The Dispatch buys SCOTUSblog

It's the end of an era. 

SCOTUSblog has been acquired by The Dispatch.

There have been rumblings about one of the OG Blogs being sold for a variety of factors (including the arrest of one of the founders, Tom Goldstein).

Now it's official.

Amy Howe, Tom's wife and co-founder of the blog, writes about the sale here:

SCOTUSblog is delighted to announce that it has been acquired by Dispatch Media, Inc., and will round out The Dispatch’s coverage of the Supreme Court and the rule of law.

This blog began nearly a quarter of a century ago as a way to promote our legal work. Over the years, it has evolved into a resource on all things related to the Supreme Court, from soup-to-nuts coverage of the cases argued at the court to retirements, confirmations, and other special features. We have scaled back our coverage in recent years as the costs of that coverage grew, but through our partnership with The Dispatch, we will be able to restore SCOTUSblog’s publishing capabilities, including expanded analysis for all merits cases and oral arguments.

The Dispatch plans to maintain SCOTUSblog as our users have come to enjoy it and will continue to offer its existing content to all readers at no cost — while bringing back some of the site’s most beloved features, such as the Stat Pack. The site will also continue to remain a source of unbiased coverage of the Supreme Court.

Another OG blogger, David Lat, will have involvement in SCOTUSblog.  From Lat's newsletter:

And I’m delighted to share that I have a personal connection to this news: as noted in Steve Hayes’s post, I’m partnering with The Dispatch as it works toward becoming, as Dispatch president Michael Rothman put it, “the definitive source for legal news and analysis in the United States.” So in the weeks and months ahead, expect to hear my voice on Advisory Opinions and read my writing in SCOTUSblog.

When I first entered legal blogging around 20 years ago, launching Underneath Their Robes (2004) and then Above the Law (2006), I drew inspiration from Tom Goldstein and Amy Howe, who founded SCOTUSblog in 2002—so it’s wild for me to think that I’ll now be contributing to SCOTUSblog’s pages. 

Congrats to Tom, Amy, David, and The Dispatch.  SCOTUSblog has always been the place to go for Supreme Court news, and I'm sure that will not change.

Big Win in Helms-Burton Act Case

 By John R. Byrne

Little delay in reporting on this, but a big win for a Cuban-American family against Expedia in the first ever federal jury trial under the Helms-Burton Act. The jury awarded the family $29.8 million, finding that Expedia trafficked in property in Cuba that had been wrongfully confiscated from the family by the Cuban communist dictatorship. Expedia promoted and sold bookings at hotels on the property. Nice win for Andres Rivero and Jorge Mestre's firm. Judge Moreno, who presided over the trial, has ordered further proceedings on damages. Herald covers it here.

Must be 21

By John R. Byrne

Erotic dancers in Jacksonville now need to be of drinking age. The Eleventh Circuit upheld a city ordinance prohibiting erotic dancers under the age of 21 from performing at adult-entertainment establishments.  What’s interesting is that the Eleventh Circuit openly acknowledged that adult entertainment ordinances are effectively graded on a government-friendly curve. Specifically, "although these ordinances are not strictly content-neutral, they are simply treated as such.” So, instead of applying “strict scrutiny” to the ordinance—which would usually kill it—the courts apply the more government-friendly intermediate scrutiny. The reason for this seemingly unprincipled approach is rooted in the so-called “secondary effects” doctrine—the notion that the government really isn’t trying to target a particular kind of speech but, rather, the undesirable effects that flow from that speech (in the case of under 21-year-old erotic dancers, human trafficking).

 

Still, Judge Newsom, who penned the opinion for the majority, also wrote a concurrence, expressing doubt over the “continuing vitality of the secondary effects doctrine.” He wrote: "The problem, as I see it, is that the government’s subjective motivation for imposing a speech restriction—whether virtuous, wicked, or somewhere in between—has nothing to do with the threshold question whether the restriction is, objectively, content- based or content-neutral. That’s a determination to be made on the face of the restriction, not on the government’s underlying purpose or intent."

Probably didn’t help the appellants’ cause that one of the establishments challenging the ordinance goes by “Wacko’s Too”….

 

Opinion below.Wacko's Too Inc. by John Byrne on Scribd

Some Markus news

My dad Stuart Markus was a lawyer in Miami for over 50 years.  He was an amazing lawyer and a better person.  He absolutely loved the law, but more than the law -- he loved people and fighting for the underdog.  When he passed away, we started the "Markus award" at the University of Miami (where he graduated in 1957), for a clinical student who fought for the underdog.  This year, that award went to Julia Steiner, a graduating 3L in the Children and Youth Law Clinic.  
 
Julia has demonstrated exceptional legal skills, diligence, and sound judgment, achieving remarkable outcomes for her clients. Julia's advocacy was powerfully exemplified in a case where she secured a more appropriate home placement for a vulnerable client, a former foster youth who had endured years of instability in the foster care system. The client, who had been subjected to multiple placements, therapeutic foster homes, and psychiatric hospitalizations, was placed at the age of 17 in a home licensed by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD). This facility, intended for adults with severe disabilities, was profoundly unsuitable for the client’s developmental needs, worsening her distress and contributing to frequent Baker Act incidents as a means of escape.
 
While Julie worked alongside her clinic partner, she was the driving force behind this case, navigating a complex web of legal and administrative challenges. The situation was made more difficult by the shifting of blame between two government agencies, and the separation of powers principles that limit the Court’s ability to specify particular placements.
 
Nevertheless, Julia persisted, bringing clarity and resolution to a case that once seemed intractable. She and her partner secured key testimony and a court order declaring the placement inappropriate. When the child welfare agency deflected responsibility to APD, Julia authored a persuasive motion arguing the placement was harming, not helping, her client. She also navigated APD’s administrative system, prompting the Court to involve the agency. When APD proposed restrictive placements outside Miami, Julia effectively argued for her client to stay close to school, support systems, and a vital guardianship program.
 
Julia built a strong, trusting relationship with her client and never stopped advocating. Her skill, persistence, and compassion led to a life-changing result: a more stable, supportive placement as her client enters adulthood. Beyond the Clinic, Julia enriches classroom discussions and recently co-authored a legal article on public nuisance claims in the opioid crisis with adjunct Professor Frank Citera. 

Congrats to Julia -- my dad would be very proud!

In other Markus news, and something else my dad would have been telling all his friends about -- I made an appearance on David Lat's podcast last week.  You can listen to it here.

The judiciary strikes back

 1.  A few weeks ago Gov. DeSantis lashed out at Judge Kathy Williams for her TRO, enjoining the enforcement of a state statute that seemed to encroach on things that were exclusively in fed land.  Yesterday there was a hearing, and it appears that police officers were not told to abide by the TRO.  Judge Williams was.... not happy:

At the court hearing Friday, Williams said she was “astounded” by the state’s arguments and said it was “concerning” to learn that state law enforcement agencies, like FHP, do not work “in concert with state officials.” “When I issued the temporary restraining order, it never occurred to me that police officers would not be bound by it,” Williams said. “It never occurred to me that the state attorneys would not give direction to law enforcement so that we would not have these unfortunate arrests.” Williams expressed her dismay at the state’s actions after a group of lawyers suing the state disclosed that at least 15 people were arrested across Florida after the judge had imposed a halt on enforcing the immigration law.

The state is now complying:

Following the court hearing, Uthmeier told the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the Florida Highway Patrol, the Florida Sheriffs and Florida Police Chiefs to “please instruct your officers and agents to comply with Judge Williams’ directives.” The arrest of the U.S. citizen was made by FHP. While he told law enforcement agencies to follow the court’s order, Uthmeier also made clear that he disagreed with the “scope” of the order. “I must note my disagreement with this order,” Uthmeier wrote in an email obtained by the Herald/Times. “For reasons my office has argued and will further outline in court, this clarification of Judge Williams’ prior order is both wrong on the merits and overbroad in its scope.”

2.  By now, I'm sure you've seen the 4th Circuit Order by Judge Wilkinson.  You should read the whole thing, which starts like this:

Upon review of the government’s motion, the court denies the motion for an emergency stay pending appeal and for a writ of mandamus. The relief the government is requesting is both extraordinary and premature. While we fully respect the Executive’s robust assertion of its Article II powers, we shall not micromanage the efforts of a fine district judge attempting to implement the Supreme Court’s recent decision. 

It is difficult in some cases to get to the very heart of the matter. But in this case, it is not hard at all. The government is asserting a right to stash away residents of this country in foreign prisons without the semblance of due process that is the foundation of our constitutional order. Further, it claims in essence that because it has rid itself of custody that there is nothing that can be done.  

This should be shocking not only to judges, but to the intuitive sense of liberty that Americans far removed from courthouses still hold dear.  

BREAKING -- Finalists for Magistrate Judge

Rossana Arteaga Gomez 

Yeney Hernandez

Jonathan Stratton

Stepanie Turk

Detra Shaw Wilder

"New US Justice Department policy cracks down on social media posts"

 That's the headline for this Reuters article about a new DOJ policy.  From the article:

The directive, which was emailed to U.S. Attorneys' offices late on Monday, appears to prohibit the types of social media posts that Trump's political appointees routinely make on their official government accounts.

The change was made by Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche, who has become frustrated by some of the rhetoric being posted by political appointees, according to one person familiar with the matter.

A Justice Department spokesperson declined to comment.

While the department has always placed restrictions on social media use by employees, such as prohibiting them from discussing non-public investigations or making politically-charged statements that could damage the department's impartiality, the new policy is much broader.

It restricts employees from including their department titles on any social media activity or reposting official government information such as press releases.

Here's the directive in the U.S. Attorney's manual.
But don't worry DOJ lawyers and prosecutors -- I will never rat you out for commenting on the blog or tipping me off to news.  Please keep sending me tips and comments!

Judge Charles Wilson's portrait hanging

On Friday, CA11 Judge Wilson had his portrait hanging ceremony at Jesuit High School in Tampa (his alma mater).  Many of his clerks and the Tampa legal community were in attendance.  Here are some pictures from the event, thanks to a former law clerk who was in attendance.  Thank you for sending them!

Congrats to Judge Robin L. Rosenberg

She was named director of the Federal Judicial Center.  From the Supreme Court website:

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., announced today that the Board of the Federal Judicial Center has selected United States District Judge Robin L. Rosenberg to be the twelfth director of the Federal Judicial Center.

Chief Justice Roberts, who chairs the nine-member Board of the Center, stated, “The Board selected Judge Rosenberg from a number of outstanding candidates. Judge Rosenberg is an experienced judge with a deep interest in education and research and a demonstrated commitment to the Center’s mission. The Board is confident that Judge Rosenberg will be a worthy successor to John Cooke, whom I thank for his seven years of dedicated service as the Center’s director.”

Upon being notified of her selection, Judge Rosenberg said, “I am honored to be selected and grateful for the opportunity to serve the Center and the judiciary in this new role. I strongly believe in the Center’s initiatives and its staff and will work tirelessly to support both as the director.” She plans to assume her new duties in August.

Pretty cool!  

It's unclear whether this will open up a spot in our District or not.  I've heard conflicting views.  We shall see. 

Guest Post By Sydney Stark and Adam Stolz – United States v. Delligatti (2025)

Delligatti And The Cost of Doing Nothing:  Why Failing to Act Means Using Physical Force Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), by Sydney Stark

First, thank you to David Oscar Markus and John R. Byrne for allowing me to submit this guest post. This post will cover the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in United States v. Delligatti, which was the subject of the 2025 Gibbons National Criminal Procedure Moot Court Competition, where my partner, Itiel Wainer, and I represented the University of Miami School of Law. I would also like to thank our devoted coaches, Adam Stolz and Luis Reyes, for their guidance and support throughout the competition and beyond.

    Sometimes the most violent crimes arise from refusing to act at all. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Delligatti held as much, concluding those crimes that can be committed by omission qualify as “crimes of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In other words, doing nothing is still using physical force under certain circumstances as far as § 924(c) is concerned.  

    Delligatti is the Court’s latest decision in a saga of cases interpreting § 924(c), which imposes a mandatory sentence to be consecutively served by an individual found to use or carry a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence (or drug-trafficking offense). Per the statute, an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” § 924(c)(3)(A). The next layer, whether a given crime carries such an element, has been the bane of many jurists in recent years. That’s in large part due to the controversial “categorical approach” federal courts are constrained to apply to determine whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence. Under that framework, courts must focus solely on whether the statutory elements of the crime entail the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force rather than whether the defendant’s actual conduct involved such physical force. If an offense can conceivably be committed in a hypothetical scenario without the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” it does not qualify as a crime of violence subject to § 924(c). The issue presented in Delligatti was whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

    The facts in Delligatti are reminiscent of a classic mobster movie. But all we need for this blog post is the following storyline: Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the notorious Genovese crime family, was convicted in federal court of attempted murder under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute. By virtue of the VICAR statute, his conviction rested on New York’s second-degree murder law, which is committed when one intentionally causes the death of another person. N.Y. Penal Law Ann. § 125.25(1). Because New York permits criminal liability through either a voluntary act or an omission, Delligatti argued that second-degree murder does not necessarily (i.e., categorically) involve the “use of physical force” and therefore falls outside § 924(c)’s definition of a crime of violence. After all, how could doing nothing amount to the act of using physical force? On the other hand, how could attempted murder not be legally categorized as a crime of violence? The Court took up this logical labyrinth and issued a decision last month on March 21, 2025. 

    The Supreme Court disagreed with Delligatti. In a 7-2 decision penned by Justice Thomas, the Court held that “the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the ‘use’ of ‘physical force’ against another person within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A).” Relying on United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, the Court reaffirmed that intentionally causing bodily injury always involves the use of physical force, even when accomplished by omission. Because the predicate offense (NY’s second-degree murder statute) requires an intent to cause death, the Court concluded it necessarily has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 

    Clarifying the scope of a crime of violence, the opinion explained how an omission can nevertheless qualify as using physical force. A defendant who has a legal duty to act but deliberately fails to do so with the intent to cause bodily injury or death still “uses” “physical force” “against the person or property of another” under the law. First, “physical force” encompasses any force that causes injury or death, whether applied directly or indirectly. Second, a person “uses” physical force when they deliberately make the force their “instrument” to cause harm. Finally, “against the person or property of another” requires only that another person be the “conscious object” of the force.

    To illustrate, the Court provided a chilling, extreme example: “a mother who purposefully kills her child by declining to intervene when the child finds bleach and starts drinking it makes ‘use’ of the bleach’s poisonous properties to accomplish her unlawful end.” In other words, inaction can be just as deliberate and violent as an affirmative act. 

    Not all justices were on board. The dissent, written by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Justice Jackson, accused the majority of stretching the ordinary meaning of “use of force.” It painted a stark picture: if a lifeguard intentionally lets a swimmer drown, the inaction may be morally reprehensible and even criminal—but has lifeguard has actually “used” physical force? The dissent said no. 

    The Court’s ruling in Delligatti reinforces that a “crime of violence” under federal law is not limited to overt acts—deliberate inaction with intent to harm qualifies as well. Whether through an affirmative act or omission, those who intend to cause bodily injury or death fall within the statute’s reach. 

RIP Michael Tarre

  A really good guy. I'll miss Michael, who always had a funny comment or story when I saw him. Joel Hirschhorn wrote this amazing and touching tribute to him on the listserv:

Michael Tarre was my best friend ever since the day I met him on the last  Friday in April, 1969. I had filed a Motion to Suppress the seizure of two joints ( in those days a felony). Michael was the assigned prosecutor. His supervisor, Barbara Schwartz. The Judge, Jack Turner. 

 The Motion was to be heard that morning. Michael came over to me just before Court started, introduced himself:

       “Mr. Hirschhorn, I am Assistant State Attorney Michael Tarre. I have read your  

        Motion and I believe it is well taken. I am going to nolle pros [whatever that

        meant  as I had been practicing all of 16 month at the time].”

      I asked Micheal what that meant. He explained: “Case over.” I was overjoyed. Could not believe my luck. I had earned my $750.00 fee. Thrilled, I invited Michael to dinner that night [today you might get indicted for that]. My then wife was less than thrilled because  she was 8 months, three weeks pregnant. Michael and I struck it off immediately during dinner. 

   A week later my eldest son, Bennnett, was born (hence I remember when I met Michael). Of course I had to invite  my new friend Michael to Bennett’s bris. Two and half years later, my other son, Douglas, was born. And of course I invited  Michael to be His godfather, a role Michael took very seriously. And those  of us who were privileged to knew Michael outside his outstanding professional life, recognized how steadfastly and uniquely devoted he was to his sister, Bonnie. 

 Michael had one of the best senses of humor known to man. Sharp, often stinging, but alway well meaning, witty and of course very straight faced funny. For my 30th birthday, March 13, 1973,  Michael gave me an elaborately wrapped and oversized package. Taped to the outside of the gift wrapping was a note: “To the biggest clown in circus court.” What was wrapped inside?, A brand spanking new unicycle. I damn near broke my neck trying to ride it. I can still hear Michael  cackling with laughter.

 Then there were the dozens,  and I mean dozens,  of times Michael  and I tried cases together in Florida, North Carolina  and other States. Michael was easily the most underrated lawyer in the Criminal Bar. Quiet,  but very effective, rock solid, brilliant strategist, sarcastic, humorous. Impossible to adequately describe how great it was to be in the same courtroom in a trial with Michael. Michael’s earning an acquittal for  Judge Howard “Mousie” Gross is legendary. But in typical  Michael fashion he shrugged it off as just another weeks  work in Court. 

  One time he and I convinced a Federal Judge in North Carolina to charge the jury with (what the Fourth Circuit eventually opined) was a non existing crime: Aiding and Abetting a Conspiracy. And there was the time when he and I (and Sky Smith) were trying a case in front of Joe Eaton (one of the greatest Judges ever). Sky’s client had a prosthesis for his left arm and hand. I had to sit next to Michael for three weeks, trying to contain my laughter at his constantly clever  barrage of comments about how the USMS was able/going  to handcuff Sky’s client. 

   I can go on and on. I loved Michael, but I am very angry at him. We had a deal. Michael was supposed to do my eulogy. It was one sentence he crafted in his typical witty fashion:  “No one was neutral about Joel Hirschhorn.” And I in turn agreed to do Michael’s one sentence eulogy: “Everyone who met, worked with,  or opposed, Michael loved him.” Truer words were never written. 

   We all have lost a great lawyer, a remarkable person. I have lost but will forever remember and cherish my best friend.

Joel

Want to be an AUSA?

By John R. Byrne

These jobs don't come around too often. The Miami US Attorney's office has announced vacancies in their criminal, civil, appellate, and asset forfeiture sections. The deadline for applying is April 18, so you'll need to get your application materials together quickly. The district is regularly one of the busiest in the country, trial-wise, and you'll hone your skills going against the best criminal defense bar around.

Congrats to the Gators on winning the school's third national title in basketball last night. Only seven universities have won more than three titles. A good trivia question for you to ponder today. 

DeSantis attacks federal judge (UPDATED with order)

UPDATE -- thanks to a helpful reader, here's the TRO.

Oy vey, here we go again.

This time our executive branch is going after Judge Kathy Williams.

From the Miami Herald:

Gov. Ron DeSantis on Monday called a federal judge an “activist” for blocking the enforcement of a new state law that makes it a crime for immigrants to come into Florida after they entered the country illegally. “Another day, another activist federal judge thinking the judiciary should be setting immigration policy rather than the elected officials,” the Republican governor said in a video posted on X on Monday.

"Activist" seems to mean any judge you disagree with... Instead of going after judges, litigate in court and if you lose, take an appeal  Sheesh.

Here's a Herald article discussing the order, which is just a 14-day TRO.  (Annoyingly, the Herald doesn't post orders that it discusses; if anyone has it, please post it in the comments or email it to me, and I will put it up.)

In the ruling, Williams said the law likely violates the U.S. Constitution because it seeks to enforce an issue that is exclusively reserved for the federal government. “In short, for nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has held that the power to control immigration — the entry, admission, and removal of noncitizens — is exclusively a federal power,” Williams, of the Miami-based U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, wrote.

***

To be charged with the new crime, an individual would need to be at least 18 years of age and law enforcement would need to prove that the person “knowingly” entered or attempted to enter Florida “after entering the United States by eluding or avoiding examination or inspection by immigration officers.” If convicted, a violator would face a mandatory sentence of nine months behind bars. In the ruling, the judge said the state law’s mandatory-detention provision “limits federal law enforcement discretion to recommend pre-trial release and obstructs federal courts’ ability to conduct proceedings requiring defendants’ presence.” “This ruling is a critical victory not only for immigrants and their families across Florida, but all of us who hold dear core principles of our Constitution,” said Bacardi Jackson, the executive director of the ACLU of Florida.

Conviction against attorney Marion Michael O’Steen reversed

From the intro paragraph of Judge Tjoflat's long opinion:

This appeal is the last chapter of a lengthy FBI investigation of the State Attorney for the Third Judicial Circuit of Florida,1 Jeffrey Alan Siegmeister. The investigation began in August 2018, after Andy Tong, whom Siegmeister was prosecuting for maintaining a gambling house in violation of Florida law,2 told the FBI that his attorney, Marion Michael O’Steen, would have to pay Siegmeister $50,000 for a favorable disposition of the case. The investigation concluded in February 2021, when a Middle District of Florida grand jury returned a twelve-count indictment against Siegmeister and O’Steen. Siegmeister was charged in eleven counts, O’Steen in four. Relevant here are Counts One through Four.

Law360 covers it here:

O'Steen, of Cross City, Florida, was convicted on the two charges in June 2022 and acquitted on two other charges of conspiracy to commit bribery and extortion. At trial, prosecutors said that O'Steen requested official acts from Siegmeister, including the favorable disposition of charges filed against his client, to enable O'Steen to get more fees from his clients.

"The offenses alleged in Counts Three and Four are materially unrelated, involve different factual predicates, and are subject to different standards of review. We consider them separately," U.S. Circuit Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat wrote for the panel.

In August 2018, O'Steen allegedly told a client that if he paid an additional $60,000 fee, O'Steen could then use a "favor" with the state attorney to make "everything go away." O'Steen told his client he could go to trial, but he didn't think the client could win and that the client would not get the same result with another attorney, prosecutors said.

That $60,000 was provided as part of an FBI sting — a fact which is key in the appellate court's decision.

O'Steen was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 44 months on those counts, to be followed by a three-year period of supervised release, and was ordered a fine of $45,000 and make restitution to the United States of $60,000.

On appeal, O'Steen's attorney argued that count three must be reversed because "a private citizen cannot be convicted as a principal to extortion under color of official right." O'Steen also argued that under the Hobbs Act, extorted property 'must be actual property of the victim' rather than 'sting money the government provided.'

"We agree. Although the use of government funds as bribe money depletes the funds available to the government, it does not 'deplete[] the assets of an individual who is directly engaged in interstate commerce.' …Therefore, evidence of an alleged extortion involving purely government money cannot establish even the minimal effect on interstate commerce that is required by the Hobbs Act," the appellate court found.

The Hobbs Act prohibits extortion and conspiracies to commit such acts that affect interstate commerce.

On count four, O'Steen argued he was entitled to acquittal because the government failed to provide beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about a 15-day filing period for a Form 8300, which reports the receipt of more than $10,000 in currency, with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

Read more at: https://www.law360.com/whitecollar/articles/2321445?nl_pk=fcc4077e-7182-4fa9-84a6-2b612a7aed76&read_main=1&nlsidx=0&nlaidx=1?copied=1

"I helped defend Reagan’s would-be assassin. Law firms that fear Trump, take note."

 That's the title of Greg Craig's op-ed in the WaPo.  Here's a piece:

 On March 30, 1981, I was a young partner at the law firm of Williams & Connolly working for the firm’s senior partner, Edward Bennett Williams, the leading trial lawyer of his generation and one of the greatest in American history.

That day sticks with me because it was the day that President Ronald Reagan was shot and nearly killed by a young man from Colorado named John W. Hinckley Jr. That night, while watching the evening news, I learned that Hinckley’s parents had contacted my law firm in search of representation for their son.

Early the next morning, I walked my normal route to work down Pennsylvania Avenue, past George Washington Hospital. The large, quiet crowd of TV cameras and members of the media stationed outside the hospital — surrounded in turn by police cars and barriers forming a perimeter around the entrance to the emergency room — reminded me that my firm might well be, at that very moment, considering whether to take on Hinckley as a client.

Because I had worked for two years as a federal public defender in Connecticut, Ed suspected that I would be eager for the firm to take the case. He might have been surprised when I told him we should decline if anyone in the firm had the kind of relationship with any of the shooting’s victims such that taking the case would cause them to leave the firm. I knew that some of the lawyers in the firm might well have worked closely with the president, been friends with his family or with James Brady, the White House press secretary who was grievously wounded and, on that day, close to death.

Ed invited me to participate in the executive committee meeting to explain that concern. Everyone agreed that we should check to see whether anyone in the firm had a close relationship with any of the victims, but on the underlying question of whether to take the case, there was at first no consensus.

The lawyers sitting around the conference table were articulate and opinionated — and they were not shy. The arguments against taking the case were straightforward: Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, there was really nothing that we could do for Hinckley that a public defender could not do for him just as well. In addition, we knew next to nothing about his background. He might have turned out to be a Nazi sympathizer who would try to turn the case into a political show trial.

The economic arguments against taking the case were most compelling. We would eliminate any capacity to build business with the Reagan administration. It was hard to believe that clients who wanted to be on the good side of the administration would ever come to us. Besides that, we would surely lose existing clients who did not want to be associated with a law firm representing a would-be presidential assassin. Having Hinckley as a client could have been a financial disaster for the firm.

After hearing the views of everyone else, Ed finally spoke: “If our law firm isn’t strong enough to take this kind of case — as controversial and as blameworthy as this person is — it would certainly be hard for any other firm to do so.” He went on: “I have seven kids in my family. And I don’t doubt that one day one of them might do something stupid or crazy that would cause me to need a lawyer for him. I would not have much respect for our profession if I called up Arthur Liman at Paul Weiss and told him ‘Arthur, I need your help,’ and he came back and told me: ‘I’m so sorry, Ed. I have consulted my partners, and we think representing your son might do damage to our bottom line. But of course we wish him best of luck.’”

Williams & Connolly took Hinckley on as a client. I was on the team, led by Vince Fuller, that defended Hinckley at trial. The trial lasted three weeks, and the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.

 

 

 

Congrats!!

First, to Chief Judge Cecilia Altonaga and Judge Miguel de la O:

The Henry Latimer Center for Professionalism and the Standing Committee on Professionalism have named Chief Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and Judge Miguel de la O of the 11th Judicial Circuit as co-winners of the 2025 William M. Hoeveler Judicial Professionalism Award.

The annual award recognizes active judges who exemplify strength of character, service, and competence as a jurist, lawyer, and public servant.

Chief Judge Altonaga and Judge de la O “demonstrate the ideals of professionalism and justice while inspiring others to do the same,” according to the Center for Professionalism.

Second, to blog author John Byrne, who was appointed to the Third DCA JNC:

John Byrne of Coral Gables is a partner at Maderal Byrne & Furst. He earned his bachelor’s degree from the University of Florida and his juris doctor from Cornell University. Byrne is appointed from a list of nominees recommended by The Florida Bar for a term ending July 1, 2028.

 Can't believe the Governor's press release didn't mention the blog!

Jewish American Heritage Month Celebration is scheduled for May 8

 You are cordially invited to attend the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s 2025 Jewish American Heritage Month Celebration on Thursday, May 8, 2025, from 4:00 to 5:30 p.m. in the Ceremonial Courtroom (13-3) at the Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr. United States Courthouse, Miami.  This year's program is titled The Resilience of the Jewish People: A Conversation with Dan Senor and United States District Judge Roy K. Altman.  A reception will be held on the 14th floor following the program.

 We hope you can join us for this event!  Please RSVP by May 2, 2025 to:  FLSD_Program@flsd.uscourts.gov