Do you like Gorsuch's writing style?

There has been quite a bit made of Justice Gorsuch's writing style (many do not like it). He wrote two opinions today, and even in a pretty straight-forward opinion sending a case back to the lower courts to address some open questions, he writes with quite a unique style:

The dissent is displeased with our decision on this score, but a contradiction lies at the heart of its critique. First, the dissent assures us that the immovable property exception applies with irresistible force—nothing more than a matter of “hornbook law.” Post, at 3–10 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). But then, the dissent claims that allowing the Washington Supreme Court to address that exception is a “grave” decision that “casts uncertainty” over the law and leaves lower courts with insufficient “guidance.” Post, at 3, 13–14. Both cannot be true. If the immovable property exception presents such an easy question, then it’s hard to see what terrible things could happen if we allow state court colleagues are no less versed than we in “hornbook law,” and we are confident they can and will faithfully apply it. And what if, instead, the question turns out to be more complicated than the dissent promises? In that case the virtues of inviting full adversarial testing will have proved themselves once again. Either way, we remain sanguine about the consequences.

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The Vetting Room's take on 11th Circuit Nominee Britt Grant

President Trump has nominated Georgia Justice Britt Grant to the 11th Circuit.  The Vetting Room has a very informative and lengthy post about Grant.  Here's the intro:

Justice Britt C. Grant is President Trump’s third nominee to the Eleventh Circuit. Like Trump’s first nominee, Kevin Newsom, Grant is a former state solicitor general (Grant of Georgia, Newsom of Alabama). Like Trump’s second nominee, Lisa Branch, Grant worked as a BigLaw commercial litigator and subsequently served as a state appeals courts judge (Grant of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Branch of the Georgia Court of Appeals). Like both Newsom and Branch, Grant is a longtime member of the Federalist Society. Although Grant–if confirmed–will be replacing an Obama appointee, Julie Carnes, the replacement will not likely have an immediate effect on the ideological balance of the court because Carnes herself most frequently votes in divided cases with her more conservative colleagues (as did the judge that Lisa Branch replaced, Frank Hull).

In other news, longtime federal prosecutor Dick Gregorie is retiring. The Herald looks at his career here.

Eleventh Circuit orders en banc hearing on whether “the risk of force clause in 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Sessions v. Dimaya?”

The original 11th Circuit ruling by Judge Hull (joined by W. Pryor and Tjoflat) is here (U.S. v. Ovalles).

The letter listing the issues before the en banc court is here:

1. Is the risk of force clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague in the light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 2014 (2018)?
2. Should this Court overrule United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2013), insofar as it requires applying the categorical approach to determine whether an offense constitutes a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)?

More on Trump's judicial appointments (UPDATED WITH SUPREME COURT RULINGS)

UPDATE.  A bunch of SCOTUS decisions this morning, including the gambling and rental car cases.  Still no Carpenter.   

The Congressional Research Service covers the statistics here.  This is the summary intro:

This report, in light of continued Senate interest in the judicial confirmation process during a President’s first year in office, provides statistics related to the nomination and confirmation of U.S. circuit and district court nominees during the first year of the Trump presidency (as well as during the first year of each of his three immediate predecessors—Presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and Bill Clinton).

Some of the report’s findings regarding circuit court nominations include the following:

 The number of U.S. circuit court vacancies decreased by 1, from 17 to 16, during the first year of the Trump presidency. The percentage of circuit court judgeships that were vacant decreased from 9.5% to 8.9%.
 During his first year in office, President Trump nominated 19 individuals to U.S. circuit court judgeships, of whom 12 (or 63%) were also confirmed during the first year of his presidency.
 Of individuals nominated to circuit court judgeships during President Trump’s first year in office, 15 (79%) were men and 4 (21%) were women.
 Of individuals nominated to circuit court judgeships during President Trump’s first year in office, 17 (89%) were white and 2 (11%) were Asian American.
 The average age of President Trump’s first-year circuit court nominees was 49.
 Of individuals nominated to circuit court judgeships during President Trump’s first year in office, 16 (84%) received a rating of well qualified from the American Bar Association, 2 (11%) received a rating of qualified, and 1 (5%) received a rating of not qualified.
 The average length of time from nomination to confirmation for President Trump’s first-year circuit and district court nominees (combined) was 115 days, or approximately 3.8 months.
 Each of the circuit court nominees confirmed during President Trump’s first year in office was confirmed by roll call vote (and none by unanimous consent or voice vote).
 Of the 12 circuit court nominees confirmed during President Trump’s first year in office, 11 received more than 20 nay votes at the time of confirmation (and of the 11, 9 received more than 40 nay votes).

Some of the report’s findings regarding district court nominations include the following:

 The number of U.S. district court vacancies increased by 38, from 86 to 124, during the first year of the Trump presidency. The percentage of district court judgeships that were vacant increased from 12.8% to 18.4%.
 During his first year in office, President Trump nominated 49 individuals to U.S. district court judgeships, of whom 6 (12%) were also confirmed during the first year of his presidency.
 Of individuals nominated to district court judgeships during President Trump’s first year in office, 37 (76%) were men and 12 (24%) were women.
 Of individuals nominated to district court judgeships during President Trump’s first year in office, 45 (92%) were white, 2 (4%) were Asian American, 1 (2%) was African American, and 1 (2%) was Hispanic.
The average age of President Trump’s first-year district court nominees was 51.
 Of individuals nominated to district court judgeships during President Trump’s first year in office, 26 (53%) received a rating of well qualified, 20 (41%) received a rating of qualified, and 3 (6%) received a rating of not qualified from the American Bar Association.
 Each of the district court nominees confirmed during President Trump’s first year in office was confirmed by roll call vote (and none by unanimous consent or voice vote).
 Of the six district court nominees confirmed during President Trump’s first year in office, two received more than five nay votes.

"Prosecutorial misconduct — especially the unlawful withholding of exculpatory evidence from the defense — is rampant across the country, yet prosecutors themselves are hardly ever held accountable."

That's a quote from this Cato Institute article on prosecutorial misconduct.  This is one of the dirty little secrets of the criminal justice system.  Nothing happens when prosecutors withhold Brady...

Prosecutorial misconduct — especially the unlawful withholding of exculpatory evidence from the defense — is rampant across the country, yet prosecutors themselves are hardly ever held accountable. Internal discipline does little to nothing, criminal prosecutions are incredibly rare, and — thanks to the Supreme Court’s invention of the doctrine of absolute immunity — prosecutors can never be held civilly liable, even for the most egregious, willful misconduct. This is all the more troubling because prosecutors wield enormous power in our criminal justice system, especially given the immense leverage they can bring to bear on defendants to coerce them into accepting pleas. In light of this background, it is crucial for the SJC to issue broad relief — in particular, to issue standing orders that compel pre-plea compliance with the disclosure obligations of Brady v. Maryland, and that provide for meaningful discipline and sanctions if prosecutors fail to meet these obligations.

One major problem is that there is absolutely no deterrence at all, either to prosecutors themselves for the misconduct (if you ask OPR, there has never been an intentional case and nothing even happens even when a judge finds misconduct) or to the cases when misconduct occurs (because the prejudice standard is made to be impossible). Why don’t all prosecutors have open-file, turn over witness statements and grand jury testimony, etc. It’s not because of concerns of witness safety (when is the last time something happened to a witness?); it’s because of the desire to win. The same thing for bail— why ask for detention... not because of any real fear that the defendant will run (that happens in a statistically insignificant number of cases); it’s for a desire to win. The same for arguing for monster sentences after trial. It’s done to convince people to plead. These incentives cause huge problems. 

It's not a surprise that the U.S. has the largest incarceration rate in the world.  The criminal justice system needs to be revamped to address these issues.  Until that time, we need judges to step up -- order disclosure of material (and not just say that the prosecutors know what their obligations are); grant bail (and not detain so many presumed innocent defendants); give reasonable sentences even after trial (so that the risks of trial don't result in 97.5% of cases pleading out, which means that innocent people are pleading).  And on and on.  Please excuse the rant.