The SDFLA Blog is dedicated to providing news and notes regarding federal practice in the Southern District of Florida. The New Times calls the blog "the definitive source on South Florida's federal court system." All tips on court happenings are welcome and will remain anonymous. Please email David Markus at dmarkus@markuslaw.com
Thousands of prisoners are serving life without parole for nonviolent crimes. Gleeson, who is neither naive nor sentimental (as a prosecutor, he sent mobster John Gotti to die in a supermax prison), knows that most defendants who plead guilty are guilty. He is, however, dismayed at the use of the threat of mandatory minimums as “sledgehammers” to extort guilty pleas, effectively vitiating the right to a trial. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are without trials, sparing the government the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Mere probable cause, and the meager presentation required for a grand jury indictment, suffices. “Judging is removed,” Gleeson says, “prosecutors become sentencers.” And when threats of draconian sentences compel guilty pleas, “some innocent people will plead guilty.”
Barack Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder and Sens. Pat Leahy (D-Vt.) and Rand Paul (R-Ky.) are questioning the regime of mandatory minimum sentences, including recidivism enhancements, that began with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Meanwhile, the human and financial costs of mass incarceration mount.
Petitioner Dudley Bryant appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, brought pursuant to the “savings clause” in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Bryant’s appeal presents the issue to which this Court alluded in Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999), and subsequently left undecided in Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert II), 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1001 (2012), and Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2013). The issue is whether the savings clause in § 2255(e) permits a federal prisoner to bring a § 2241 petition when he has established that his current 235-month sentence for an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) conviction exceeds the 10-year statutory maximum penalty authorized by Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a).
When a conviction has become final, a federal prisoner usually may challenge the legality of his detention only through a § 2255 motion. However, the savings clause in § 2255(e) permits the prisoner to file a § 2241 habeas petition when a § 2255 motion was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). After review of the record, the briefs of the parties and the amicus, and having the benefit of oral argument, we conclude Bryant has satisfied the savings clause’s requirements in § 2255(e).
Bryant has proven that his prior § 2255 motion was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention” and that his § 2241 petition can now proceed under § 2255(e) because: (1) from the time of his initial sentencing in 2002 throughout his first § 2255 proceeding in 2005, our Circuit’s binding precedent in United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 401-02 (11th Cir. 1996), held that a concealed-firearm offense under Fla. Stat. § 790.01 was a “violent felony” under § 924(e) and squarely foreclosed Bryant’s claim that he was erroneously sentenced above the 10-year statutory maximum penalty in § 924(a); (2) subsequent to Bryant’s first § 2255 proceeding, the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), set forth a new standard to evaluate which crimes constitute violent felonies under § 924(e), and Begay, as interpreted by United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009), overturned our Circuit precedent in Hall; (3) Begay’s new rule is substantive and applies retroactively to Bryant’s § 924(e) claim on collateral review; (4) as a result of pure § 924(e)-Begay error and retroactive application of Begay, Bryant’s 235-month sentence exceeds the 10-year statutory maximum authorized by Congress in § 924(a); and (5) the savings clause in § 2255(e) reaches his claim of illegal detention above the statutory maximum penalty. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Bryant’s § 2241 petition and remand with instructions set forth herein.
We first review the procedural history of Bryant’s case, the savings clause in § 2255(e), and our Circuit’s prior rulings about § 2255(e). We then summarize the five specific requirements a § 2241 petitioner must satisfy to proceed under § 2255(e) and explain why Bryant has satisfied them.
President Barack Obama's six federal judicial nominees in Georgia appear poised for Senate consideration after years of delay in filling seats on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
The White House announced late Thursday that Obama had selected Northern District Chief Judge Julie Carnes for the Eleventh Circuit. The president also tapped four lawyers and judges to fill spaces on the Northern District, including one to replace Carnes, a 1992 appointee of President George H.W. Bush.
Those five nominees join Jill Pryor, a partner at Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore who was nominated by Obama for the Eleventh Circuit nearly two years ago. She was blocked by Georgia Sens. Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson, but they appear to back all six nominees now.
The district court nominees are Judge Michael Boggs of the Georgia Court of Appeals, Mark Cohen of Troutman Sanders, Leigh Martin May of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, and Judge Eleanor Ross, a DeKalb County State Court judge.
Prominent Miami criminal defense attorney Larry Handfield, the former chairman of the Public Health Trust, Jackson Health System’s governing board, has quietly pleaded guilty to filing false tax returns.
The criminal conviction is a surprising chapter in the career of Handfield, 57, one of South Florida’s most prominent African-American lawyers and civic leaders.
Handfield will serve 12 months of probation after he pleaded guilty late last month in Miami federal court to two misdemeanor tax-evasion charges. He must repay $78,842 in restitution to the government.
He is now facing an inquiry from the Florida Bar, which regulates the state’s lawyers.
“This was a seven-year-old matter, and when it was brought to my attention, I fully cooperated with the government and the matter was resolved with a misdemeanor,” Handfield said Monday.
Handfield said he has already paid the government the money and he expects his probation to be terminated by the end of the month.
Handfield, a Miami native, is well known in South Florida legal circles. Over the years, governors have appointed Handfield to several statewide commissions — including Florida’s Commission on Ethics.
A Nativity scene, a Festivus pole and a chair holding fake pasta with eyeballs and an accompanying “provHerb” from the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster have been allowed to be shown as displays at the Florida Capitol.Here's a picture of Chaz Stevens and his Festivus pole in the Florida Capitol:
However, the officials making the decisions are drawing the line with Satan.
The Department of Management Services emailed The Satanic Temple on Wednesday, telling the group its proposed display of an angel falling from heaven into an open fire was “grossly offensive.”
President Barack Obama has nominated a federal judge from Atlanta to serve in the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
White House officials said in a statement Thursday that U.S. District Court Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, Julie E. Carnes, has been nominated to serve in the court of appeals.
Officials say Carnes has served as a federal judge in Georgia since 1992, and has been the District Court's chief judge since 2009.
Officials say Carnes was born and raised in Atlanta, graduated from the University of Georgia School of Law in 1975, and served on the editorial board of the Georgia Law Review.
White House officials say Carnes began her legal career as a clerk for a U.S. Court of Appeals judge in 1975.
The situation the officers confronted in the instant case bears none of these indicia of an urgent, ongoing emergency. The officers here did not receive an emergency report regarding an ongoing disturbance, but rather a service call regarding what appeared to be a bullet hole, which circumstances known to the officers indicated had been made at least 39 hours prior to when the officers made entry.5
When Officer Martin first arrived at the apartment building, she did not encounter a tumultuous scene, nor were the officers met with chaos when they returned to the building the next day. The officers observed no violent behavior, nor did they see or hear evidence that a fight had taken place or that anyone had been injured, other than finding a single bullet hole.
Nor did the officers have any information that would lead them to suspect that Timmann might be suicidal, or that he might be home (in fact, the absence of his work vehicle indicated that he was likely not at home). Considering the totality of the circumstances, it was not reasonable for the officers to believe that someone inside Timmann’s apartment was in danger and in need of immediate aid. Therefore, we find that the District Court erred in holding that the emergency aid exception justified the officers’ warrantless entry into Timmann’s apartment.
