Thursday, September 22, 2016

Is flight from the police = reasonable suspicion or consciousness of guilt?

Many courts have said yes over the years. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).


But the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has rightfully come out the other way in light of recent encounters between black men and the police:
Second, as set out by one of the dissenting Justices in the
Appeals court opinion, where the suspect is a black male stopped
by the police on the streets of Boston, the analysis of flight
as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus cannot be
divorced from the findings in a recent Boston Police Department
(department) report documenting a pattern of racial profiling of
black males in the city of Boston. Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at
495 n.18 (Agnes. J., dissenting), citing Boston Police
Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO)
Study Results, http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/boston-policecommissioner-
announces-field-interrogation-and-observation-fiostudy-
results [https://perma.cc/H9RJ-RHNB].13 According to the
study, based on FIO data collected by the department,14 black men
in the city of Boston were more likely to be targeted for
police-civilian encounters such as stops, frisks, searches,
observations, and interrogations.15 Black men were also
disproportionally targeted for repeat police encounters.16 We do
not eliminate flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion
analysis whenever a black male is the subject of an
investigatory stop. However, in such circumstances, flight is
not necessarily probative of a suspect's state of mind or
consciousness of guilt. Rather, the finding that black males in
Boston are disproportionately and repeatedly targeted for FIO
encounters suggests a reason for flight totally unrelated to
consciousness of guilt. Such an individual, when approached by
the police, might just as easily be motivated by the desire to
avoid the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by
the desire to hide criminal activity. Given this reality for
black males in the city of Boston, a judge should, in
appropriate cases, consider the report's findings in weighing
flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.
Here, we conclude that the police had far too little
information to support an individualized suspicion that the
defendant had committed the breaking and entering. As noted,
the police were handicapped from the start with only a vague
description of the perpetrators. Until the point when Carr
seized the defendant, the investigation failed to transform the
defendant from a random black male in dark clothing traveling
the streets of Roxbury on a cold December night into a suspect
in the crime of breaking and entering. Viewing the relevant
factors in totality, we cannot say that the whole is greater
than the sum of its parts.

Wednesday, September 21, 2016

"Any possibility of unfair prejudice was ameliorated when the district court explicitly instructed the Rhode Island jury not to hold Alcantara's wearing of a Yankees hat against him."

That was the First Circuit explaining why a New England jury could be fair in deciding whether a Yankee fan was guilty:
Alcantara's second claim of evidentiary error runs along
similar  lines.    He  argues  that  a  handful  of  references  to  his 
wearing a New York Yankees baseball cap prejudiced the jury (which
he assumes to have been composed of Boston Red Sox fans) against
him.  As an initial matter, all but two of the cited references
occurred  during  defense  counsel's  cross-examination.    In  any 
event,  this  testimony,  like  the  references  to  luxury  vehicles 
discussed  above,  was  relevant  to  the  witnesses'  knowledge  of 
Alcantara and his appearance.  Any possibility of unfair prejudice
was ameliorated when the district court explicitly instructed the
Rhode Island jury not to hold Alcantara's wearing of a Yankees hat
against him.

Tuesday, September 20, 2016

Should prosecutors experience one day in prison before taking the job?

These Maryland legislators did just that. They should be praised. They wanted to see what prison life was like so that they were more informed about the criminal justice laws they were proposing and voting on. Prosecutors routinely throw out numbers like 5 years, 10 years, or more, without even knowing what one day is like in prison.  Perhaps they should.

From the WP:

The conditions inside the facility were reminiscent of a prison movie: stale air, dim hallways, only the bare necessities. The prisoners described getting about an hour and a half of physical recreation per day, but, depending on where you fell in the lineup for the yard, that could be cut to 45 minutes. Prisoners are allowed outside recreation only four months of the year: June through September. The rest of the year, they are told, is too cold to go outside. Because of lengthy construction projects, some inmates had not been outside for recreation time in more than a year.

On a day when outside temperatures reached 100 degrees, we quickly realized that cellblocks in most state correctional facilities are not air conditioned. It’s so hot that inmates sleep on the floor with their feet in toilet water. Rats infested the food and gnawed through walls.


Monday, September 19, 2016

Jeb exclamation point!

Funny video of Jeb from the Emmys here.

Meantime, all the actors playing lawyers in OJ won.  And Marcia Clark actually attended.





Thursday, September 15, 2016

Should William Pryor and Julie Carnes have recused from Matchett?

Judge Pryor, joined by Carnes, starts his order respecting the denial of rehearing this way (background here):
A majority of the Court has voted not to rehear en banc our decision in this appeal, United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015), which held that the advisory sentencing guidelines cannot be challenged as void for vagueness. As members of the panel (and coincidentally the only members of this Court to have served on the United States Sentencing Commission), we write to explain why we agree with that decision.
We divide our discussion in two parts. First, we explain that Matchett is correct because the vagueness doctrine applies only to laws that regulate the primary conduct of private citizens. Advisory sentencing guidelines regulate judges, not private individuals; they guide judicial discretion within a statutory range. Advisory sentencing guidelines do not define crimes or fix punishments. Second, we explain that Matchett is not worthy of en banc rehearing.
 But as members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, should they have recused? Andrew Hessick argues in this post that they should have:
Judge Pryor does not have a personal interest at stake in the case, but he does have an interest in his capacity as a member of the Commission. Holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to sentencing guidelines protects his work on the Commission from future challenges of that sort.
His participation in the decision also raises separation of powers concerns. The sentencing guidelines are legislative in nature. A judge who both sits on the Commission and rules on the Commission’s guidelines acts as both judge and legislator. Of course, judges sit on committees that create all sorts of rules―evidence, civil procedure, etc. But those committees prescribe rules for the administration of the courts. Sentencing guidelines are different. They prescribe terms of imprisonment. Anxiety about deprivations of liberty at the hands of the government is a major reason the Constitution separates powers.