Judge Stanley Marcus

 By Wifredo Ferrer

Judge Stanley Marcus is widely regarded as one of the keenest and sharpest legal minds on the federal bench—a true legal giant. Those of us who have had the privilege of clerking for him know that reputation is well earned—and that it only tells part of the story.

I clerked for Judge Marcus in 1990, fresh out of law school. That year remains one of the most formative of my professional life. I learned more during that clerkship than I did in all three years of law school combined. Every morning brought rigorous, Socratic-style questioning—not to intimidate, but to sharpen thinking, test assumptions, and demand intellectual honesty. Precision mattered. Preparation mattered. The facts mattered. The law mattered. And above all, getting to the right answer mattered. Judge Marcus’s work ethic truly knows no bounds—he approaches every case, no matter how large or small, with the same intensity, discipline, and sense of responsibility.

Judge Marcus exemplifies the highest standards of excellence, integrity, and professionalism. He teaches his clerks that public service is not abstract or aspirational—it is practical, demanding, and deeply consequential. He insists that each case be approached with care, fairness, and respect for the parties, and that every opinion reflect both intellectual rigor and clarity of thought. He believes that judges and lawyers alike play a critical role in promoting fairness, equal opportunity, and the enduring promise of equal justice under the law. His leadership on the bench sets a standard not only for those who work with him, but for the broader legal community.

What makes Judge Marcus exceptional, however, is not only his intellect, but his humanity.

During my clerkship year, my father was diagnosed with cancer. Judge Marcus could not have been more compassionate or understanding. In a profession that often rewards detachment, he demonstrated something far more lasting: empathy, perspective, and grace. He reminded me—by example—that while the work of the law is important, it should never eclipse what matters most: our families and the people we love.

Over the years that followed, and especially after my father passed away five years later, Judge Marcus became a lifelong mentor and, in many ways, a “young uncle” figure to me. His guidance extends well beyond legal analysis. Whenever I face difficult professional moments, I still find myself asking, “What would Judge Marcus do?” The answer is usually the same: analyze the facts carefully, find the answer in the law, use common sense, and give the “bottom line”—clearly, directly, and with conviction.

Judge Marcus sets the standard for what it means to be both a jurist and a lawyer: relentlessly pursuing the cause of justice, never losing sight of the obligation to seek the truth—not merely to win—and always carrying oneself with character, discernment, humility, and respect for others. His legacy is reflected not only in his decisions, but in the generations of lawyers he has trained to think carefully, write clearly, and act with integrity.

Our bench, our bar, and our community are better because of his service. I am profoundly grateful to have learned from him, and even more grateful to have him in my life—not only as a mentor, but as a friend.

And that is the bottom line.

FBA Write Up below:

Judge Stanley Marcus was nominated to the district court by President Reagan in 1985. A native of New York, Judge Marcus received his BA from Queens College of the City University of New York before receiving his JD from Harvard University. Judge Marcus served on the district court until 1997, when he was elevated to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals by President Clinton. In 2022, as part of a three-judge panel, Judge Marcus ruled that Alabama's proposed redistricting maps were unlawful under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F.Supp.3d 924 (N.D. Ala. 2022). Judge Marcus continues to serve as a senior judge on the Eleventh Circuit. 

News & Notes

1.  On Tuesday, the court had its Jewish American History Month presentation at the courthouse.  Judge Leibowitz presided over an interesting panel and his family Norman and Irman Braman were honored.

2.  While we are on Jewish American History Month, Judge Roy Altman's book Israel on Trial is #12 on the New York Times best seller list.

3.  Switching gears, the Haitian murder jury is deliberating.  Day #2 starts today.

4.  Lots of immigration battles occurring now in our courts.  The 11th Circuit had this 2-1 opinion yesterday covering 110 pages of debate between Judges Marcus and Rosenbaum on one side, and Judge Lagoa on the other.  Marcus starts this way:

The question we face today is whether unadmitted aliens found in the interior of the United States are eligible for bond while they go through immigration proceedings. For nearly thirty years, the answer to that question was, for most aliens, “yes.” Last year, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) took a different view. It now maintains that these aliens must be detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). We are called on to decide if the Government’s new reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is correct. Hundreds of district courts and four other circuits have already weighed in, reaching well-reasoned yet distinctly contrary conclusions. See Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025); see also Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-3050, 2026 WL 1223250 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026). This is the first time our Court has addressed the question. In these consolidated appeals, Petitioners -- Fidencio Hernandez Alvarez and Ismael Cerro Perez -- were detained without the possibility of a bond hearing pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). Each challenged his detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). On review of Petitioners’ habeas claims, the district court held that the discretionary detention provisions found in § 1226 governed their detention instead, rendering each of them eligible for bond. The Government appeals that decision. It insists that under § 1225(b)(2)(A), Petitioners -- as aliens present in the United States without having been lawfully admitted -- are “applicants for admission,” and so they must be detained without the possibility of bond unless they can establish clearly and beyond a doubt that they are entitled to be admitted. We are unpersuaded by the Government’s re-interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A). That provision limits no-bond detention to applicants for admission who are “seeking admission,” and on the facts of this case, neither Petitioner was seeking lawful entry into the United States after inspection by an immigration officer when he was arrested, nor was either Petitioner taking any cognizable step to obtain the rights and privileges of lawful entry. In fact, neither Petitioner was pursuing any object, let alone “lawful entry,” when he was detained following a traffic stop. The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that nobond detention generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country, and not to aliens who are simply present here. Finally, we reject the Government’s claim that even if it has misread the INA, Petitioners are now “seeking admission” because they did not voluntarily self-deport after the initiation of removal proceedings. We do not hold that Congress is without the power to authorize the detention of unadmitted aliens who are simply present in the country. That question is not before us. We hold only that Congress has not done so under the provisions found in the INA. Nor do we decide whether either Petitioner is a flight risk or would pose a danger to the community if he were released on bond. That, too, is not before us. We affirm the grant of habeas relief in each of these consolidated cases.

Judge Lagoa starts her dissent:

The majority concedes that “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission,” on their ordinary meaning, are “synonymous.” Maj. Op. 15–16. It then spends fifty pages explaining why the ordinary meaning does not apply. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits disagree. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). So do I. I respectfully dissent.  

RIP Larry Hoffman and Dave Coulson

It's been an awful stretch for legal legends in Miami.  We lost two more this week -- Founding partner of Greenberg Traurig, Larry Hoffman, and Winston & Strawn's partner, Dave Coulson.

 

More about Hoffman:

Larry J. Hoffman, one of three co-founders of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., with Mel Greenberg and Robert Traurig, played a key role in charting the firm’s course from its Miami inception in 1967 to its growth today as a global law firm with more than 2,850 lawyers worldwide and 49 locations on four continents. Larry passed away Sept. 11 at his Coconut Grove home, just weeks after his 95th birthday.

Larry’s prescient plan for building a global law firm proved so successful that Greenberg Traurig became the example other law firms follow. He was a leader in the profession who recognized the need to bring a business-minded approach to managing a law firm – a concept that today has become universal.

A successful business owner prior to practicing law, Larry pioneered the concept of running a law firm like a business. He was one of the first law firm leaders to hire experienced professionals to manage the business side of the firm so lawyers could focus on practicing law. He created staff positions in the roles of marketing, professional development, and IT long before they were commonplace in law firms.

 

More about Coulson:

David Andrew Coulson passed away unexpectedly on September 8, 2025, in Philadelphia, PA, while on his way back to Miami from a dream vacation in Italy with the love of his life, his wife Jeannie Etter Coulson. He is survived by Jeannie and their twin children, Chloe Coulson and Connor Coulson, each just starting college. David spoke of his children often, to anyone who would listenso proud of all their accomplishments in school, on the field, or on the golf course. His family, friends and colleagues are so saddened by his sudden loss.

David had a full and inspiring life, which ended way too quickly. He was loved by all who knew him. He was 62 years old, born on October 11, 1962, in Elgin, Illinois to Alan J. Coulson and Carol Y. (Aurand) Coulson, both deceased. He graduated from Larkin High School in Elgin, IL, and then attended and graduated from the University of Miami in 1985. From there, he went on to attend and graduate from Harvard Law School in 1988. He was especially proud that, after law school, he had clerked for the Honorable Stanley Marcus when he was Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 

 

Jewish American History Month at the court

It was a packed house yesterday at the Federal Courthouse as Beth Bloom led the way for a wonderful event -- it started with a video put together by Bobby Gilbert (featuring Judges Stanley Marcus and Joan Lenard) and then moved into an interesting discussing between Judge Roy Altman and Dan Senor. Good stuff.

Judge King turned 97 last month

 97!

Here's an email that Judge Moreno sent to him last year, which he graciously shared with the blog:

Larry, tomorrow is your 96th birthday . That, in and of itself, is an accomplishment. Your contributions to the law are incredible, not only as the longest serving district judge (appointed by President Nixon in 1970 after your service as a Florida Circuit judge when there were only a few in Dade County) but also as a lawyer when your fought segregation in Southern “Miamuh.” You had one trial after another in the 70’s and 80’s, a record that rivals if not surpasses Judges Marcus, and Scott then and Altonaga, Middlebrooks and Martinez. I remember trying the murder of an agent along with other cases before you and a score of other jury trials. Even when you took senior status soon after my arrival in 1990 you kept a 100 per cent caseload, like Chief Judge Altonaga now does. So when you were replaced by Judge  Lenard, our district got two judges, your replacement and you. We called ourselves the lonely 11 due to the delay in confirmations. You were my first Chief followed by Chief Judges Roettger, Davis, Zloch, Moore and Altonaga. And at the end of your seven year term you kept on working, and finally began traveling with your wonderful wife before her untimely passing. You planned and worked hard to get King and Atkins buildings (subsequently Moore and Altonaga got the Ferguson and the Ft: Lauderdale courthouses). Your son, as a Florida judge, and daughter and son in law as AUSAs, followed in your footsteps serving the community.  Now that you are recovering from your fall, I know you will have time for your children and grandchildren. You certainly deserve a break. You have a building named after you (at Notre Dame only canonized saints or those who fund the $40 million dollar cost get that.) Plus you received the prestigious Devitt Award given by Justice Ruth Ginsburg. So now you can relax, enjoy your golden years and let the active judges handle our present load. I know you converted to Catholicism so you know of many other ways to serve. You are a big Gator so I will work on you becoming a Fighting Irish fan. Thank you and happy birthday. Fred

Judge Melissa Damian has been sworn in (UPDATED)

That's her with her children and Chief Judge Altonaga.

That means all three new judges are in and working.  Congratulations again to all three!

Cases will now start getting transferred.

Let the fun begin.

Update with a picture of the swearing in of David Leibowitz, with his wife and son, by Judge Marcus.  Judges Altonaga, Moreno, and Jordan were also present  

Let's Just Cut to the Chase, Please

Let's Just Cut to the Chase, Please 

GUEST POST BY MICHAEL CARUSO

Yesterday, the 11th Circuit decided U.S. v. Sotis (Mizelle (M.D. Fla.) with William Pryor and Marcus joining) and affirmed the defendant’s convictions for illegally exporting scuba diving equipment to Libya.

At trial, government agent Wagner testified to his interactions with Sotis. On cross-examination, the co-defendant's counsel asked Wagner whether civil penalties were an option he could have pursued instead of criminal penalties. On re-direct, the government asked whether Wagner had seen a case with “this level of willfulness.” Sotis objected, but only to Wagner’s comparison to previous cases.

On appeal, the Court concluded that Wagner’s opinion was improper but that allowing it was not plain error. Rule 701 restricts a lay witness to testimony rationally based on the witness’s perception, which is helpful to determining a fact in issue and that is not based on specialized knowledge.  Wagner’s testimony that he had never seen so much willfulness was improper because it purported to tell the jury about Sotis’s state of mind—something to which neither he nor any other witness could testify based on his rationally based perception. Permitting his testimony was error. But "harmless." In other words, mess around prosecutors, and you WON'T find out.

The evidence ruling seems clear. Interestingly, DOJ lawyers argued on appeal that Wagner's "opinion was a rational inference based on his personal participation and observations as a special agent for the Commerce Department and therefore did not exceed the permissible bounds of witness testimony." I wonder what the lesson is here. Don't ask this type of question, or ask, and even if found to be an error, the conviction will be saved by the harmless error rule.

What also should be clear but often is not is what may happen after a party "opens the door." The prosecutors argued, and the trial judge found that Sotis had opened the door. I've always believed, however, that a lawyer cannot open the door to the introduction of inadmissible evidence. The Court didn't address this point. Perhaps the Court felt that something that should be understood didn't have to be said.

Better Late Than Never

By Michael Caruso

 

Yesterday, at the behest of an 8th-grade civics class, Massachusetts lawmakers formally exonerated Elizabeth Johnson a mere 329 years after she was convicted of witchcraft and sentenced to death (thankfully, she was not executed). Johnson was 22 when she was caught up in the hysteria of the witch trials and sentenced to hang. Then-Gov. William Phips threw out her punishment, but while dozens of suspects officially were cleared, including her own mother, Johnson's name wasn't included in various legislative attempts to set the record straight. Until now.

Similarly, former President Trump used his pardon power to right very old wrongs, including the boxer Jack Johnson—convicted in 1913 of a Mann Act violation—and Susan B. Anthony—convicted in 1872 of voting fraud. (Although the Susan B. Anthony Museum rejected the pardon as she would have wanted).

The wrongly convicted and unduly punished should not have to wait that long. Currently, there are about 17,000 petitions for pardons and commutations pending. Critics like Professors Rachel Barkow and Mark Osler have assailed the modern use of the pardon power as "too often ignored or used to create calamities rather than cure them." They, along with others, recently testified at a House Oversight Committee hearing about our clemency system's issues.

And earlier this year, Attorney General Merrick Garland selected Elizabeth Oyer, a former federal public defender, and Mayer Brown partner as the U.S. Pardon Attorney. Ms. Oyer began her career as a law clerk for our very own 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Stanley Marcus.

In this role, Ms. Oyer presides over the office that reviews and evaluates federal clemency applications. Earlier this month, several clemency advocates privately met with Ms. Oyer, "a rare occurrence that left them cautiously optimistic about forthcoming changes to a strained system."

For the clemency system to function, however, we need lawyers. Families Against Mandatory Minimums does excellent work recruiting, training, and assisting lawyers who want to lend a hand. It's never too late to right a wrong, but the sooner, the better.

Do dems secretly want Roe to get overturned?

 That's the question that keeps coming up at every holiday party and cocktail event.  If Roe gets wiped away, will that turn the tide in the next election and help the Democrats keep the House/Senate and retake the Supreme Court?  Is that worth it since it appears that the party is in neutral? 

Meantime, Ruth Marcus wrote this piece in the Washington Post about the oral argument:

The vision of getting the courts out of the abortion-deciding business sounds so reasonable, so alluring.

It is also wrong, misleading and dangerous.

Mississippi Solicitor General Scott Stewart laid out the argument during the oral argument last week — urging the justices not only to uphold his state’s ban on abortion after 15 weeks but to overrule its decisions finding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose.

“The Constitution places its trust in the people,” Stewart said. “On hard issue after hard issue, the people make this country work. Abortion is a hard issue. It demands the best from all of us, not a judgment by just a few of us. When an issue affects everyone and when the Constitution does not take sides on it, it belongs to the people.”

Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh amplified Stewart’s argument, presenting it as the position of one side but leaving little doubt how much it resonated with him.

The Constitution, Kavanaugh posited, is “neutral” on abortion, “neither pro-life nor pro-choice.” Consequently, “this Court should be scrupulously neutral on the question of abortion … rather than continuing to pick sides.”

How superficially appealing all this is. Who could be against neutrality, especially scrupulous neutrality? Who disagrees with leaving choices to “the people” in a democracy?

The fundamental flaw here is that the Constitution exists in no small part to protect the rights of the individual against the tyranny of the majority. The Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment exist to put some issues off limits for majority rule — as Justice Robert H. Jackson put it in a 1943 ruling protecting the right of Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren not to be forced to salute the flag, “to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities.” The Supreme Court, in protecting abortion rights, isn’t telling women what to do: It is preserving space for them to make their own decisions about their own pregnancies.

The Constitution instructs that the majority cannot force its preferred religion on the minority; in fact, it must respect and accommodate individuals’ free exercise of their own religious beliefs. The Constitution teaches that the majority cannot choose to shut down or punish speech that it finds disagreeable or even offensive. It means that “the people’s” decisions about how to reduce gun violence are limited by the court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment.

Conservative justices have had no difficulty taking this disempowering of “the people” to sometimes questionable extremes.

They’re happy to second-guess the decisions of elected officials and public health experts about how best to safeguard their communities in the midst of a pandemic when religious institutions claim their rights are being violated. They don’t flinch at saying that the core First Amendment protection for political speech places strict limits on Congress’s ability to limit corporate spending on elections or enact other campaign finance rules.


***

Thus, constitutional protection for the right to abortion is not a deviation from the court’s jurisprudence, it is a logical extension of it. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code,” the court plurality noted in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. “The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter,” except perhaps in “rare circumstances.”

Stewart, the Mississippi lawyer, blithely assured the justices that the court’s abortion cases are unique, and that its other precedents, on contraception, gay rights or same-sex marriage wouldn’t be next in line if Roe and Casey fell. But why not? Maybe conservative activists have no burning desire to overrule Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 same-sex marriage ruling, but as a logical matter the right, without a basis in history or tradition, should be at least as vulnerable as abortion.

“I’m not sure how your answer makes any sense,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor told Stewart. “All of those other cases … rely on substantive due process. You’re saying there’s no substantive due process in the Constitution, so they’re just as wrong, according to your theory.”

***
And to withhold protection — in the current circumstance, to withdraw the protection that has existed for almost 50 years since Roe v. Wade — is not a neutral choice. It is a thumb on the scale.

Luck (and Carnes) v. Marcus

 Woah, this opinion a doozy.  Thanks to my commenters for pointing it out to me.  Apparently it's been the talk of the (appellate) town and I initially missed it.

I don't even know how to describe it... you must read this opinion -- about a mansion in Palm Beach -- for yourself.  It's 136 pages of back and forth between two of the most conservative judges in the country (Luck in the majority, joined by Carnes, against Marcus in dissent).  And it gets really personal.  Here's the first salvo to give you a flavor:

The “irony today” is not, as the dissenting opinion says, that we have done as the Supreme Court has instructed and conducted an independent examination of the whole record relating to Burns’s constitutional claims. Dissenting Op. at 73. The “irony today” is that it is the dissenting opinion that goes beyond the “whole record” in this case, the record developed by the parties and put before the district court. The dissenting opinion consults extra-record sources and draws from them the “facts” that it determines support its conclusion. Throughout the dissenting opinion, it laments the “incomplete record” and the “limited record” that’s before us. Id. at 74, 123 n.5. So, the dissenting opinion escapes the confines of the record to look for evidence that the parties never put forward and the district court never considered.  

I'm no civil lawyer, so I can't tell you who is right.  And I'm no architect or student of these types of homes, so I don't know who has the better of the argument here (maybe renaissance man Rumpole can help) even though both opinions have pictures and tons of historical references.

I'm just here for the food fight! Just to give you a sense, the majority opinion references the dissent 98 times.*  I wonder how Judge Marcus felt when he read Judge Luck's opinion saying that he (Marcus) didn't understand "the way appellate review works."  

The opinion is also noteworthy because just a few months ago, Judge Luck joined an opinion by Judge Newsom criticizing Judge Rosenbaum for being too personal.  As I explained here, I thought that criticism was way off and that Judge Rosenbaum was anything but personal in her dissent.  

So something must be going on to get Judge Luck so upset in this pretty mundane civil dispute.  Anyone know the backstory?

*I simply did a find "dissent" and got 98 hits, so that number may be slightly off.  But you get the idea.

En banc 11th Circuit rules in gender discrimination case

Knowing the makeup of the court, you know how this one came out already.  Summary judgment for the company, Kia Motors, affirmed.  Judge Branch writes the majority opinion.  There are six separate opinions in all:

BRANCH, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT, TJOFLAT, ED CARNES, MARCUS, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, joined.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, filed a concurring opinion.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

WILSON, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, joined.

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARTIN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, joined.

Interestingly, 4 senior judges elected to participate in the case, and all of them voted with the majority.  Had they not participated, it looks like there would have been a 3 judge plurality.

"An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”

That was Justice Gorsuch for a 6 Justice majority today (including Chief Justice Roberts) in Bostock v. Clayton County.  This was another slap down for the 11th Circuit, which has tilted WAY too far to the right.

Justice Kavanaugh was completely wrong in his dissent, but at least he wasn’t a jerk about it — unlike Alito.  Look at the difference in tone:

Kavanaugh at least acknowledged “the important victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans. Millions of gay and lesbian Americans have worked hard for many decades to achieve equal treatment in fact and in law. They have exhibited extraordinary vision, tenacity, and grit—battling often steep odds in the legislative and judicial arenas, not to mention in their daily lives. They have advanced powerful policy arguments and can take pride in today’s result.”

Alito, on the other hand, said Gorsuch’s opinion “is virtually certain to have far-reaching consequences” which will “threaten freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and personal privacy and safety.” He said that Gorsuch was “irresponsible,” because his opinion “greatly impeded—and perhaps effectively ended—any chance of a bargained legislative resolution.”

Meantime, the 11th Circuit has a couple of 2-1 decisions. First is a reversal of the Metro-West injunction related to corona. Newsom and Martin square off, with a visiting district judge joining Newsom.

The second is a reversal of a suppression order, with Branch and Marcus in the majority. Kudos to Judge Ungaro for dissenting:

While the evidence is that the three men and Mrs. Yarborough were secured near the porch of the house and, as emphasized by the majority, Officer Monroy’s re-entry was swift and his search was cursory, the only conclusion I can reach from the record is that Officer Monroy made the sweep, no doubt for officer safety, because the arrest scene was proximate to the house and he had a concern that the house, like any structure, could have concealed the presence of a dangerous individual. In other words, Officer Monroy conducted the sweep based on speculation, rather than articulable facts.

SDFLA judges are starting to grant release based on COVID-19 (yes!) UPDATED WITH 4/6 BARR MEMO

UPDATE -- AG Barr tells prosecutors he's really serious about releasing folks on bond.  Here's the 4/6 memo: “You should now consider the medical risks associated with individuals being remanded into federal custody during the COVID-19 pandemic. Even with the extensive precautions we are currently taking, each time a new person is added to a jail, it presents at least some risk to the personnel who operate that facility and to the people incarcerated therein.”  AG Bill Barr instructed prosecutors that they should "consider not seeking detention to the same degree we would under normal circumstances." 

I know of at least 3 cases, the most recent from today in United States v. Karl Oreste, Case no.14-20349-Scola. The order is here. Kudos to AUSA Lois Foster Steers for agreeing to this compassionate release motion and to AFPD Julie Holt for successfully pursuing the motion. Judge Scola writes a really good order, explaining how serious this issue is in our prison system.

Judge Williams also granted one, over the prosecutor’s objection in the Bart Hernandez case.  The Miami Herald covered that decision here.  It’s strange that the government objected here where there was only a few months left on the sentence and the defendant’s mom really needed the help.  Big ups to Judge Williams for granting this over objection.  Defense attorneys: Jeff Marcus, Dan Rashbaum, and Alison Green.

And here’s a lengthy and really well-reasoned order granting bond pending sentencing in United States v. Johnny Grobman by Judge Goodman.  The government not only fought against this order, but is appealing to Judge Altman.  (Full disclosure, I have been brought on as appellate counsel in the Grobman case and consulted on this motion before Magistrate Judge Goodman as well as the government appeal to Judge Altman. (Phil Reizenstein and Jackie Arango are the leads.)  So I won’t comment other than to say it would be worth your time to review Judge Goodman’s order).  

Any others?  Please send them along!

11th Circuit procedures for oral argument week of March 30

Two choices — submit on the papers or do it by phone. The panel is Carnes, Marcus, and Luck. Here’s the email that went out this morning (I have an argument on 4/2).

It's Judge Newsom, not Newsome

Judge Newsom has quickly become known as one of the more entertaining writers on the 11th Circuit.  He even makes IP litigation fun.  From the intro:

Royal Palm Yacht & Country Club, a residential community in Boca Raton, Florida, is home to multimillion-dollar mansions, a championship golf course, and even a private marina. It’s also home, as it turns out, to the contentious real-estate rivalry that spawned this trademark litigation.
Royal Palm Properties, a real-estate broker whose specialty is buying and selling homes in Royal Palm Yacht & Country Club, sued its competitor, Pink Palm Properties, for infringing its registered service mark on the phrase “Royal Palm Properties.” Pink Palm Properties counterclaimed, challenging the mark’s validity. A jury in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida upheld Royal Palm Properties’ mark but found that Pink Palm Properties hadn’t infringed it. The district court, though, overturned the verdict in part, granting Pink Palm Properties’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and ordering the cancellation of Royal Palm Properties’ mark. The question before us is whether the district court correctly flipped the jury’s verdict and granted judgment as a matter of law on Pink Palm Properties’ trademark-invalidation counterclaim.

We hold that the district court erred. To be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Pink Palm Properties would have had to make quite the showing at trial—such that no reasonable jury could have found that it failed to prove grounds for cancelling Royal Palm Properties’ mark. Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that Pink Palm Properties didn’t meet this high bar. On neither of its two grounds for cancellation—that the “Royal Palm Properties” mark (1) is not “distinctive” and (2) is “confusingly similar” to previously registered marks—did Pink Palm Properties prove, decisively, that it had won the day. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision to overturn the jury’s verdict and invalidate Royal Palm Properties’ service mark.

I enjoyed this discussion and the footnote especially:*

Pink Palm Properties certainly satisfied the first two Coach House requirements. The “Royal Palm Properties” mark clearly “resembles” the “Royale Palms” marks—the spelling of the dominant words is nearly identical8—and the “Royale Palms” marks were registered several years before the “Royal Palm Properties” mark.

8.Welcome to the author’s life. Compare “Newsom” with “Newsome.”

* Welcome to this author's life as well.  Compare "Markus" with "Marcus."

BREAKING -- Barbara Lagoa and Robert Luck to be nominated to the 11th Circuit (UPDATED with President Trump's official release)

Numerous sources have confirmed that Florida Supreme Court Justices Barbara Lagoa and Robert Luck are set to be nominated to fill the 11th Circuits seats of Judges Tjoflat and Marcus.  Both are former AUSAs in Miami, former 3rd DCA judges, and current Justices on the Florida Supreme Court.  And both are *excellent.*  A big congrats to them.  Very exciting news.

UPDATE -- shortly after this post, President Trump made it official with this release:

Today, President Donald J. Trump announced his intent to nominate:

Barbara Lagoa of Florida, to serve as Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Barbara Lagoa currently serves as a Justice on the Supreme Court of Florida. Prior to her appointment by Governor Ron DeSantis in 2019, Justice Lagoa was a District Judge on the Florida Third District Court of Appeal. Before taking the bench in 2006, Justice Lagoa was an Assistant United States Attorney in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and spent 11 years in private practice in Miami, Florida. Justice Lagoa also served as the Chair of the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee from 2015 to 2016. Justice Lagoa earned her B.A., cum laude, from Florida International University and her J.D. from Columbia Law School, where she served as Associate Editor of the Columbia Law Review.

Robert J. Luck of Florida, to serve as Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Robert Luck currently serves as a Justice on the Supreme Court of Florida. Prior to his appointment by Governor Ron DeSantis in 2019, Justice Luck was a District Judge on the Florida Third District Court of Appeal and a Circuit Judge for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida. Before taking the bench in 2013, Justice Luck was an Assistant United States Attorney in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida. Justice Luck also served as an Adjunct Professor at Alabama State University from 2007 to 2008, where he taught an undergraduate class in business law. Upon graduation from law school, Justice Luck served as a law clerk to Judge Ed Carnes of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, to whom he also later served as a Staff Attorney. Justice Luck earned his B.A., with highest honors, from the University of Florida and his J.D., magna cum laude, from the University of Florida Levin College of Law, where he was inducted into the Order of the Coif and served as Editor-in-Chief of the Florida Law Review.

Stanley Marcus to take senior status

Big news out of the 11th Circuit today.  Judge Stanley Marcus announced that he will be taking senior status meaning that Donald Trump will get to appoint another judge to that court.  Although Marcus was appointed by President Clinton, he is known for siding with the conservative wing of the court, especially on criminal justice issues so it’s not altogether clear that a Trump appointee will move the already very conservative court more to the right.  With Marcus’ announcement, that means that Trump has two seats to fill on the 11th (Tjoflat also recently announced his retirement).  Both seats will be filled from Florida.

Big en banc 4th Amendment opinion comes down 7-5

It's the usual battle lines in United States v. Paul Johnson, Jr.

William Pryor for the majority, which includes Ed Carnes, Tjoflat, Marcus, Newsom, Branch and Grant. Newsom concurs, Branch concurs (joined by Grant), Jordan dissents, Rosenbaum dissents, and Jill Pryor dissents (joined by Wilson, Martin, and Jordan).

Lots of interesting writing and fighting here.

Pryor starts off this way:

This appeal requires us to decide whether a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he removed a round of live ammunition and a holster from the pocket of a suspect during a protective frisk, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). At 4:00 a.m., the officer responded to a call about a burglary in progress in a high-crime area. When the officer arrived at the scene, he saw Paul Johnson, who matched the burglar’s description, standing in a dark alley. After detaining Johnson, the officer frisked him and immediately recognized that he had a round of ammunition in his pocket. The officer removed the ammunition and an empty holster covering it. He then canvassed the area and found two pistols less than a foot from where he first saw Johnson. After a grand jury indicted Johnson for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he moved to suppress the pistols, ammunition, and holster, but the district court denied his motion. A panel of this Court reversed. United States v. Johnson, 885 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, op. vacated, 892 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2018). We then vacated that decision and ordered rehearing en banc. We now affirm the denial of Johnson’s motion to suppress because the officer was entitled to seize the ammunition to protect himself and others.

Newsom writes a concurrence saying that both sides have nice totality of the circumstances arguments and that on balance he's with the majority, but he favors bright lines and would end up saying that cops can always seize a bullet:

So in the next “bullet case,” rather than asking—or worse, requiring the responding officer to ask—whether the neighborhood is sufficiently scary, the hour sufficiently late, the light sufficiently dim, and the suspect and scene sufficiently secure, I would simply hold that the Fourth Amendment permits the protective seizure.

Branch agrees (Grant joins) with Newsom but writes separately without all of the nice stuff about the dissents:

Because I conclude that a bullet falls in to the category of “guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer,” id. at 29, and cannot logically be separated from a gun for Terry purposes, I would find that anytime an officer conducts a lawful Terry frisk, the officer may seize any bullet located during the frisk.

Jordan dissents and says, what about originalism? Originalism would not have allowed this to go forward and all of those in the majority who are generally champions of originalism are awfully quiet now:

Relying on Justice Scalia’s originalist position, Mr. Johnson argues that we should construe Terry narrowly, and not extend it to allow the seizure and removal of items that are neither weapons nor contraband. See Mr. Johnson’s En Banc Br. at 18-23. But the majority barely acknowledges this argument, and declines to address its merits. According to the majority, we are bound by Terry, and must therefore ignore the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment.2
The majority is correct that Terry constitutes binding precedent, and that no one on this court can wish it away. But accepting Terry does not require extending its reach on an issue of first impression. Terry permitted pat-downs for weapons, and only weapons. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (“Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow . . . any search whatever for anything but weapons.”). By allowing officers to seize a stand-alone bullet from an unarmed suspect who is in handcuffs and being held at gunpoint by several officers, the majority expands Terry beyond its “narrow scope.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979).

Rosenbaum dissents, arguing that the majority is answering a question that was never briefed or argued:

Today we hold that any ammunition may always be seized during a frisk when the searching officer immediately identifies it as ammunition, regardless of any surrounding circumstances. This is a new rule that we did not ask the parties to address, that neither party briefed, and that the government expressly declined to adopt at oral argument.
Indeed, during oral argument, the Court asked the government, “Once you feel the bullet, the officer can seize the bullet. Is that the government’s position?” Recording of Oral Argument dated Oct. 24, 2018, at 38:58. And the government responded without equivocation, “No, Your Honor.” Id. Then the government explicitly stated, “We are not asking the Court to rule that a bullet in isolation in all circumstances would be sufficient to reach in [to the pocket and seize]; we are asking the Court to apply the facts-specific Fourth Amendment tests that this Court has applied and other courts have applied . . . under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51:34.1
Because we operate only “as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties,” Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 148 n.10 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), once the government disclaimed the per se rule at oral argument, we were left with only two permissible options: apply a true totality-of-the-circumstances test or rehear the case, ask the per se question to the parties and, if necessary, appointed counsel, and analyze the arguments presented. Instead, the Majority Opinion takes a third route and adopts the new per se rule on its own. That new rule may well be correct. Or it may not. But if we wanted to consider such a rule, we should have asked the parties to brief and argue it in this en banc proceeding, instead of asking them to brief and argue a more discrete question.

Judge Rosenbaum is the Kagan of our Circuit. A glimpse here from the conclusion:

Charades may be fun at parties, but not in judicial opinions where officer safety and privacy rights hang in the balance. I therefore respectfully decline to engage in that activity.12
IV.
Today we issue a new rule we did not ask the parties to brief, they did not brief, and the government expressly disavowed. And we do this even though we could have obtained the parties’ input on the question we decide today. I respectfully decline to participate in that activity. The parties’ testing of the issues we decide is and should be the engine that drives our adversarial system.

Jill Pryor's dissent (joined by Wilson, Martin, and Jordan) defends the panel decision:

The panel correctly held that the seizure of a bullet and holster from the pocket of Mr. Johnson—who was compliant with officers’ commands, on the ground, handcuffed behind his back, and held at gunpoint by several officers—constituted an unreasonable seizure under Terry and its progeny. See United States v. Johnson, 885 F.3d 1313, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2018). With respect, I dissent from the majority opinion’s contrary holding.

Roy Altman has been sworn in (UPDATED with news regarding Rudy Ruiz)

Update — The Senate is moving forward with Rudy Ruiz on Monday with the cloture motion ripening.  He should be confirmed early next week.  

Judge Marcus had the honor of swearing in Roy Altman yesterday.  Not minutes later, judges started reassigning cases to Judge Altman!

Here's a nice picture of the event:

Legal writing on display in latest en banc back and forth

This time it's a civil case and it's Judge Newsom for the majority, in which ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, MARCUS, WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges, joined.

Judge Rosenbaum filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARTIN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, joined.

Newsom frames the issue:

Faced with a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff asserting an intentional-discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Protection Clause, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must make a sufficient factual showing to permit a reasonable jury to rule in her favor. She can do so in a variety of ways, one of which is by navigating the now-familiar three-part burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by proving, among other things, that she was treated differently from another “similarly situated” individual―in court-speak, a “comparator.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258–59 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). The obvious question: Just how “similarly situated” must a plaintiff and her comparator(s) be?
To date, our attempts to answer that question have only sown confusion. In some cases, we have required a proper comparator to be “nearly identical” to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). In others, we have expressly rejected a nearly-identical standard. See, e.g., Alexander v. Fulton Cty., 207 F.3d 1303, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2000). In still others, without even mentioning the nearly-identical benchmark, we have deemed it sufficient that the plaintiff and the comparator engaged in the “same or similar” conduct. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). And to make matters worse, in still others we have applied both the nearly-identical and same-or-similar standards simultaneously. See, e.g., Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). It’s a mess.
In an effort to clean up, and to clarify once and for all the proper standard for comparator evidence in intentional-discrimination cases, we took this case en banc and instructed the parties to address the following issue:

The Supreme Court has held that in order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that she was treated differently from another “similarly situated” individual. What standard does the phrase “similarly situated” impose on the plaintiff: (1) “same or similar,” (2) “nearly identical,” or (3) some other standard?

 More:

So, we are left to try to find the sweet spot between Lewis’s squishy not-useless standard and the City’s preferred nearly-identical standard. For reasons explained below, we hold that a plaintiff proceeding under McDonnell Douglas must show that she and her comparators are “similarly situated in all material respects.”

Judge Rosenbaum has this to say about the Majority:

The Majority Opinion tries to hide the “not onerous” elephant in the McDonnell Douglas framework by wishing it away as a mere “descriptor that doesn’t pertain to the substantive standard that governs the prima facie analysis.” Id. In the Majority Opinion’s view, then, the plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie case is “not onerous” with respect to something other than her burden to establish a prima facie case under the substance of the standards governing the prima facie case.
Wait . . . what?
Of course, whether standards are onerous or not governs whether the plaintiff’s burden on the prima facie case is onerous or not. It makes no sense to speak of the plaintiff’s prima facie burden as “not onerous” if the plaintiff must, in fact, satisfy an onerous substantive standard to meet her prima facie burden.