Judge Cannon denies FPD's motion to recuse

 Here's the order, which starts this way:

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant Ryan Wesley Routh’s Motion to Recuse the undersigned (the “Motion”), filed on October 17, 2024 [ECF No. 48]. Defendant presumes my impartiality as a judicial officer but argues that recusal is warranted under the catch-all provision of the federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and the Due Process Clause [ECF No. 48]. This is so, Defendant states, because a combination of circumstances creates an “appearance of partiality” due to the “unique facts and circumstances of this case” and my purported “relationship to the alleged victim” [ECF No. 48]. The United States opposes the Motion, maintaining that Defendant has failed to present a sufficient basis in law or fact to warrant recusal [ECF No. 52]. In Reply, Defendant reiterates his previously articulated arguments and advises of an additional matter which he states “could further add to the appearance of partiality”—namely, that I attended high school with one of the prosecutors in this case and attended his wedding nine years ago during my service as an Assistant United States Attorney in this district [ECF No. 62 p. 6].

Upon full review of the Motion, and fully advised in the premises, I see no proper basis for recusal. The Motion [ECF No. 48] is therefore DENIED.

There are a number of interesting lines in the motion:

Second, Defendant argues that recusal is warranted because former President Trump has made various public statements about me [ECF No. 48 pp. 6–8; ECF No. 62 p. 5]. As Defendant acknowledges, I have no control over what private citizens, members of the media, or public officials or candidates elect to say about me or my judicial rulings [see ECF No. 48 p. 7]. Nor am I concerned about the political consequences of my rulings or how those rulings might be viewed by “some in the media” [ECF No. 48 p. 7]. I have never spoken to or met former President Trump except in connection with his required presence at an official judicial proceeding, through counsel. I have no “relationship to the alleged victim” in any reasonable sense of the phrase [ECF No. 48 p. 1]. I follow my oath to administer justice faithfully and impartially, in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of this country. 28 U.S.C. § 453. And Defendant has identified no practice, much less an established practice, warranting a judge’s recusal because a party, witness, or alleged victim in a judicial proceeding makes public statements—positive or negative—about a judge who lacks any control over such statements.

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This case, like the prior cited cases involving former President Trump, were randomly assigned to me through the Clerk’s random case assignment system. Period. I will not be guided by highly inaccurate, uninformed, or speculative opinions to the contrary.

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Finally, Defendant identifies as an “additional matter” that I went to high school in the 1990s with one of the prosecutors assigned to this case and attended his wedding nine years ago while serving together as Assistant United States Attorneys in this district [ECF No. 62].2 This factor does not supply a basis from which a reasonable observer—equipped with all of the facts and circumstances—would question my impartiality. I maintained a professional friendship with the stated prosecutor during my time as a prosecutor (2013–2020), as I did with other colleagues within the United States Attorneys’ Office. As part of that professional friendship, I attended his wedding nearly a decade ago. I maintain no ongoing personal relationship with the prosecutor, nor have I communicated with him in years. In short, my personal friendship years ago with the prosecutor has no bearing or influence whatsoever on my impartial handling of this case or any other case in which he may appear as counsel of record. Nor has Defendant cited any authority to support the notion that a judge with former government service should recuse from a matter because, years later, a former colleague with whom the judge maintained a professional friendship appears in a case before her. That broad rule, absent more, would be destabilizing, and in any event, it does not supply a basis on this record to support disqualification.