Dissents from denials from cert at SCOTUS

 There were some interesting dissents today at SCOTUS from denials of cert.  Professor Berman summarized the opinions here:

In Anthony v. Louisiana, Justice Sotomayor dissents from the denial of certiorari, joined by Justice Jackson, and her 15-page dissent concludes this way:

Our criminal justice system holds prosecutors to a high standard. The prosecutor is “the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty.” Berger, 295 U. S., at 88.  From that special role, “improper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none.” Ibid....

These principles demand careful scrutiny of the rare cases in which a prosecutor takes the stand as a sworn witness in a jury trial.  Because this case presents one of the most egregious instances of prosecutorial testimony amounting to prosecutorial misconduct, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s refusal to issue a summary reversal.

in In Khorrami v. Arizona, Justice Gorsuch dissents from the denial of certiorari (which was not joined by Justice Kavanaugh, though he did indicate he would grant the petition).  His 10-page dissent starts and concludes this way:

The State of Arizona convicted Ramin Khorrami of serious crimes before an 8-member jury.  On appeal, Mr. Khorrami sought a new trial, arguing that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution guarantee individuals like him a trial before 12 members of the community....

For almost all of this Nation’s history and centuries before that, the right to trial by jury for serious criminal offenses meant the right to a trial before 12 members of the community.  In 1970, this Court abandoned that ancient promise and enshrined in its place bad social science parading as law.  That mistake continues to undermine the integrity of the Nation’s judicial proceedings and deny the American people a liberty their predecessors long and justly considered inviolable.  Today’s case presented us with an opportunity to correct the error and admit what we know the law is and has always been.  Respectfully, we should have done just that.

In Chinn v. Shoop, Justice Jackson dissents from the denial of certiorari, joined by Justice Sotomayor, and her 2-page dissent starts and concludes this way:

This is a capital case involving a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). There is no dispute that, during the capital trial of petitioner Davel Chinn, the State suppressed exculpatory evidence indicating that the State’s key witness, Marvin Washington, had an intellectual disability that may have affected Washington’s ability to remember, perceive fact from fiction, and testify accurately....

Because Chinn’s life is on the line, and given the substantial likelihood that the suppressed records would have changed the outcome at trial based on the Ohio courts’ own representations, see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011), I would summarily reverse to ensure that the Sixth Circuit conducts its materiality analysis under the proper standard.