1. Paul Rashkind has been working on Guantanamo cases and he just got a nice win in DC: hearsay is not admissible in the detainee cases. Here's SCOTUSBlog's coverage:
U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton went further than any of his District Court colleagues has gone in cutting back on the Pentagon’s option of proving its detention cases by using a kind of evidence that normally would not be allowed in court — hearsay, as a substitute for direct proof of facts. The judge refused to follow the government’s plea that all of its hearsay evidence about an individual detainee should have a special rank, admitted into court with a presumption that it was reliable unless detainees’ lawyers could show it was not.
Judge Walton’s 12-page order outlining a “framework” for processing government offers of hearsay evidence can be downloaded here.
2. The Federal Defenders are participating in the Race for the Cure of breast cancer this October. If you want to help out, see here. (I fixed the link)
3. Interviews for the U.S. Attorney slot and the District Court slot will happen next Wednesday, September 2. Unfortunately, they are not open to the public.
4. One of the judicial candidates, FPD Kathy Williams, is receiving UM's Lawyers in Leadership Award, which recognizes “dedication to public citizenship and leadership.” Rick Bascuas covers it here.
5. Miami officer pocketed Crime Stoppers reward cash (via Miami Herald). To keep up the PD theme, I'm sure a PD got assigned to one of the defendants in the case.
Here's a great scene from My Cousin Vinny to get you to your weekend. Check out the PD's opening at the 4:45 mark...
The SDFLA Blog is dedicated to providing news and notes regarding federal practice in the Southern District of Florida. The New Times calls the blog "the definitive source on South Florida's federal court system." All tips on court happenings are welcome and will remain anonymous. Please email David Markus at dmarkus@markuslaw.com
Friday, August 28, 2009
Thursday, August 27, 2009
Judge Kozinski champions right to privacy in computers
The Fourth Amendment is not dead... at least in the Ninth Circuit. Judge Alex Kozinksi,* writing for an en banc Ninth Circuit, ruled that many additional safeguards must be put in place before a computer search can go forward. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing. Here's the summary of the holding by Kozinski:
When the government wishes to obtain a warrant to examine a computer hard drive or electronic storage medium in searching for certain incriminating files, or when a search for evidence could result in the seizure of a computer, see, e.g., United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008), magistrate judges must be vigilant in observing the guidance we have set out throughout our opinion, which can be summed up as follows:
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. See p. 11876 supra.
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized personnel or an independent third party. See pp. 11880-81 supra. If the segregation is to be done by government computer personnel, it must agree in the warrant application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora. See pp. 11877-78, 11886-87 supra.
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover only the information for which it has probable cause, and only that information may be examined by the case agents. See pp. 11878, 11880-81 supra.
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done so and what it has kept. See p. 11881-82 supra.
My former law-school classmate, Professor Orin Kerr, has been railing on the decision over at the Volokh Conspiracy. Professor Kerr calls the opinion "breathtaking"** and says that it is light on citations to authority. He goes so far as to say: "This is the most free-wheeling, 'look ma no hands' legal decision I've read in a long time."
I think Kerr has got it all wrong here and that the en banc 9th Circuit has got it right. Computer searches are inherently different than any other type of search. And by the very nature of the search, a search warrant for any type of digital information -- no matter how discreet -- will lead to a search of the entire computer. Nowadays, there is nothing more private than a computer, not even your home. The old 4th Amendment analysis plainly hasn't been working with searching computers. And finally, one court had the courage to say so.
I know this isn't Scalia-Dershowitz, but I challenge my old friend Orin to a debate on whether this case was correctly decided. We can do it in blog posts or email or whatever. I hope he accepts. My first question to the good professor is whether he would agree that computer searches are inherently different than any other kind of search.
*Isn't it interesting that Kozinski wrote this opinion. Remember that he's the guy who had the contents of his computer publicly disclosed.
**Interestingly, the same word was used to describe the government's position: "Judge Thomas, too, in his panel dissent, expressed frustration withthe government’s conduct and position, calling it a 'breath-taking expansion of the ‘plain view’ doctrine, which clearly has no application to intermingled private electronic data.' Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1117."
When the government wishes to obtain a warrant to examine a computer hard drive or electronic storage medium in searching for certain incriminating files, or when a search for evidence could result in the seizure of a computer, see, e.g., United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008), magistrate judges must be vigilant in observing the guidance we have set out throughout our opinion, which can be summed up as follows:
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. See p. 11876 supra.
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized personnel or an independent third party. See pp. 11880-81 supra. If the segregation is to be done by government computer personnel, it must agree in the warrant application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora. See pp. 11877-78, 11886-87 supra.
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover only the information for which it has probable cause, and only that information may be examined by the case agents. See pp. 11878, 11880-81 supra.
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done so and what it has kept. See p. 11881-82 supra.
My former law-school classmate, Professor Orin Kerr, has been railing on the decision over at the Volokh Conspiracy. Professor Kerr calls the opinion "breathtaking"** and says that it is light on citations to authority. He goes so far as to say: "This is the most free-wheeling, 'look ma no hands' legal decision I've read in a long time."
I think Kerr has got it all wrong here and that the en banc 9th Circuit has got it right. Computer searches are inherently different than any other type of search. And by the very nature of the search, a search warrant for any type of digital information -- no matter how discreet -- will lead to a search of the entire computer. Nowadays, there is nothing more private than a computer, not even your home. The old 4th Amendment analysis plainly hasn't been working with searching computers. And finally, one court had the courage to say so.
I know this isn't Scalia-Dershowitz, but I challenge my old friend Orin to a debate on whether this case was correctly decided. We can do it in blog posts or email or whatever. I hope he accepts. My first question to the good professor is whether he would agree that computer searches are inherently different than any other kind of search.
*Isn't it interesting that Kozinski wrote this opinion. Remember that he's the guy who had the contents of his computer publicly disclosed.
**Interestingly, the same word was used to describe the government's position: "Judge Thomas, too, in his panel dissent, expressed frustration withthe government’s conduct and position, calling it a 'breath-taking expansion of the ‘plain view’ doctrine, which clearly has no application to intermingled private electronic data.' Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1117."
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
$$$$
Today's DBR covers the net worth of state court judges and their spouses. No surprise that former AUSA John Schlesinger tops the list as his wife Marilyn Milian is the judge of "The People's Court." But does Billy Shields have a man-crush on Schlesinger (not that there's anything wrong with that)... From the intro to the article:
Miami-Dade Circuit Judge John Schlesinger looks like he could play a judge on TV. Good looking, with a full shock of iron-gray hair and a granite jaw, Schlesinger is telegenic. But it’s his wife, Marilyn Milian of “The People’s Court,” who’s the television judge, and that helps explain why Schlesinger reported a net worth of $7.18 million, including a $2.7 million Coral Gables home, $1.8 million in the bank and a $95,000 Aston Martin sports car.
So DBR peeps, is the federal judge list coming next?
Miami-Dade Circuit Judge John Schlesinger looks like he could play a judge on TV. Good looking, with a full shock of iron-gray hair and a granite jaw, Schlesinger is telegenic. But it’s his wife, Marilyn Milian of “The People’s Court,” who’s the television judge, and that helps explain why Schlesinger reported a net worth of $7.18 million, including a $2.7 million Coral Gables home, $1.8 million in the bank and a $95,000 Aston Martin sports car.
So DBR peeps, is the federal judge list coming next?
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Should judges reject agreed to plea agreements?
We've discussed this issue many times on this blog. If two parties in the adversary system work out a deal, should the judge be able to reject it? (Along the same lines, should a judge be able to reject a civil settlement?) I think the answer is clearly no for reasons I've articulated before.
The issue has come up again, this time out of the district. This time some (alleged?) crooked judges agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a particular sentence agreed to by the prosecutor. The federal judge rejected the deal in this order, in part because of the "scandalous conduct" of the judges.
What say you, readers? Are you persuaded by the court's reasoning? Should judges be permitted to reject the deals made by the parties to the lawsuit?
The issue has come up again, this time out of the district. This time some (alleged?) crooked judges agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a particular sentence agreed to by the prosecutor. The federal judge rejected the deal in this order, in part because of the "scandalous conduct" of the judges.
What say you, readers? Are you persuaded by the court's reasoning? Should judges be permitted to reject the deals made by the parties to the lawsuit?
Monday, August 24, 2009
Bueller, Bueller, Bueller....
Is there a better comedy than Ferris Bueller's Day Off?
Talk to me people. What's going on in Federal Court this week? Is it just going to be more UBS postings...
Summer's over -- there's gotta be something good going on.
You know it's slow when SFL is comparing Tom Julin to Kingpin and Rumpole is already doing football posts. BTW guys, check out this article -- anonymous bloggers are being outed. And is it me, or is it wrong to put someone (this time Richard Hatch) in jail for giving an interview while at a halfway house?
There are times, however, when it's better to just keep quiet.
Friday, August 21, 2009
Judge Zloch slaps UBS cooperator
We covered earlier the UBS defendant who was asking for probation for his extensive cooperation. The government was asking for 2 1/2 years (or a 50% reduction). Judge Zloch today sentenced Bradley Birkenfeld to 40 months, or 10 months more than the government asked for. (Here's the AP story). What say you, readers? When, if ever, is it appropriate for a judge to sentence above the parties' recommendations? (I think the answer is probably never, but I'm happy to hear arguments to the contrary).
11th Circuit update
Thanks very much to JANE MOSCOWITZ for this guest post:
Richard Strafer and Howard Srebnick had a big win in the Eleventh Circuit this week in United States v. Kaley. Judges Marcus, Wilson and Tjoflat reversed and remanded the district court's decision not to permit the Defendants to challenge the pretrial restraint of assets they wanted to use to hire their counsel of choice, Howard Srebnick and Susan Van Dusen. Judge Marcus wrote that the Court was bound by United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1989), which held that a defendant is only entitled to such a hearing if he meets the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. Here, clearly believing that there should have been an evidentiary hearing, the Court determined that the trial court had failed correctly to balance the Defendants’ assertion of their right to a hearing and the prejudice to them of its denial. Judge Marcus especially noted the prejudice to the Defendants of being deprived of their counsel of choice, calling that a “powerful” form and “substantial source” of prejudice. The Court sent the case back for a correct evaluation of the factors to determine whether a hearing should be held.
Judge Tjoflat concurred in a separate opinion in which he held that Bissell should not apply because its use of Barker v. Wingo was “non-binding dicta.” Judge Tjoflat did not find the return of the indictment or the submission of an ex parte affidavit sufficient to determine whether the restrain was proper. He wrote that under the standard procedural due process test of Mathews v. Eldridge, an evidentiary hearing should be held ( a proposition with which Judge Marcus agreed) and should be held pretrial. The resolution of whether assets that are to be used for the payment of counsel of choice may continue to be restrained cannot wait for determination at the trial. He noted that, if the matter is carried along till trial, the “prosecutorial incentives increase the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation in the absence of a prompt hearing. A prosecutor has everything to gain by restraining assets that ultimately may not be forfeited. By doing so, he can stack the deck in the government’s favor by crippling the defendant’s ability to afford high-quality counsel. If the prosecutor can delay judicial oversight of the restraint until trial, he also has nothing to lose, as he does not have to dedicate any extra resources to defending his decision.”
Richard Strafer and Howard Srebnick had a big win in the Eleventh Circuit this week in United States v. Kaley. Judges Marcus, Wilson and Tjoflat reversed and remanded the district court's decision not to permit the Defendants to challenge the pretrial restraint of assets they wanted to use to hire their counsel of choice, Howard Srebnick and Susan Van Dusen. Judge Marcus wrote that the Court was bound by United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1989), which held that a defendant is only entitled to such a hearing if he meets the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. Here, clearly believing that there should have been an evidentiary hearing, the Court determined that the trial court had failed correctly to balance the Defendants’ assertion of their right to a hearing and the prejudice to them of its denial. Judge Marcus especially noted the prejudice to the Defendants of being deprived of their counsel of choice, calling that a “powerful” form and “substantial source” of prejudice. The Court sent the case back for a correct evaluation of the factors to determine whether a hearing should be held.
Judge Tjoflat concurred in a separate opinion in which he held that Bissell should not apply because its use of Barker v. Wingo was “non-binding dicta.” Judge Tjoflat did not find the return of the indictment or the submission of an ex parte affidavit sufficient to determine whether the restrain was proper. He wrote that under the standard procedural due process test of Mathews v. Eldridge, an evidentiary hearing should be held ( a proposition with which Judge Marcus agreed) and should be held pretrial. The resolution of whether assets that are to be used for the payment of counsel of choice may continue to be restrained cannot wait for determination at the trial. He noted that, if the matter is carried along till trial, the “prosecutorial incentives increase the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation in the absence of a prompt hearing. A prosecutor has everything to gain by restraining assets that ultimately may not be forfeited. By doing so, he can stack the deck in the government’s favor by crippling the defendant’s ability to afford high-quality counsel. If the prosecutor can delay judicial oversight of the restraint until trial, he also has nothing to lose, as he does not have to dedicate any extra resources to defending his decision.”
Friday's notes
School's back Monday. To get you in the mood, here's a clip from Back to School:
The DBR reports that the mold lawsuit filed by Ted Klein's family has been dismissed by Judge Story. Apparently, you can only get $1,000 under the Federal Employees Compensation Act when death results from on-duty injuries of a federal employee. Readers, can this law be constitutional? That seems insane to me.
The UBS case keeps going and going and going. This time a banker and a lawyer have been indicted. Via Curt Anderson:
A banker and a lawyer from Switzerland were indicted Thursday on fraud charges for allegedly helping rich Americans evade taxes by hiding assets in Swiss banks, including UBS AG and a smaller Zurich-based institution.
Among the allegations in court documents against banker Hansruedi Schumacher, 51, and 42-year-old attorney Matthias Rickenbach is that they told a New York businessman they paid an unnamed Swiss government official a $45,000 bribe for information on whether the businessman's account would be revealed to U.S. investigators.
Schumacher and Rickenbach each face a single charge of conspiring to defraud the U.S., which carries a potential five-year prison sentence. Prosecutors said both men remain in Switzerland, and it wasn't immediately clear if they had U.S. lawyers to represent them.
The indictment comes one day after the Swiss and U.S. governments unveiled an agreement in which UBS will divulge names of some 4,450 wealthy Americans suspected of dodging taxes through secret bank accounts. Many of those people, and the bankers and attorneys who advised them, could also face criminal charges.
And from the last post, we're debating Plaxico Burress' two year sentence in the comments. Go post your thoughts.
The DBR reports that the mold lawsuit filed by Ted Klein's family has been dismissed by Judge Story. Apparently, you can only get $1,000 under the Federal Employees Compensation Act when death results from on-duty injuries of a federal employee. Readers, can this law be constitutional? That seems insane to me.
The UBS case keeps going and going and going. This time a banker and a lawyer have been indicted. Via Curt Anderson:
A banker and a lawyer from Switzerland were indicted Thursday on fraud charges for allegedly helping rich Americans evade taxes by hiding assets in Swiss banks, including UBS AG and a smaller Zurich-based institution.
Among the allegations in court documents against banker Hansruedi Schumacher, 51, and 42-year-old attorney Matthias Rickenbach is that they told a New York businessman they paid an unnamed Swiss government official a $45,000 bribe for information on whether the businessman's account would be revealed to U.S. investigators.
Schumacher and Rickenbach each face a single charge of conspiring to defraud the U.S., which carries a potential five-year prison sentence. Prosecutors said both men remain in Switzerland, and it wasn't immediately clear if they had U.S. lawyers to represent them.
The indictment comes one day after the Swiss and U.S. governments unveiled an agreement in which UBS will divulge names of some 4,450 wealthy Americans suspected of dodging taxes through secret bank accounts. Many of those people, and the bankers and attorneys who advised them, could also face criminal charges.
And from the last post, we're debating Plaxico Burress' two year sentence in the comments. Go post your thoughts.
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