Monday, January 30, 2012

Go Dore Go!

Nice win today for friend of blog Dore Louis (as well as Joe Rosenbaum and Marcia Silvers) before Judge Cooke. Jay Weaver has the details on this crazy case:
In October, his criminal case on cigarette smuggling charges ended in a mistrial when the FBI arrested a juror who tried to extort money from the defendant’s family in exchange for the promise of a “not guilty’’ verdict. On Monday, a federal judge threw out the charges altogether, saying prosecutors failed to make their case against the Davie construction executive at his second jury trial. Marrero’s two-step journey rarely, if ever, happens in Miami federal court. “They were prosecuting an alleged fraud that occurred in Europe in a U.S. court,” said Marrero’s attorney, Joseph Rosenbaum. “They never should have charged him in the first place.” A year ago, Marrero, 48, was charged with conspiracy and money laundering. The indictment accused him of trying to “enrich himself” by buying cigarettes overseas, hiding the cartons inside cargo containers at the Port of Miami and shipping them to Portugal, Ireland and Germany — without attaching proper documents or paying customs duties. But U.S. District Judge Marcia Cooke granted Rosenbaum’s motion for acquittal after the prosecution rested its case, saying the statute of limitation in the conspiracy case dating back to 2001 had expired. Cooke’s judgment of acquittal followed a guilty plea earlier this month by one-time juror Italo Campagna, just as Marrero’s second trial was getting underway. Campagna, 55, of Miami, was charged with soliciting a bribe after demanding between $50,000 and $100,000 from Marrero’s relatives to sway the 12-person jury during the first trial in October. Marrero and his family immediately contacted authorities.

Heron!

I wish I had some SDFLA news for you, but I don't, so here are your Monday morning videos:



Friday, January 27, 2012

Ugly fight over federal judges

Jill A. Pryor and Mark H. Cohen should be federal judges, but they want Cohen to go to the 11th and Pryor to the district court even though President Obama is vetting them for the opposite positions:

Republican Sens. Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson on Tuesday sent a letter to the White House saying they would support Cohen, a partner at Troutman Sanders, for the 11th Circuit vacancy, and back Pryor, a Bondurant Mixson & Elmore partner, for a vacant post on the district court.
In an eight-line letter to the White House counsel, the senators also resurrected the name of a third candidate, U.S. Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker, whose nomination for another district court vacancy was returned to the White House in December at the apparent request of the president's staff. The letter, on Isakson's stationery but signed by both senators, notified White House counsel Kathryn Ruemmler that the senators would return "blue slips" to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on Cohen for the 11th Circuit and Pryor and Walker for the district court. A blue slip is the Senate's traditional indication that a nominee has received the approval of his or her home state senator. But the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary has been vetting Pryor for the 11th Circuit post, according to Fulton County Superior Court Senior Judge Melvin K. Westmoreland. 

Meantime, Senators are threatening to stall all appellate appointments over the recess appointment dispute with the President.  Even though Judge Jordan has support from both sides of the aisle, such a move would hurt his chances.  Apparently, Senator Rubio has said that he is not going to support an across the board rejection of Obama's nominees.  For Judge Jordan's sake, I hope that politics don't jam him up.


Thursday, January 26, 2012

FIU hosts Justice Alito at moot court finals

Dean Alex Acosta was rightfully beaming tonight, as his law school had its final round of moot court with a bench of Justice Alito, Judge Marcus, and Judge Barkett.  Here is Acosta introducing the final round with the judges in the background:



Lots of judges in town came to the festivities.  Here's a picture of Judges Huck and Altonaga with the panel:

The participants were Sherman Davis, Matthew Rogoff, Nicholas Greene, and Jeremy Chevres; and the issues hit close to home -- the GPS/4th Amendment issue (couldn't Justice Alito have convinced the Court to release Jones next week?!) and the Padilla retroactivity issue. Everyone did a nice job.

73-year old man pleads guilty in large fraud case

Via Curt Anderson:

A prominent businessman pleaded guilty Wednesday to fraud in a $135 million real estate scheme that fleeced hundreds of investors, including the Roman Catholic prep school he once attended.
Gaston Cantens, 73, faces up to five years behind bars after pleading guilty to a single count of wire and mail fraud conspiracy. U.S. District Judge Kathleen Williams set sentencing for April 4.
Cantens also lured investors from Miami's close-knit Cuban-American community, many of them elderly and some Roman Catholic priests.
One victim, 80-year-old Eduardo Arango, said he lost about $800,000 investing with Cantens. He called the plea agreement "a sweet deal" because Cantens could have faced more charges and a longer prison sentence.
"Most of the victims were people who are very aged. They lost whatever their resources were. They have suffered," Arango said.

Another GOP debate tonight.  Too bad Ali-G isn't the moderator:



Read more here: http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/01/25/2957872/religious-fla-prep-school-a-victim.html#storylink=cpy

Tuesday, January 24, 2012

Why blogs are awesome

Legal blogs are buzzing over yesterday's GPS ruling in Jones.  Before we had blogs, we would have to wait for law professors to write law review articles that no one would read.  But now, we have instant access to tons of great commentary about the decision. 

Orin Kerr over at Volokh has a number of really interesting posts on the opinion, including this one which discusses Scalia's trespass ruling in Jones and this one which raises three questions to think about after Jones.  I also found interesting Tom Goldstein's reaction about how the government didn't really lose as badly as everyone says it did. 

The beauty of all of this is that there is some really great, high powered opinions and commentary available to everyone right away.

And here is your moment of zen for the day:

Monday, January 23, 2012

SCOTUS decides GPS monitoring is a search

Per Justice Scalia: "The Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment."

Here's the opinion. This is a biggie, and a huge loss for the feds who were fighting hard. Scalia backs away from the traditional Katz test:
This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th centurywas tied to common-law trespass. Later cases, which have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach, have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, which said that the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” id., at 360. Here, the Court need not address the Government’s contention that Jones had no “reasonable expectation of privacy,” because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 34. Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particularconcern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, butnot substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 176; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 64. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, and United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705—post-Katz cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to “beepers,” electronic tracking devices representing another form of electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the conclusion that a search occurred here. New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, and Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, also do not support the Government’s position. Pp. 4–12.
Justice Sotomayor doesn't like this analysis and concurs to explain that all this old stuff may need to be re-examined in light of evolving technology:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. E.g., Smith, 442 U. S., at 742; United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976). This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a greatdeal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellu- lar providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medi- cations they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps, asJUSTICE ALITO notes, some people may find the “tradeoff” of privacy for convenience “worthwhile,” or come to acceptthis “diminution of privacy” as “inevitable,” post, at 10, and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protectedstatus only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. See Smith, 442 U. S., at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes”); see also Katz, 389 U. S., at 351–352 (“[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private,even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”).
Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan also concur, but disagree with Scalia's property analysis, and would stick to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.