the happiest in life in reaching what you want to reach."
Principal Sonja Braziel said that Zuniga "told me that her aunt would be attending and asked if we would like her to say a few words. When she told me who it was, we thought of course. She was just coming to share in her niece's recognition. We are just so excited to have her."
Students did not know beforehand that Sotomayor would be attending the event.
"This was a big surprise for everyone," said Francesca Mundy, 62, whose granddaughter is a graduating eighth-grader. "This was something that I expect to be done in college, not at middle school.

Pretty cool.

11th Circuit report says Judge Fuller's actions...

..."might constitute one of more grounds for impeachment."  Aly Palmer at the Daily Report has more:

When U.S. District Judge Mark Fuller of Alabama tendered his resignation on Friday, his fellow judges apparently were preparing to send his case to a national judicial body for consideration of possible impeachment by Congress.
On Monday the Judicial Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued an order saying the conduct of Fuller, who was arrested on domestic abuse allegations in Atlanta last summer, "might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment." The order referred the matter to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which has the ability to send a judicial discipline matter to the House of Representatives for impeachment.
Friday's letter from Fuller to President Barack Obama, saying the judge would resign effective Aug. 1, would appear to moot the question of impeachment as a practical matter. But Monday's order signifies that judicial leaders within the Eleventh Circuit were willing to hand down the most significant disciplinary consequence within their arsenal.
The Judicial Council consists of all of the Eleventh Circuit's active members, minus its most junior member and Chief Judge Ed Carnes, who hasn't been participating in the Fuller matter, as well as the nine chief judges of the district courts within the Eleventh Circuit. The opinion noted that the chief judge of the Middle District of Alabama, where Fuller sits, did not participate either. Judge Gerald Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit acted as chief judge on the matter in Carnes' stead, and Tjoflat's signature appears on Monday's order.
An August police report said Fuller's then-wife accused him of assaulting her at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in downtown Atlanta. He later agreed to a domestic violence intervention program and alcohol and substance abuse assessment to resolve the resulting misdemeanor battery case against him. Fuller's Atlanta criminal defense lawyer has said that Fuller made no admission of guilt and that, upon completion of the program, the case against him would be dismissed and his arrest record expunged.

Why would the 11th tip Fuller off so he could resign on Friday?

Here's the one page order:

"It was, quite frankly, somewhat ingenious how he got the drugs into the jail"

That was AUSA Catherine Koontz to Judge Dimitrouleas about a man who mailed drugs into the prison.  Paula McMahon has more:

A onetime Broward County chemical engineer was sentenced to just over a year in prison Friday for mailing postcards laced with a hallucinogenic drug to inmates in the Broward CountyJail.

William Hahne, 57, pleaded guilty last month to two federal conspiracy charges for sending the synthetic hallucinogen NBOMe, which has a similar effect to LSD, to his pals in the Joseph V. Conte Jail in Pompano Beach.


Two men who received the extra special jail mail, disguised as artwork and tattoo designs, admitted they ran a popular drug-dealing business in the lockup. They tore the postcards into tiny squares they sold for $10 a "hit" or exchanged for treats from the commissary.

Hahne's lawyer, Glenn Kritzer, said his client has a long history of mental illness, including psychosis, that contributed to his track record of drug-related arrests. He asked the judge to consider sentencing Hahne to less than 15 months.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Catherine Koontz suggested Hahne receive the highest recommended penalty of one year and 11 months.

"It was, quite frankly, somewhat ingenious how he got the drugs into the jail," Koontz told the judge.

Hahne, handcuffed, shackled and wearing beige jail scrubs, apologized to U.S. District Judge William Dimitrouleas.

"I hope you'll believe me when I tell you I will never do this again," Hahne said.

The judge skeptically asked if Hahne said the same thing to another federal judge when he was sentenced to four years in prison for manufacturing the drug Euphoria in 2004 at a sophisticated drug lab in his home near Fort Lauderdale High School. That arrest got him fired from his county job.

"Yes, your honor. I mean, no, your honor," Hahne replied, clearly flustered by the blunt question.

"So maybe you figured you'd do it again so you didn't say that to Judge Hurley?" Dimitrouleas said.

"No, your honor, it just didn't enter my mind," Hahne said.

The judge said he weighed Hahne's history of mental illness and his criminal history and sentenced him to one year and three months in federal prison.

 Paula M. also had this interesting story about a fugitive over the weekend.  Good stuff.

And in your moment of Zen, indicted defendant Jack Warner cited to the Onion to support his claim that the U.S. is picking on him.  Too good:

Friday news & notes

1.  Welcome guest blogger turned more-regular-contributor Brian Toth.  Here's a post of his from yesterday.  You'll be seeing more of this about once a week.

2. Is this the most ridiculous federal indictment ever?  A guy can't pull out his own money now?  Oy.

3.  I've said it a bunch on this blog -- Judge Gleeson is a shining star on the district bench.  Check out his most recent order expunging a federal conviction.  This is justice.  This is what our district judges were meant to do.  We need more Judge Gleesons, who recognize the power that a lifetime appointment affords to do justice and to be a check on the executive branch.  For too long judges have thought that ruling for the prosecutors is the way to go.  This is an example of a former prosecutor doing right where the government took an unjust position.  How many other judges would have just said -- I don't have the power to do this; I have to defer to the feds or the marshals or BOP or whatever.

Big ups to Judge Gleeson.  Here are a few excerpts from the order:

Jane Doe filed an application on October 30, 2014, asking me to expunge her thirteen-year old fraud conviction because of the undue hardship it has created for her in getting — and especially keeping — jobs.  Doe gets hired to fill home health aide and similar positions only to be fired when her employers learn through subsequent background checks about her conviction.  Since the conviction was for health care fraud, it’s hard to blame those employers for using the conviction as a proxy for Doe’s unsuitability.
However, even if one believes, as I do, that employers are generally entitled to know about the past convictions of job applicants, and that their decisions based on those convictions are entitled to deference, there will nevertheless be cases in which all reasonable employers would conclude that the conviction is no longer a meaningful consideration in determining suitability for employment if only they had the time and the resources to conduct a thorough investigation of the applicant or employee.
I have conducted such an investigation, and this is one of those cases.  In addition to presiding over the trial in Doe’s case and her subsequent sentencing, I have reviewed every page of the extensive file that was created during her five years under probation supervision.  I conclude that the public’s interest in Doe being an employed, contributing member of society so far outweighs its interest in her conviction being a matter of public record that the motion is granted and her conviction is expunged....
Doe is one of 65 million Americans who have a criminal record and suffer the adverse consequences that result from such a record. Her case highlights the need to take a fresh look at policies that shut people out from the social, economic, and educational opportunities they desperately need in order to reenter society successfully.
The seemingly automatic refusals by judges to expunge convictions when the inability to find employment is the “only” ground for the application have undervalued the critical role employment plays in re-entry. They are also increasingly out of step with public opinion. The so-called “ban the box” practice, in which job applications no longer ask the applicant whether he or she has been convicted of a crime, is becoming more prevalent. There is an increasing awareness that continuing to marginalize people like Doe does much more harm than good to our communities.
Accordingly, Doe’s application for an order expunging her conviction is granted. It is hereby ordered that the government’s arrest and conviction records, and any other documents relating to this case, be placed in a separate storage facility, and that any electronic copies of these records or documents and references to them be deleted from the government’s databases, electronic filing systems, and public record. Doe’s real name is to be removed from any official index or public record. It is further ordered that the records are not to be opened other than in the course of a bona fide criminal investigation by law enforcement authorities and only when necessary for such an investigation. The government and any of its agents may not use these records for any other purpose, nor may their contents be disseminated to anyone, public or private, for any other purpose.
Finally with respect to the relief granted here, I welcome the input of the parties. My intention is clear: no inquiry of the federal or state government by a prospective employer should result in the disclosure of Doe’s conviction. Effectuating that intent without unduly burdening those governments or impairing their legitimate law enforcement interests is not so clear, at least not to me. Thus I welcome any proposed modifications to the relief set forth above, and of course any such proposals by the government would not be regarded as a waiver of its opposition to my decision to expunge the conviction.

An apt observation on word choice by the Eleventh Circuit

Today, the Eleventh Circuit issued an unpublished opinion in Fuentes-Rangel v. Woodman, which affirmed an order granting a petition asking that a child be returned to Mexico under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act of 1988, or ICARA. The treaty and its implementing legislation command courts to return children to their countries of habitual residence if the children were wrongfully removed from their country or wrongfully retained in the United States. But there are narrow exceptions to this command, and lawyers who practice in this area most often describe these exceptions as "affirmative defenses." The lawyers in the Fuentes-Rangel case did so as well, which prompted the second footnote in the opinion. Here it is, in its entirety:

The parties describe Article 12 of the Hague Convention as an "affirmative defense." In ICARA, Congress described Article 12 as an "exception." See 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4) ("Children who are wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies."); id. § 9003(e)(2)(B) ("[A] respondent who opposes the return of the child has the burden of establishing ... by a preponderance of the evidence that any other exception set forth in article 12 ... applies."). We do not decide whether Article 12 is properly categorized as an "affirmative defense" or if instead it is an "exception." We accept the parties' characterization.

We often characterize concepts embodied in statutes different from how the statutes actually characterize them. For example, most of our district judges adopt reports and recommendations. But the governing statute doesn't give them that option; instead, "[a] judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (emphasis added). We also eagerly await the results of en banc decisions of the Eleventh Circuit, rather than in banc decisions of the Eleventh Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) ("A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service ...."). Common usage often carries the day.

So the Eleventh Circuit's observation on the lawyers' choice of words in Fuentes-Rangel was an interesting one. But -- for those of us who are into this kind of thing -- it was disappointing that the panel didn't ultimately weigh in. (I'm partial to exception. Not only does this have the benefit of tracking the language of the statute, but it seems to work better with how the Hague Convention and ICARA are designed to work.) Correcting usage isn't normally a reason to publish a decision. But there are always exceptions. See, e.g., In re UNR Indus. Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) ("There is a big difference between inability to alter the outcome (real mootness) and unwillingess to alter the outcome ('equitable mootness'). Using one word for two different concepts breeds confusion. Accordingly, we banish 'equitable mootness' from the (local) lexicon.").