Get ready for the guest bloggers

Taking a little break from the blog for a week. Starting tomorrow, you'll have SFL, Rumpole, and Rick Bascuas entertaining you. Enjoy.

Magistrate feels “like a schoolmarm scolding little boys."

The whole opinion is definitely worth a read. Here's a snippet:

• My practice is to preliminarily review every motion called an “emergency” the day it
  is filed. However, other cases, motions filed, scheduled hearings and settlement conferences do not afford me the luxury of dropping everything to hear a party’s perceived “emergency” especially when it involves a case that has already taken an inordinate amount of the court’s time (to the detriment of other litigants who need decisions in their matters) to resolve yet another in a series of routine discovery disputes. Thus, as the motion has worked its way up the tall stack of other matters on my desk, there are no longer any depositions to take.
• I am not the Maytag repairman of federal judges desperately hoping for something to do.
• Counsel for Plaintiff could not resist replying. Mr Kossack’s reply adds up the number of Mr. Cannon’s improper objections during Mr. McCurdy’s deposition and compares them to the number of improper objections Mr. Cannon accuses him of making. Not wanting to miss an opportunity to engage equally unseemly “tit-for-tat,” Mr Kossack pads his reply with gratuitous comments which include a reference to counsels’ respective choice of beverages during depositions.
• To ensure that reading the 185 pages of these exchanges was not a complete waste of time, I assigned this motion to a law student extern to prepare a legal memorandum to further his education. In a short period of time he was able to prepare a well-written, concise memo which identified a large number of state and federal cases throughout the country articulating the standards for making deposition objections and identifying improper conduct for which lawyers have been admonished or sanctioned. He correctly concluded that both lawyers engaged in misconduct which violated Rule 30(c)(2).
• The exchanges related in excruciating, repetitive detail in the moving and responsive papers and their attachments were painful to read. If I was an elementary school teacher instead of a judge I would require both counsel to write the following clearly established legal rules on a blackboard 500 times.
• Although these papers, and the conduct they relate, make me feel like a school marm scolding little boys, I am the judge whose duty it is to decide this motion. Accordingly, Mr. Kossack and Mr. Cannon are admonished for engaging in conduct which I know you know violates Rule 30(c)(2). You are better men and better lawyers than the conduct in which you have engaged illustrates.

Being on a plane...

... with 8 rows is not fun. Tampa for the day. Back tonight.

Tuesday News and Notes

1. Moving sucks.

2. The FBI is taking the absurd position that Wikipidea shouldn't use its emblem.

3. Law.com covers the Irey case.

4. Roberts v. Kagan, per Dahlia Lithwick.

5. More on Kagan -- she is only 6th SCOTUS law clerk to become Justice.

6. Miranda is losing its teeth.

7. Obama is having a tough time getting judges confirmed. Another article on it here.

8. Conrad Black writes on his time in a federal prison. The whole thing is worth a read:

In the Coleman Low Security compound, there are 1,800 residents and it is a little universe terminally addicted to gossip about the custodial system and especially the goings-on of the group confined there. By this time there were large numbers of journalists and photographers clustered at the gate of the Coleman complex and ongoing television coverage watched with some bemusement by my fellow residents in the television rooms of the residential units.
A steady stream of well-wishers from all factions of the compound came to say goodbye, as I put my books and papers and a few clothes items into cardboard boxes. (The only article of clothing that I took that was not among the few things I had bought myself was the nondescript brown shirt bequeathed to me when he left by the don of one of the famous New York gang families).
The Mafiosi, the Colombian drug dealers, (including a senator with whom I had a special greeting as a fellow member of a parliamentary upper house), the American drug dealers, high and low, black, white, and Hispanic; the alleged swindlers, hackers, pornographers, credit card fraudsters, bank robbers, and even an accomplished airplane thief; the rehabilitated and unregenerate, the innocent and the guilty, and in almost all cases the grossly over-sentenced, streamed in steadily for hours, to make their farewells.
Most goodbyes were brief and jovial, some were emotional, and a few were quite heart-rending. Many of the 150 students that my very able fellow tutors and I had helped to graduate from high school, came by, some of them now enrolled in university by cyber-correspondence.

New digs

Personal post: I've moved office space to right across the street from the Federal Courthouse in Miami (the address is 40 N.W. Third Street, Courthouse Center, Penthouse 1, Miami, Florida 33128). And I've added two great lawyers -- Margot Moss and Mona Markus-- to join Robin Kaplan and me. 

Margot (pictured right) was a partner at Fowler White and before that was an assistant public defender for 10 years.  Mona (left)graduated Harvard Law School a year after I did. She was a partner at Stearns Weaver, where she has worked for 11 years.

I am very excited about the move and the growth of the Firm, which will now be called Markus & Markus (instead of David Oscar Markus PLLC). I have some work to do on the website...

I will be sharing space with a bunch of other lawyers, including Marc Seitles, Richard Klugh, Hector Flores, William Barzee, and Ivlis Mantilla. 

Trustees behaving badly

It hasn't been a good run for receivers and trustees in the Southern District of Florida lately.  John Pacenti covers the latest abuse of trust here:

A longtime court-appointed trustee and receiver entrusted with $1 million earmarked for the victims of ex-lawyer Scott Rothstein’s mammoth fraud is refusing to return the money and is the subject of a federal investigation, sources told the Daily Business Review.


The money was donated by the law firm chairman in his heyday as a Broward County power broker to Holy Cross Hospital in Fort Lauderdale. As part of the recovery effort for fraud victims, federal authorities and bankruptcy attorneys for the defunct Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler demanded the money back, along with millions of dollars in other charitable and political donations made by Rothstein and his law firm.

The hospital returned the money in November shortly after Rothstein’s $1.2 billion fraud collapsed. A source said the money was wired by the hospital directly to an account controlled by Marika Tolz, who was working under a contract with the U.S. Marshals Service.

The federal law enforcement agency, which is responsible for assets seized in criminal cases, hired her to safeguard the Holy Cross money until it could be disbursed and to oversee real estate seized from Rothstein after reports that one of his properties was burglarized and another was infested with mold.

The U.S. trustee’s office discovered the $1 million discrepancy in May and asked Tolz to resign from its rotating panel of trustees assigned to bankruptcy cases. The Daily Business Review reported in May that Tolz had resigned from her cases after discrepancies were discovered, but investigators and the the U.S. trustee’s office have remained tight-lipped about the case.

"Miami also has a great NBA basketball team, right?"

That was the chief of the multidistrict panel, U.S. District Judge John G. Heyburn II of Kentucky, after Ervin Gonzalez was pushing for the oil litigation to be here in Miami.  From Curt Anderson's report:

More than 100 lawyers crowded into a sixth-floor courtroom in Boise's downtown courtroom, jockeying amongst themselves for the limited speaking slots in a hearing that lasted about 1 1/2 hours. Although some 2,000 miles from the Gulf, Boise was the scheduled stop for the roving seven-judge panel.

Most lawyers only got to talk for a few minutes, and there were a few moments of levity.

After Miami attorney Ervin Gonzalez extolled the virtues of South Florida and its chief federal judge, Federico Moreno, Heyburn cracked that Miami also has "a great NBA basketball team, right?" -- a reference to the Miami Heat's recent signings of stars LeBron James, Dwyane Wade and Chris Bosh.

Assuming the cases are centralized as expected, the judge or judges chosen to hear them will have to decide key issues such as whether they are dismissed or allowed to continue, and whether to certify one or more class actions for people and businesses in similar situations. If the cases are not dismissed and unless there is an early settlement, a handful are usually chosen to go to trial first as "bellwhethers" that can determine the ultimate outcome of all lawsuits.

255 pages of en banc fun

The 11th Circuit issued United States v. Irey today, with 255 pages of opinions, which are a must read for any criminal practitioner in this Circuit. The question presented is whether a lengthy variance (from 30 years to 17) was reasonable in a horrific case involving multiple acts of child rape. The majority, written by Carnes and joined by Dubina, Black, Hull, Marcus, Wilson and Pryor, found the variance substantively unreasonable. Lots of interesting questions addressed, like how much deference is due to trial courts at sentencing.

Here are some highlights from Carnes' opinion:

The steady stream of criminal cases flowing through this Court brings us many examples of man’s inhumanity to man, and we see a depressingly large number of crimes against children.


The 17 ½-year sentence, if all of it were to be served, would amount to only 4 months and a week for each of the 50 distinguishable victims that Irey raped, sodomized, or sexually tortured.


In light of 18 U.S.C. § 3624, Irey will likely serve only 15 years and 3 months of his sentence, which works out to less than four months for each of those 50 victims who can be distinguished from each other in the images that show some of Irey’s crimes. And that calculation does not include any time for Irey’s additional criminal behavior of producing and distributing the massive amount of extremely graphic child pornography. Four months per child raped, sodomized, and tortured is grossly unreasonable. In sentencing there should be no quantity discount for the sexual abuse of children.


We realize that 17 ½ years, even when reduced to 15 ¼ years to serve is, as the panel stated, “a substantial portion of a human life—and no serious person should regard it as a trifle.” … Irey, after all, sentenced the children he raped, sodomized, and sexually tortured to a lifetime of harm, and the egregious child pornography he created and distributed will, because he uploaded it to the internet, continue causing harm for far longer than 17 ½ years. Irey’s pink wall series will last longer than his own lifetime or ours, inciting and encouraging the sexual abuse of multitudes of children yet unborn.


Because of the substantial deference district courts are due in sentencing, we give their decisions about what is reasonable wide berth and almost always let them pass. There is a difference, though, between recognizing that another usually has the right of way and abandoning one’s post. We will not quit the post that we have been ordered to hold in sentencing review and the responsibility that goes with it. The Supreme Court has instructed us that “[i]n sentencing, as in other areas, district judges at times make mistakes that are substantive,” and that it is our duty “to correct such mistakes when they occur.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 354, 127. In this case the district court made a substantive mistake, a clear error in judgment, by unreasonably varying downward from the advisory guidelines sentence when no sentence less than it is sufficient to fulfill the purposes set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act. To do our duty to correct that mistake, we vacate the sentence the district court imposed and remand with instructions that the defendant is to be resentenced within the guidelines range.

Judge Tjoflat concurs that the amount of variance is unreasonable but dissents, arguing that the case should be remanded for the district judge to find what is reasonable. He argues that it is not the job of the 11th Circuit to sentence Irey:

In sum, when placed on a balance sheet, the grave institutional harm caused by the court’s approach significantly outweighs any benefit the approach might yield. Resentencing defendants on appeal diminishes the role of the district court in the eyes of the legal profession, and it diminishes the public’s confidence in the district courts as an institution for administering criminal justice. It misallocates and gobbles up judicial resources. None of this is necessary. If a sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion, we should simply say so and return the case to the district court, the appropriate forum for the main event.

The first dissent is written by Judge Edmonson, and joined by Birch Barkett and Martin:

The limit that the law places on the right use of appellate court power to interfere with the sentencing decisions of United States District Judges (who, of course, have -- under the law -- powers of their own) is, for me, what this appeal is about. The specific case before us involves a serious crime and ghastly conduct -- “horrific” in the District Judge’s words -- on the part of Defendant. And, no party
has contended that the District Judge, in imposing the sentence, made a significant procedural error. The government prosecutors (who bear the 1 burden of showing reversible error) contend that the sentence imposed in district court is too lenient and that no sentence would be lawful except the maximum sentence of imprisonment that the pertinent criminal statute will allow: 30 years.

The issue is not whether federal appellate judges ought to do their duty. They must. And the issue is not whether appellate courts can review sentences and sometimes correctly set them aside, even when the sentence was imposed without procedural errors. They can. Appellate judges do have some legitimate power to review the substance of sentences: that is, to determine whether a District Judge has imposed a sentence that is either too lenient or too harsh as a matter of law. The general question presented here is what is the limit, under the law, on the power of appellate judges in deciding such reviews.

Next up is Judge Birch, who says (I think quite rightly):

The time-worn adage in jurisprudence that hard facts often lead to bad law is certainly applicable to this case. I have little doubt that had I been the sentencing judge I might well have fashioned a different and harsher sentence for this defendant. But the decision at play here is the respective roles of the appellate court and the sentencing court. Our appellate role is properly constrained by the standard of review to which we are required to adhere. As Judge Edmondson persuasively describes the application of that standard to the record, it compels an affirmance of the sentencing court’s judgment in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and join in the dissenting opinions of Judge Edmondson and Judge Barkett.

Judge Barkett also dissents, joined by Birch and Martin:

I agree with just about everything in Judge Edmondson’s dissent. If there is any point of departure, it is the addition (or clarification, in my view), that the district judge must articulate the reasons for the sentence imposed based on the evidence in the record. Because the record may support a number of reasonable sentences, this articulation is necessary so that the appellate court can be satisfied that the district judge actually considered how all of the § 3553 factors relate to the defendant’s individual case.