News & Notes

1.  On Tuesday, the court had its Jewish American History Month presentation at the courthouse.  Judge Leibowitz presided over an interesting panel and his family Norman and Irman Braman were honored.

2.  While we are on Jewish American History Month, Judge Roy Altman's book Israel on Trial is #12 on the New York Times best seller list.

3.  Switching gears, the Haitian murder jury is deliberating.  Day #2 starts today.

4.  Lots of immigration battles occurring now in our courts.  The 11th Circuit had this 2-1 opinion yesterday covering 110 pages of debate between Judges Marcus and Rosenbaum on one side, and Judge Lagoa on the other.  Marcus starts this way:

The question we face today is whether unadmitted aliens found in the interior of the United States are eligible for bond while they go through immigration proceedings. For nearly thirty years, the answer to that question was, for most aliens, “yes.” Last year, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) took a different view. It now maintains that these aliens must be detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). We are called on to decide if the Government’s new reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is correct. Hundreds of district courts and four other circuits have already weighed in, reaching well-reasoned yet distinctly contrary conclusions. See Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025); see also Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-3050, 2026 WL 1223250 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026). This is the first time our Court has addressed the question. In these consolidated appeals, Petitioners -- Fidencio Hernandez Alvarez and Ismael Cerro Perez -- were detained without the possibility of a bond hearing pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). Each challenged his detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). On review of Petitioners’ habeas claims, the district court held that the discretionary detention provisions found in § 1226 governed their detention instead, rendering each of them eligible for bond. The Government appeals that decision. It insists that under § 1225(b)(2)(A), Petitioners -- as aliens present in the United States without having been lawfully admitted -- are “applicants for admission,” and so they must be detained without the possibility of bond unless they can establish clearly and beyond a doubt that they are entitled to be admitted. We are unpersuaded by the Government’s re-interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A). That provision limits no-bond detention to applicants for admission who are “seeking admission,” and on the facts of this case, neither Petitioner was seeking lawful entry into the United States after inspection by an immigration officer when he was arrested, nor was either Petitioner taking any cognizable step to obtain the rights and privileges of lawful entry. In fact, neither Petitioner was pursuing any object, let alone “lawful entry,” when he was detained following a traffic stop. The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that nobond detention generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country, and not to aliens who are simply present here. Finally, we reject the Government’s claim that even if it has misread the INA, Petitioners are now “seeking admission” because they did not voluntarily self-deport after the initiation of removal proceedings. We do not hold that Congress is without the power to authorize the detention of unadmitted aliens who are simply present in the country. That question is not before us. We hold only that Congress has not done so under the provisions found in the INA. Nor do we decide whether either Petitioner is a flight risk or would pose a danger to the community if he were released on bond. That, too, is not before us. We affirm the grant of habeas relief in each of these consolidated cases.

Judge Lagoa starts her dissent:

The majority concedes that “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission,” on their ordinary meaning, are “synonymous.” Maj. Op. 15–16. It then spends fifty pages explaining why the ordinary meaning does not apply. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits disagree. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). So do I. I respectfully dissent.