Perhaps. Professor Berman has the story on a judge rejecting a plea deal with an appellate waiver
here.
From the
Denver Post:
They began appearing in federal criminal
cases in Colorado after the state's current U.S. attorney, John Walsh,
took office in 2010, said Jeff Dorschner, a spokesman for the office.
Walsh, Dorschner said, was concerned about wasting the court's and the
government's resources when defendants appeal the sentences they
received after initially agreeing to those sentences in plea deals. Such
appeals are almost always denied.
"The concept is simple,"
Dorschner said. "If you are sentenced within the guideline you agree to
in the plea agreement, then you don't have the ability to appeal that
sentence. ... This is the most narrow, limited appellate waiver I think
you're going to find."
In a brief urging Kane to accept the deal,
prosecutors wrote that the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has found
appellate waivers acceptable. Prosecutors say they are legitimate parts
of the bargaining process.
Vanderwerff's attorney also urged Kane to accept the deal.
"Both sides benefit from it," Assistant Federal Public Defender Edward Harris wrote.
Harris did not return a call for comment.
Kane, though, viewed the waiver dimly.
"[S]acrificing constitutional rights at the altar of efficiency," he wrote, "is of dubious legality."
From
the opinion:
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory, not mandatory, see United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 247 (2005), no circuit court has revisited the
enforceability of appellate waivers. Sentencing, post-Booker, requires
a trial court to consider context and to apply criteria rather than
perform a mechanical or clerical entry of a matrixed judgment. See United States v. Calderon-Villaneuva,
1:12-cr-235, Order Denying Unopposed Motion to Enter into Plea
Agreement Containing an Appeal Waiver (doc. 14) (D. Colo. June 28,
2012). Ethical and moral values inevitably infuse the decisionmaking
process, but they must be justified by being drawn from governing texts
in statutes and judicial opinions and established principles of
fairness generally accepted by the community affected by the criminal
conduct, i.e., the fundamental values widely accepted by society and
identifiable as such.
The responsibility of appellate review is to decide how well the
sentencing judge has established the sentence within this described
discipline. That is fundamentally dissimilar to the pre-Booker
function of determining whether an arithmetic calculation has been
executed correctly. Rather, reviewing sentences under an abuse of
discretion standard is a complex inquiry meant to assure that the
judicial administration of justice is relevant to the values and
expectations of society.
Indiscriminate acceptance of appellate waivers undermines the ability
of appellate courts to ensure the constitutional validity of
convictions and to maintain consistency and reasonableness in
sentencing decisions. Indeed, appellate waivers would have insulated
from review the underlying convictions in some of the most notable
criminal decisions in the Supreme Court’s recent history. See Nancy J. King and Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 Duke L. J. 209, 249 (2005) (noting that waivers would have precluded appellate review in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); and United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005)). Thus, such waivers should only be included
where they are justified by the facts and circumstances of a particular
case.