Cohn was born in 1948 in Montgomery, Alabama. He received his Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Alabama in 1971 and his J.D. from the Cumberland School of Law at Samford University in 1974. While at Alabama, Cohn was a member of the Zeta Beta Tau Fraternity.
Cohn served in the Alabama Army National Guard from 1970 to 1972, in the United States Army Reserves from 1972 to 1975, and in the Florida Army National Guard from 1975 to 1976.
Cohn served as assistant public defender in the Broward County Public Defender's Office in 1975 and as assistant state attorney in the Broward County State Attorney's Office in 1975 to 1978.
Cohn was in private practice in Fort Lauderdale, Florida from 1978 to 1995; he worked for a year with the Michael Widoff law firm before beginning his own general trial practice in 1979.
In 1995 Cohn became a judge on the 17th Judicial Circuit Court of Florida.
President George W. Bush nominated Cohn on May 1, 2003 to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, to the new seat created by 116 Stat. 1758. Confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2003, and received commission on August 1, 2003. He took senior status on August 5, 2016.
The SDFLA Blog is dedicated to providing news and notes regarding federal practice in the Southern District of Florida. The New Times calls the blog "the definitive source on South Florida's federal court system." All tips on court happenings are welcome and will remain anonymous. Please email David Markus at dmarkus@markuslaw.com
Friday, August 12, 2016
James Cohn takes senior status
In early August, Judge James Cohn quietly took senior status. It's not even reflected on the court's website yet. Judge Cohn, one of my favorite judges, had the perfect demeanor for a federal judge. Easy going and gentlemanly, yet decisive. Even when he ruled against you, you and your client felt like you got a fair shake. Here's some information about Judge Cohn from Wikipedia:
Thursday, August 11, 2016
Legal Standards -- #ThrowbackThursdayEdition
This
week, the Eleventh Circuit dusted off some old case law for the legal-standards
sections of two published opinions.
In the first, the court, quoting one
of its decisions from 2006, set forth the standard for grants of summary judgment:
We review de novo a grant or denial
of summary judgment, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bridge
Capital Inv’rs, II v. Susquehanna Radio Corp., 458 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th
Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton
Cty., Ga., 466 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In 2010 the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure replaced the word “issue” with “dispute,” supposedly because
it “better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” But—as seen
by this decision—the word “issue” is still quite frequently used.
Regarding motions to dismiss, the Supreme
Court of the United States nearly a decade ago famously wrote that that the “no
set of facts” standard described in Conley v. Gibson of 1957 “ha[d] earned its retirement.” In an important
securities-law decision issued yesterday by the Eleventh Circuit, however, that
“no set of facts” standard came back.
Review of a district court’s
decision to grant a motion to dismiss is conducted de novo. Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2004). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint
as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127
S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual
support are entitled to no assumption of truth,” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). The motion is granted only when the movant demonstrates “beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957); see also Flint v. ABB, Inc., 337 F.3d 1326, 1328–29 (11th Cir.
2003).
Wednesday, August 10, 2016
Caruso and company lead Johnson fight
I missed this DBR article last week, which details the developments with Johnson in the 11th Circuit, including the cert grant in Beckles. Big ups to Michael Caruso, Janice Bergman, and Brenda Bryn for leading this fight. Here's the intro:
Next term, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear a case from the Atlanta federal appellate court that could shorten prison terms for thousands of people.
Miami Federal Public Defender Michael Caruso won a coveted slot on the high court's docket for an issue that's roiling the federal circuits. In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which stands alone on this matter, one judge went so far as to accuse her court of fomenting injustice through unforced errors.
The question for the U.S. Supreme Court is whether possession of a sawed-off shotgun is a crime of violence under federal sentencing guidelines for career offenders. Significant swings in mandatory sentence zones — from up to 10 years to 15 years to life — turn on the answer.
The court ruled a year ago in Johnson v. United States that a similar provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague. A "residual clause" in the definition of a violent felony allows enhanced sentences for any crime involving "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Prosecutors argued that the definition covered nonviolent crimes like drunken driving and attempted burglary.
In Johnson, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for an 8-1 majority that the residual clause invites "arbitrary enforcement." The court decided the wording violates due process, being "so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes," in Scalia's words.
Monday, August 08, 2016
Arrest vs. surrender
It's a dirty little (not-so)secret in our system that cooperators are treated very differently than those who decide to fight. Sometimes those discrepancies are justified, but many times they are not. For example, if you cooperate and agree to plead guilty before charges are filed, you are allowed to surrender and immediately bond out. But heaven-forbid that you want to fight the upcoming charges, you almost will certainly be arrested (at 6am in front of your family) and often-times, there will be a fight over bond. There is simply no reason for this other than to punish people who want to fight. Unless a defendant presents a real danger or risk of flight, he should be permitted to surrender just like the cooperator.
Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miami-gardens/article94388857.html#storylink=cpy
The Opa-Locka case is a good example. The cooperator was (rightfully) permitted to surrender. From the Herald:
On Monday, the 51-year-old administrator surrendered in federal court in Miami on a charge of using his office to pocket thousands of dollars in bribes while shaking down local businesses seeking licenses in one of Florida’s poorest cities.
Appearing in handcuffs and leg braces, the once-popular city manager who resigned from his job last week pleaded not guilty, was granted a $50,000 bond and was released in the afternoon.
Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miami-gardens/article94388857.html#storylink=cpy
According to the Miami Herald, a "sweeping" indictment is coming out soon. Will those defendants be given the same courtesy? Why shouldn't those individuals also be permitted to surrender and post bond as well? Is it a good use of resources to send the SWAT team in full riot gear to a white-collar defendant's home at 6am to arrest a defendant in front of his kids?
Sunday, August 07, 2016
RIP Julie Kay.
How sad. She was such a nice woman and a great, crafty reporter. She really loved scooping everyone on law stories. Here's the DBR obit. Rest in peace Julie.
Daily Business Review reporter Julie Kay so loved her job that when the opportunity arose to join a group of attorneys going to Cuba, she refused to let her battle with cancer get in the way.
Two days after receiving chemotherapy treatment, she boarded a plane with the international law section of the Florida Bar last year. She didn't tell anyone about the treatment because she was afraid she wouldn't be allowed to go.
Kay, 54, died Sunday in Pompano Beach after a 10-year battle with ovarian cancer that included multiple surgeries, chemotherapy and a four-month clinical trial in Houston.
Kay was ferociously private about her health issues to the end, and friends said she saw it as a victory that so many people didn't know she was so ill.
"She never complained about her illness and despised pity," said Sallie James, Kay's friend for more than 30 years. "She was a warrior with the kind of courage that is seldom seen anywhere. Julie loved being a reporter more than anything and always focused her energy on her work instead of her health."
For Kay, journalism was a kind of medicine for the soul. She reveled in finding "juicy" story ideas as business of law reporter at the Daily Business Review for more than six years. Her life revolved around reporting, her friends, and her nieces and nephews.
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